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Abstract
This thesis is an examination of the opposition to the redevelopment of a fruit and
vegetable wholesale market in Spitalfields, east London. I argue that such
opposition has not received the attention it deserves in the literature on urban
redevelopment. The thesis examines the origins and establishment of the
Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers, and examines its discourse in
order to ascertain where the roots of the Campaign's opposition lay. After
outlining the methodology used in the research, the history of the market is
examined within the context of the Spitalfields area. Previous plans for
redevelopment are discussed and attention then focusses on plans put forward in
1986. The role of the City of London Corporation, the government and the
Spitalfields Development Group are explored and stress is laid on the ways in
which these three institutions portrayed redevelopment as a mechanism for inner
city renewal, for the benefit of all interested parties. The Campaign to Save
Spitalfields from the Developers is then studied, looking at its make-up and its
arguments over the impact of redevelopment on Spitalfields. Its origins within the
local Labour Party and the local voluntary sector are traced and the influence of
these bodies on the Campaign in terms of its arguments and ideas on
redevelopment are illustrated. The ways in which the Campaign represented
redevelopment in the area are then discussed. The portrayal of Spitalfields as a
multicultural community area and immigrant area are discussed, and the images the
Campaign constructed of the City of London and of the likely face of Spitalfields
examined. I argue that these representations are important in elucidating a reason
for the Campaign's opposition. I then examine these representations of
Spitalfields in the light of the Campaign's claims to representativeness. I examine
the ways in which the Campaign dealt with the emergence of another group in the
area, and indicate what I understand to be the sources of the Campaign's
discomfort with this group. I conclude by arguing for further study of opposition
movements that emerge to protest against urban redevelopment, and by arguing for
an intensive qualitative research methodology.
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Chapter One
Motivations and Method
This thesis is concerned with a critique of oppositional action in response
to redevelopment in East London. It explores the activities of a locally-constituted
group of people, the Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers, in their
attempts to prevent the relocation of Spitalfields fruit and vegetable wholesale
market from its present site by its owners, the City of London Corporation, and
the construction in its place of an office complex by a development company called
the Spitalfields Development Group.
Redevelopment in urban areas is currently changing the face of cities
worldwide, a process exemplified in London. The City of London and its fringe -
areas such as that to the east - are being rebuilt and transformed on a hitherto
unprecedented scale. The redevelopment of areas of docklands downriver from
Tower Bridge in London, being redeveloped under the auspices of the London
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) are an example of this. Inner urban
areas are being redeveloped for the needs of the finance sector, that renewal being
promoted by the government and developers alike as a solution to the problems of
the inner city. That promotion is undertaken through a discourse which legitimizes
such activities. The Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers (CSSD)
was established in October 1987 with the aim of preventing the redevelopment
planned for Spitalfields and the removal of its 300 year old fruit and vegetable
wholesale market. They opposed it on the grounds that such a development would
have dire consequences for the area and its people. In opposing the relocation of
the market they countered a set of arguments justifying the redevelopment with
arguments of their own. It is those arguments and the representations of the area
that the Campaign constructed, and the consequences of that which constitute the
focus of this story.
An original aim of this thesis was to look at the Spitalfields redevelopment
and its opposition and to theorize a democratic alternative as to how the future
form and function of inner urban areas could be decided by the people who live
there. In conceptualizing the roots and construction of such oppositional action,
the task was to contribute to that action. However, in the course of the research it
became clear that the activities and discourse of the opposition group under study
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required closer examination because of the questions that arose concerning the
power relations between not only the Campaign and its opponents (the City, the
developers and the Government) but also between the Campaign and its
constituency that appeared and were mediated through its discourse. These
questions form the basis of this thesis. The aim is to provide a critique of the
political discourse of this opposition group. But why this research topic?
The Motivation
The redevelopment - economically and physically - of urban areas has
received copious attention within urban studies. Some accounts seek to explain
the processes transforming the face of cities, and their associated social, economic
and political implications, with reference to the restructuring of the global
economy. A recent collection edited by Smith and Feagin, which could be viewed
as part of the urban political economy school, exemplifies this approach. 1
 The
collection documents changes in global economic restructuring and its impacts in
various places throughout the world with the aim of highlighting the various
responses at a number of scales and in different sectors of social, economic and
political life. The overall aim is to theorize the links between macro economic
processes and responses at the local leveL Another collection edited by Parkinson,
Foley and Judd examines urban renewal in the US and UK in a similar vein.2
Other accounts are directed more towards the policy initiatives taken by th €
/ governmenand its predecessors towards the inner city, which have included in
recent years an encouragement of redevelopment financed by the private sector,
promoted as an ameliorative strategy to the governmentally-perceived problems of
inner city areas. 3
 Assessments have been made of ideological considerations
notably concerning the ways in which the role of the market and public sector
1 Smith, M.P. and Feagin, J.R. (eds) (1987) The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring am1
Community Politics. Blackwell, Oxford.
2Phnson, M., Foley, B., and Judd, D. (eds) (1988) Regenerating the Cities: The UK Crisis
and the US Experience. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
3Gibson, M.S. and Langstaff, Mi. (1982) An Introduction to Urban Renewal. Hutchinson,
London. Byrne, D. (1989) Beyond the Inner City. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
Robson, B. (1988) Those Inner Cities: Reconciling the Social and Economic Aims of Urban
Policy. Clarendon, Oxford. Donnison, D. and Middleton, A. (eds) (1987) Regenerating the
Inner City: Glasgow's Experience. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Davies, H.W.E. (1981)
The Inner City in Britain. in Schwartz, G.G. (ed) (1981) Advanced Industrialisation and the
Inner Cities. Lexington, Massachusetts. pp. 1-36; Clark, D. (1989) Urban Decline.
Routledge, London.
9
interests have impacted on urban policy with unforeseen and limiting results.4
Alternative strategies proposed by bodies such as the Greater London Council
(GLC) have also been assessed.5
As these and other accounts of urban redevelopment illustrate, the
engagement of the people living in areas affected by redevelopment with such
schemes has received little attention. For example, the regeneration of London
Docklands by the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), and the
experiences of other Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) in Britain have
received a great deal of attention within urban studies. 6 The actions of people
opposing the developments facilitated by the development corporations and other
organisations have not. 7 This is strange and lamentable. Perhaps it is explained
by urban geography's concentration on theorizing spatial form and process, and
with a concern shared with other areas in social science for policy-orientated
research. Either way, the reactions of people to urban redevelopment have to a
great extent been ignored. Redevelopment in urban areas affects a lot of things -
an area's form, its function, its social, political and economic milieux - it has a
direct impact on the people who live in affected areas. It has been an aim of this
research to start to redress this imbalance.
The redevelopment of urban areas is often contested and thus is often
political because it involves the struggle between groups for the imposition of
particular forms and meanings on an area. For Wilson and subsequent writers, the
process known as urban redevelopment or urban renewal (I use the terms
interchangeably) is recognized as being inextricably political by definition:
[Urban renewal is] the redevelopment or rehabilitation of the
older parts of towns and cities, including their central business
areas. In practice, urban renewal, so described, has often
4Lawless, P. (1988) British Inner Urban Policy Post 1979: A Critique. Policy and Politics 16
pp. 261-275.
5MacKintosh, M. and Wainwright, H. (eds) (1987) A Taste of Power: The Politics of Local
Economics. Verso, London.
6Ambrose, P. (1986) Whatever Happened to Planning? Methuen, London. Church, A. and
Hall, J. (1986) Discovery of Docklands. Geographical Magazine 58 pp. 632-639. Church, A.
(1988) Urban Regeneration in London Docklands: A five-year Policy Review. Environment and
Planning C 6, pp. 187-208. Church, A. (1988) Demand-led Planning, the Inner City Crisis and
the Labour Market: London Docklands Evaluated, in B.S. Hoyle, D.A. Pinder, and M.S. Husain,
(eds) (1988) Revitalising the Waterfront: International Dimensions of Docidands Redevelopment.
Beihaven Press, London. Ward, R. (1986) London: The Emerging Docklands City. Built
Environment 12, pp. 114-127. Short, J. (1989) Yappies, Yuffies and the New Urban Order.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 14 pp. 173-188.
7A notable exception is the work of Brownill on the People's Plan for the Royal Docks.
Brownill, S. (1987) The Politics of Local Change: A Case Study of the People's Plan for
Newham's Docklands. Ph.D. thesis, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of
Birmingham.
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meant the displacement of an existing low income population,
creating space for more profitable office, commercial and
luxury residential development or the provision of transport
facilities.8
That displacement can cause reaction from those affected by it. Redevelopment is
therefore political because people affected by it engage with it. People can take
action against the things that they feel will affect them; they join movements in
order to change things at the local level, because that is the scale at which they are
affected and at which they experience the consequences of change in urban areas.
As Castells has rightly, I think, pointed out:
They may be unable to control the international flows of
capital, but they can impose conditions on any multinational
wishing to set up in their community... They will support
representative democracy, but they go to the city council
meeting en masse both to remind their representatives that they
are there to represent them, and so to exercise some control.
So when people find themselves unable to control the world,
they simply shrink the world to the size of their community.9
I am not suggesting that all people affected by urban redevelopment schemes do
engage with that redevelopment process. What I am suggesting is that when such
reaction occurs it is worth studying and the conditions of action assessed.
Some geographers have looked at social process using Castell's
theorisations on urban social movements as a basis. 10
 Such a framework was not
considered for this thesis because of the incompatibility between the empirical
evidence of this research and the criteria for identifying and examining urban social
movements developed by Castells and subsequent writers. Monographs
documenting the action taken by people in opposition to unwanted changes in their
areas illustrate another way in which such studies of oppositional action may be
8Wilson, J.Q. (1966) Urban Renewal; the Record and Controversy. MIT Press, Boston.
Quoted in Gibson, M.S. and Langstaff, MJ. (1982) An Introduction to Urban Renewal.
Hutchinson, London.
9castells, M. (1983) The City and the Grassroots. Sage, Beverley Hills. p.33 1.
10Castells, M. (1983) The City and the Grassroots. Sage, Beverly Hills. For example, see
Drakakis-Smith, K. (1989) Urban Social Movements and the Built Environment: An Analysis
of Housing Provision in North Australia. Antipode 21 PP. 207-23 1; Cox, K.R. (1988) Urban
Social Movements and Neighbourhood Conflicts: Mobilisation and Structuration. Urban
Geography 9 pp. 416-428; Fainstein, S. (1987) Local Mobilisation and Economic Discontent.
in Smith, M.P., and Feagin, J.R. (eds) (1987) The Capitalist City. pp. 323-342; Smith M.P.
and Tardanico, R. (1987) Urban Theory Reconsidered: Production, Reproduction and Collective
Action. in Smith, M.P. and Feagin, J.R., (eds) (1987) The Capitalist City. pp. 87-110. For
developments of Castells theories of urban social movements see also Pickvance, C. (1985) The
Rise and Fall of Urban Movements and the Role of Comparative Analysis. Environment and
Planning D - Society and Space 3 Pp. 31-53; Lowe, S. (1986) Urban Social Movements: The
City After Castells. Macmillan, London; Fincher, R. (1987) Defining and Explaining Urban
Social Movements. Urban Geography 8pp. 152-160.
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undertaken - by descriptive accounts, documenting stuggles and actions of
resistance. 11
 For example, the opposition that arose in response to the relocation
of Covent Garden fruit and vegetable market and the redevelopment on that site
has been documented by Anson, a planner initially involved in the redevelopment
plans who changed sides and helped organise the residents group that attempted to
have an impact on the plans for the area.12
 Anson's account provides valuable
evidence of the reactions of a group of local residents to the redevelopment plans,
and an example of the way in which this research could have been written up. His
account is however, uncritical of the group with which he was associated and
lacks any substantive conceptualisation of the logic and actions of that
organisation, beyond vague appeals to class analysis as an aid to understanding the
origins and trajectory of that movement. Similarly the redevelopment of Tolmers
Square in Euston is documented by Wates, again an 'insiders' account of
opposition to unwanted plans for redevelopment and the formulation of
alternatives. 13
 Again, this account, whilst a valuable record of events, does not
develop questions concerning the formation of the Tolmers Square Village
Association and the construction of its arguments.
This research has aimed to document opposition to to the redevelopment of
Spitalfields in East London, quite simply on the grounds that opposition to
redevelopment had never been examined fully and critically. This thesis is
therefore primarily a contribution towards the literatures on urban redevelopment.
The Case Study
Given that I wanted to study opposition to redevelopment, on the grounds
that it has been all but ignored, or at best simplified, the question then arose as to
how it should be studied. What methodologies should be employed, what
questions should be asked of the material and how should that material be
conceptualised? A case study approach appeared to be suitable for this research.
Case studies are generally accepted as being good descriptive devices from which
' 1 Gon M, and Kennedy, M. (1987) Capital Investment or Community Development? The
Struggle for Land Control by Boston's Black and Latino Community. Antipode 19 pp. 178-209.
Herschkovitz, S. (1987) The Expansion of Offices into Residential Areas: Organized Social
Protest in a Threatened Neighbourhood. Geoforum 18 pp. 165-172.
l2,ijn, B. (1981) I'll Fight You For It! Behind the Struggle for Covent Garden. Cape,
London.
N. (1976) The Battle for Tolmers Square. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
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to illustrate the inter-related nature of the elements in a situation' 4, or as a way of
organising social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object
being studied. 15 As Castells points out, they are praised in that they permit in-
depth analysis and blamed for their singularity and their disallowance of
extrapolation. However, the general value of any observation depends on the
purpose of its use.' 6 The general strategy has been to seek out relations in order
to explain or develop theory, as Pahi suggests.'7 For as Burgess and Mitchell
both note, the case study can yield complexly inter-related facts and information,
from which certain theoretical principles can be abstracted. 18 Some types of
inquiry in social science are not usefully explored with case studies. If the aim is a
search for typicality and the exposure of trends and patterns, case studies may be
avoided because it is so difficult to discern the extent to which they are typical.'9
The search for representativeness is not necessarily the aim of such intensive
research strategies.20 Although there are certain features of this case study that
will be applicable to similar situations elsewhere, the importance of this case study
lies in the conceptual ideas developed from this research. What is important is not
the applicability of the research findings to other cases. The validity of the case
study, as Mitchell points out, lies with the cogency of the theoretical reasoning
behind it and the mode of conceptualization of the material.21
I chose therefore to base my examination of opposition to redevelopment
on a single case study, that of the experiences of the Campaign to Save Spitalfields
from the Developers. Through my examination I have aimed to pick out certain
points and develop particular ideas concerning the study of opposition to
redevelopment. These will be clear during the reading of my study. But the
question still remains concerning my arrival at those conclusions. Given that I
have been unable to fmd any clear maps or plans to help guide my way through the
material, any indications in the literature as to how this material might be
approached beyond illustrations of what I should not do, how did I arrive at the
questions I have asked of this material? The methodology that I adopted used an
l4p	 R.E. (1987) Divisions of Labour. Blackwell, Oxford. p.146.
15Goode WI. and Hatt P.K. (1952) Methods in Social Research. MacGraw Hill, New York.
p.33!. Quoted in Pahi, R.E. (1987) Divisions of Labour. Blackwell, Oxford, p.146.
16Castells, M. (1983) The City and the Grassroots. Sage, Beverley Hills. p.xxix - xx.
l7p, R.E. (1987) Divisions of Labour.
18Burgess, R.G. (1982) Field Research: a Source Book and Field Manual. Allen and Unwin,
London. p.236. Mitchell, J.C. (1982) Case and Situation Analysis. p.191. Sociological
Review 31 pp. 187-211.
'9Fothergill, S. and Gudgin, G. (1985) Ideology and Methods in Industrial Location Research.
p.104. In D. Massey and J. Allen (eds) Politics and Method. Methuen, London. pp. 92-115.
2O	 Sayer, A. (1984) Method in Social Science. Hutchinson, London. p.222.
21Mitchell, J.C. (1982) Case and Situation Analysis. p.207.
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examination of the discourse of the Campaign, and I shall now explain why I
thought this helpful in examining my material and finding questions to ask of it.
My first concern with examining my material was to find a way to assess
what the Campaign did, how they did it, and why. The first two questions could
be answered easily enough through a narrative and commentary on the
Campaign's actions. But explaining the Campaign's actions in terms that refered
to their context and explained their actions without reference to a hidden 'reality' or
set of formations outside their own 'reality' seemed difficult until I started to
consider the possibilities for my examination of the Campaign that would be
opened up through an examination of the Campaign's discourse. As Connolly
notes:
Because the discourse of politics helps set the terms within
which that politics proceeds, one who wants to understand and
assess the structure of political life must deliberately probe the
conventions governing those concepts.22
If an examination of discourse is helpful in understanding political life, we must
first define what we mean by the term 'discourse', and then ascertain why it
should be so helpful in understanding the logics of political action.
It seems to me that definitions of discourse abound, but that most agree on
certain points. Thompson, for example, sees discourse as the 'actually occuring
instances of expression which appear in the flow of a conversation, text or similar
form'. Discourse and thus its analysis is therefore primarily concerned with the
study of language:
The language of politics is not a neutral medium that conveys
ideas independently formed; it is an institutionalized structure
of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain
directions.
Laclau and Mouffe take that definition further to equate discourse with that totality
which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic. 25
 Thus anything
that signifies or has meaning can be considered as part of the discourse. Meanings
can be embodied in technical processes, institutions, patterns of general behaviour,
22Connolly, W.E. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse. Martin Robertson, Oxford,
Second Edition. p.1.
23 Thompson, J.B. (1987) Language and Ideology: A Framework for Analysis. The
Sociological Review 35 pp. 5 16-536.
Connolly, W.E. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse. p.!.
25Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1987) Post-Marxism Without Apologies. p.82. New Left
Review 166 pp. 79-106.
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forms for transmission and diffusion and pedagogical forms. For Macdonell, any
technique in and through which the social production of meaning takes place may
be considered part of the discourse.26
 For Laclau and Mouffe, this means that
every social configuration is meaningful. '(0)bjects are never given to us as mere
existential entities; they are always given to us within discursive articulations'.
The work of Foucault is most useful is determining guiding rules for the
detection of discursive formations. He has emphasised the rules of formation
through which groups of statements achieve a unity. Foucault proposes sets of
criteria for determining whether or not a group of statements constitute a unity.
Reference may be made to a common object of analysis. A certain manner of
preference or mode of statement may be present. A system of permanent and
coherent concepts may be deployed. An identity or persistence of theoretical
theme may be identified. A discursive formation may be identified where an order
exists, this regularity being constituted by the presence of a systematic dispersion
of elements within these criteria.28
26Macdonell, D. (1987) Theories of Discourse. Blackwell, Oxford. p.4.
271ci E. and Mouffe, C. (1987) Post-Marxism Without Apologies. p.82.
28Foucault, M. (1972) (1989) The Archaeology of Knowledge. Routledge, London.
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In actually attempting discourse analysis as a methodology with which to
examine the material collected during the research for this thesis, I relied heavily on
Edward Said's interpretation of discourse as expounded in his work on
Orientalism. 1
 Said himself recognises the debt he owed to Foucault's writings on
discourses and their examination.2
 Said's conceptualisation of discourse was
useful in that it allowed an ordering of the material to take place which allied closely
with the categories in the data which I had constructed semi-intuitively whilst that
data was collected, categories such as the construction of the Campaign by
themselves as a group representative of the area within the context of the local
political milieu of Spitalfields, and to the construction of a set of images and ideas
about Spitalfields by the Campaign. It was possible to identify in relation to the
Campaign a discursive formation. A discursive formation may be defined as a
system of concepts which acts as a framework which in turn incorporates specific
combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies and practices, and which then in
turn refer, and are relevant to, social action. To return to Foucault's prescription
above, I would argue that the Campaign might be identified as sitting within and
constructing a discourse because they refered to a common object of analysis, in a
specific manner, underpinned by a particular system of concepts and a specific
theoretical framework for interpreting the social world.
With this analytical framework in mind, using Said's study of Orientalism I
made the decision to draw from his work two themes around which I could base
my examination of the Campaign's discourse. Firstly, Said uses in his work the
idea that the examination of discursive formations might reveal the power relations
which those discourses support. This is because any discourse will concern itself
with certain objects and puts forward certain concepts at the expense of others. A
discourse will delimit specific topics for consideration and has the power to include
them within its remit, or conversely, to exclude them. It is this aspect of discourse
which renders its study fruitful with regard to any aims for a consideration of
relations of power and their operation. An examination of discourse involves
questioning how that linguistic and non-linguistic totality of meanings may serve to
control, dominate, include and exclude. 3
 In addition, and as Macdonell points out,
a discourse takes effect directly and indirectly through its relation or address to
another discourse.4
 With the aid of discourse analysis, therefore, it is both possible
1Said, E. (1978) Orientalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
2ibid p.3.
3c.f. Said, E. (1978) Orientalism. p.3.
4Macdonell, D. (1987) Theories of Discourse. p.3.
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and necessary to ascertain how one discursive construction may be negated by
another.
Secondly, Said also points to the importance of identifying within
discursive constructions the representations of material and social entities that are
constructed as a means to an end. Discourses have the power of inclusion and
exclusion; they also have the power to name things as they wish. During analysis,
Said asserts, one should accord priority to the idea that that which is circulated
within a discourse will not be the 'truth' about an object but rather representations
of that object.5 A set of statements of whatever kind relating to an object will
contain within them a set of meanings, the examination of which will indicate a
purpose behind them, a set of arguments about the purpose of that object. An
awareness and sensitivity towards language is crucial here; language is a highly
organized and encoded system, employing many devices to express, indicate,
represent and exchange messages and information. The value, efficacy, strength
and apparent veracity of a written statement about the object with which the
discourse is concerned relies very little on the original subject of the discourse, but
rather on the representation that is carried within that discourse. Discourse is about
representation as a means to an end. Underlying all the different units of a
discourse - the vocabulary used whenever the subject of the discourse is spoken or
written about - is a set of representative figures. 6 It is those representations, their
position and their significance, which constitute the focus for inquiry within
discourse analysis, with the ultimate aim of establishing the outcome for that
discourse (and for the users and constructors of that discourse) of that
representation.
Therefore following Said the task appeared to be to identify the sites of
confrontation between discourses, and the construction of representations or images
within these discourses. This would then mould the material in such a way as to
enable the construction of a text which would allow the power struggles within the
story - the confrontations between the Campaign and groups such as the developers
and other groups active in the area - and the representations constructed by different
actors in the story - the images constructed of Spitalfields, for example - to become
apparent as the reader progressed through the text. This was undertaken, in crude
terms, by examination of both the medium and the message of the story - the ways
in which positions and arguments were proposed and expounded, in both the public
5Saici, E. (1978) Orientalism. p.21.
6ibid. p.11.
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and private domain, and the ways in which the messages, the arguments and
representations of the parties concerned were delivered.
The methodology used to both identify the discourses important to the
story, their sites of confrontation, their representations, their mode of delivery and
their messages, was very straightforward. The material at my disposal was
diverse, ranging from notes and documents relating to the background of the story,
through to observations from meetings, via interviews of varying types with people
connected with the redevelopment story.7 That material was systematically
examined with the aid of highlighter pens and certain groups of statements relating
to particular material or social entities defined. For example, collections of
statements on the representation of women, on portrayals of the City of London, on
images of Spitalfields, and on perceptions of other so-called community groups
working in the area were drawn together. Much of this activity was intuitive;
having spent a great deal of time with the Campaign, I knew that certain ideas were
very important to them as a group, for example, the importance of the Labour Party
in their minds both to Spitalfields and to the Campaign. Sometimes the results of
this activity were suprising to me, for example, in relation to a particular group of
statements on the history of the area and the meaning of immigration for some
members of the Campaign. I called these groups of statements, very loosely,
discourses, on the grounds that these statements worked together systematically to
reveal ideas about power relations and the use of representations that otherwise
remained obscured when they lay embedded in the mass of material collected.
A second stage, involving the actual analysis of these discourses, was far
more difficult. It involved not only working through these discourses and
attempting to ascertain what they said, but also debating consistently (and mostly
with myself) the validity or otherwise of the interpretations I was imposing on them
and attempting to construct and structure a text which would reveal these discourses
whilst telling a story. Actually describing that process in any detail, perhaps for the
purposes of replication by another, is problematic, because with the benefit of
hindsight one glosses over or forgets the problems entailed in this process, but
which were integral - crucial, even - to the success of this process. In brief, I took
those statements relating to the power relations entwined within the Campaign's
discourses and separated them out from those relating to the construction of
representations and images by the Campaign. Once a collection of statements and
positions was assembled, relating to conflicts and tensions between groups, it was
i detail these types of material and their collection below.
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then possible to identify discourses of redevelopment and opposition which
interacted with one another, and to note how this interaction resulted in
developments that produced further aspects of the story under study. Chapter Six,
dealing with the confrontations between the Campaign and another group at work in
the area, was written as a documentation of the consequences of the conflict
between two discourses. A similar technique was used in Chapters Two and Three
in order to highlight the sites of conflict between the discourses of redevelopment
and opposition of the developers and the Campaign respectively. 8
 In Chapters
Four and Five, I focus on the construction of discourses as a means of
representation, looking at the conventions, codes of understanding and traditions
that were constructed around the idea of Spitalfields, which included elements of
the area's history and comment on the population composition of the area. The
focus here is weighted more towards a consideration of the construction of
particular representations of Spitalfields for specific ends. 9
 Whilst there is some
overlap between the two categories in the final text, this crude division still holds;
Chapters Three, Four and Six relate mainly to the Campaign's relations with other
groups in the area, opposed and supporting, current and historical, whilst Chapter
Five concentrates on the representations of Spitalfields constructed by the
Campaign for its own ends. Once separated out, and often with no clear idea of
any conclusions that I would draw, I then constructed a text using the material
gathered during the fieldwork, broken down into sections and subsections. In
many cases, only when this process was complete, (and often after extensive
writing and re-writing) was it possible to then summarise the conclusions about the
Campaign's discourses that were being examined at each point, and insert those
conclusions into the text.
8 t is to my regret that a closer inter-weaving of the two views by way of analysis of conflict
between the two discourses was not possible because of the lack of parity in my material on the
developers when compared with that on the Campaign.
9Again, my lack of material on the construction of Spitalfields by the developers meant that I
could not undertake a direct comparison of the discursive strategies of both the developers and the
Campaign as they interacted.
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This idea of representation and its power gave me a conceptual tool with
which to examine the matices of power in which the Campaign sat. It helped me,
as Chapter Five will demonstrate, to examine the ways in which Spitalfields was
portrayed by the Campaign and from those representations find a way to
conceptualise power relations that I could observe to be in operation. In short, by
examining the Campaign's discourse I have been able to determine where the roots
of the Campaign's arguments lay, and tackle questions concerning the
motivations, functions and consequences of their political action. I have been able
to examine the material collected in the course of the research and produce my
interpretations of what, how and why the Campaign argued what they did.
Methodology and Research Techniques
So far in this introductory chapter, I have explained why I chose to
research the topic of opposition to redevelopment, and explained how my choice
of methodology indicated to me the questions I should start asking of my material.
I shall now explain how that research was undertaken.
This thesis may be termed an ethnography - a text about people. Writing
ethnographies is concerned with the inscription of social action. 33 We describe
and explain what we see and understand. Writing however is not just the
presentation of research results from that ethnographic work. As Clifford has
pointed out, writing is properly experimental. 34 It involves attempts to find new
ways of presenting and understanding that which comes out of the research.
Writing as the presentation of ethnographies is also caught up in the invention of
cultures rather than their representation.35 A text cannot claim to present reality; it
must be seen one of a possible number of realities. Yet the author has power to
describe and explain what she or he sees. The author has power over the field.
S/he is the one holding the pen, writing it down and perhaps ultimately getting it
published.
This thesis, then, is my interpretation of the the activities and arguments of
the Campaign that I have studied. I have the power to write what I like about the
Campaign. This is balanced in part, although not mitigated, by my and the
33Jackson, P. (1989) Maps of Meaning. Unwin Hyman, London. p.172.
Clifford, J. (1986) Introduction. p.2. in J. Clifford and G.E. Marcus. (eds) Writing Culture:
The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. University of California Press, Los Angeles. pp. 1-
26.
35ibid.
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Campaign's decision for them to produce a parallel account of their activities, and
a critique of my thesis. But the fact remains that this is a subjective interpretation.
I do not consider this to be a contentious point, due to the maturity of the debate on
questions concerning the validity of qualitative research, so I shall not dwell on
that per se.36 Rather, I wish to take note of advice offered elsewhere on the
establishment of validity in qualitative research such as this, and devote the
remainder of this chapter to an explanation and exposure of my role in the
research.37
To list the activities undertaken in the course of the research is insufficient.
Nancy Mifier has pointed out the way that the theories we use in academic writing
and research contain fragments of autobiography; those fragments require
exposure.38
 Biographical details are important, as is the researcher's relationship
with the fieldwork, as are relationships with 'respondents' in determining the data
collected, both in terms of access to information in the first place, and in terms of
the type of ethnographic material collected. There is however more to the use of
an interpretative methodology than acknowledging the presence of the researcher,
or noting his or her attributes and status, such as age, background, gender, or
race, and noting how they might affect the interpretation offered. Said quotes
Gramsci with reference to the need to produce an 'inventory' of such personal
attributes:
The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of
what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself as a product of the
historical process to date, which has deposited in you an
infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.., therefore it is
imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.39
I am twenty-six years old, I am a white woman research student at present living
and working in London. I am educated to degree level and would defme myself as
3&Fhe Dictionary of Human Geography, edited by R. Johnson (Second Edition, 1986, Blackwell,
Oxford) gives a comprehensive bibliography on qualitative methods. See also the collection
edited by Eyles, J. and Smith, D.M. (1988) Qualitative Methods in Human Geography Polity
Press, Cambridge. For discussions of interpretation in the social sciences, see Clark, G.L.
(1989) Law and the Interpretative Turn in the Social Sciences. Urban Geography 10 pp. 209-
228; Sirauss, A.L. (1987) Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge; Rabinow, P. and Sullivan, W.S. (eds) (1987) Interpretative Social Science:
A Reader. University of California Press, Berkely.
37See Smith, Si. (1988) Constructing Local Knowledge: The Analysis of Self in Everyday
Life. in Eyles, J. and Smith, D.M, (eds) (1988) Qualitative Methods in Human Geography.
Polity, Cambridge. pp. 17 - 38.
38Nancy Miller, The Critic as Author; Getting Personal. Paper presented at Queen Mary College
Centre for European Studies Seminar, 22nd February 1990.
39Gramsci, A. Quaderni del Carcere. Ed. Valentino GelTalana (Turin, Einaudi Editore, (1975) 2:
1363. Quoted in Said, E.W. (1978) Orientalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. p.25.
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middle class both in terms of my current social position and background.
Politically I am a socialist.
Yet that inventory, that 'exposure' is insufficient. As Clifford argues,
writing the ethnographer into fieldwork accounts is essential. 40
 It shows the
interpretation to be the creation of an individual, exposes the power of the
individual and whilst this may not reduce it, at least acknowledges its effects. Yet
there has been a certain resistance to this idea within writing in the social sciences,
possibly springing from the discipline's positivistic heritage and its stress on the
neutrality and objectivity of the researcher. 41 As Pratt comments:
Fieldwork produces a kind of authority that is anchored to a
large extent in subjective, sensuous experience. One
experiences the indigenous environment and lifeways for
oneself, sees with one's own eyes, even plays some roles,
albeit contrived ones, in the daily life of the community. But
the professional text to result from such an encounter is
supposed to conform to the norms of a scientific discourse
whose authority resides in the absolute effacement of the
speaking and experiencing subject.42
As Pratt notes, the use of a personal narrative in the text potentially mediates the
contradiction between fieldwork's engagement and description's self-effacement.
It inserts into the text the authority of the personal experience Out of which the
ethnography is made.43
How is that undertaken? The strategy adopted here has been to include an
autobiographical account of my involvement with the Campaign to Save
Spitalfields from the Developers. The purpose is to expose my own role, and also
to indicate which research techniques have been used. I am cautious of including
in this thesis a personal account of the research experience. Intuitively and
theoretically I can justify it, but such narratives can run the risk of descending into
indulgence and perhaps unnecessary catharsisA- Further, as with the thesis (and
indeed most writing) this is an invention, and I as author have the power to include
or exclude what I will. Some things are too private or personal either to myself or
40Clifford, J. (1986) Introduction. p.14. In I. Clifford and G.E. Marcus (eds) Writing
Culture. pp. 1-26.
41 A notable exception is Eyles' mini-biography in Eyles. J. (1982) Senses of Place.
Silverbrook, Warrington.
42Pratt Ml. (1986) Fieldwork in Common Places. p.32. in J. Clifford and G.E. Marcus
(eds) Writing Culture. pp. 27-50.
43ibid.
Porteus advotes writing as catharsis; I am not sure I agree with his whole argument although I
broadly support the spirit in which it was written. Porteus, J.D. (1989) Katharsis: Academic
Writing as Self-Therapy. Area 21 pp. 83-85.
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others to merit inclusion, whilst other aspects of my research I fmd myself unable
through lack of a suitable vocabulary to inscribe or articulate. As ever, the reader
is the ultimate judge of the use of such an autobiography and its use in affirming
the validity of my subjective and individual interpretation and critique of the
Campaign's opposition to the redevelopment of Spitalfields Market.
A short autobiography of a research experience.
My involvement in the opposition surrounding the redevelopment of
Spitaiflelds started with a fortuitous and perhaps serendipitous encounter in March
1988 with a broadsheet produced by the Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the
Developers. The choice of this particular case study came from a combination of
this initial chance, gut feeling once the research was underway that this case study
would be worth investigating in as much depth as I could manage, and the
realization that this was a good example in purely empirical terms of
redevelopment and opposition.
Small events can shape, determine and change the course of much larger
ones. I found the broadsheet produced by the Campaign during a meeting of the
East London History Society, which I had attended to in order to hear Caroline
Adams talk about her book on pioneer Syihetti settlers in Britain.45
 I contacted the
Campaign's co-ordinator, and was invited to attend the next Campaign meeting.
Previous to this I had searched through the archives of both the Tower Hamlets
Local History Library and the Bishopsgate Institute for information and press
cuttings on the redevelopment of the market.
At that time Jane Jacobs, a postgraduate research student at University
College, London, and I started our collaboration.46
 We had heard through mutual
friends that we were both interested in studying Spitalfields Market, albeit from
very different perspectives. We agreed to go to the next Campaign meeting
together on 17th May 1988. We arrived and were invited to join in proceedings,
got involved in the discussions and put on the mailing list for further information.
At that time the Campaign was preparing to go to the House of Commons
Committee to petition against the Private Bill that would relocate the Market from
45Adams, C. (1987) Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers: Life Stories of Pioneer Syihetti
Settlers in Britain. Tower Hamlets Arts Press, London.
46Thjs research has been completed. See Jacobs, J.M. (1990) The Politics of the Past:
Redevelopment in London. Ph.D Thesis, University of London.
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Spitaffields. In response to a request for people to attend the House of Commons
Committee sessions made in the mailing letter, both Jane and I agreed to sit with
the Campaign. We both needed to attend the proceedings in connection with our
Ph.D research, and most of the other members of the Campaign at that time were
unable to attend because of work committments. We were therefore able, as well
as being willing, to show our committment to the Campaign in terms of active
input.
So I attended the House of Commons Committee sessions and found
myself involved in the Campaign. 47
 The Campaign kept going through the
summer months, and I wrote a small report for them documenting our activities to
date. This report was accepted and sent round to various groups including the
Labour Party and the Trades Council, who had given the Campaign a small
amount of funding in the early days. I also started a series of interviews with
people associated with various aspects of both case studies. 48
 These interviews
were conducted as semi-structured, information-gathering excercises in the main.
At that time I was not interested so much in elaborating on the underlying features
of the oppositional discourse, but merely finding out what was going on, and what
people thought and understood of those immediate events. These interviews were
important as they made me known in the area to a number of voluntary sector
professionals. I considered, briefly, a larger questionnaire-based survey of
attitudes in the area towards the relocation of the market but decided that I had
insufficient time.
The Campaign continued over the winter months of 1988/89, mostly
involved with issues surrounding the market. We delivered large quantities of
newsletters in November 1988 and went flyposting in December, to make our
presence known. We decided, when the time came, to petition against the Bill
when it moved to the House of Lords. In March and April 1989 I went round
with other members of the Campaign collecting signatures for a petition to present
I shall use 'I' rather than 'we' from now on in my account, although much of what I describe
was shared by Jane. Throughout our research we attempted to enjoy a non-competitive
collaboration over our research. During the first year of this, we shared material resources,
exchanged information, and discussed at great length our ideas about our work. This was a very
useful exercise for both of us. As we both started writing we felt a need to distance ourselves
from each other's ideas, not through concerns of direct 'theft' of ideas, but rather through a concern
to protect our own originalities and to try and stop the subtle osmosis of ideas that inevitably
occurs through discussion of a shared research interest. We felt this strategy, hard as it was, to be
necessary for the demands of our Ph.D.s as original pieces of work. Whilst writing we therefore
discussed many aspects of writing, how we structured our work and so on, but tried to avoid
discussing our ideas, although this was tempting. For a more detailed account see Woodward, R.
and Jacobs, J. (1989) Researching Common Ground. Praxis 16 pp. 14-16.
48See below for a fuller explanation.
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as evidence in the House of Lords Committee. When the House of Lords
Committee sat in May 1989, I attended the Committee sessions, taking notes and
helping formulate questions.
The decision in the House of Lords Committee went against the Campaign
and the Bill received Royal Assent. The Campaign continued, becoming
increasingly concerned with new pians that were produced for the Market site and
the consultation that was initiated by the developers and the local authority. At that
time the Community Development Group, a local organization aiming to work
with the developers in order to obtain 'community gain' from further
redevelopments, came into being. The Campaign became involved with that and
with the discussions over other sites due for redevelopment in the area. I
continued to take an active part in the Campaign until I moved away from London
in December 1990.
On Being a Participating Observer
As this brief account of two years' involvement with the CSSD implictly
indicates, I became very involved with my fieldwork. This involvement raises
several points concerning what is commonly known as participant observation.
Participant observation is defmed as 'the method by which a researcher observes
the social life of the subject by participating in that life'. 49
 The researcher actively
takes part in the entity under consideration and passively observes that entity. The
term is used as a catch-all for any research involving participation and observation.
As such it is perhaps of little use other than as an indicator of a basic research
strategy. Participant observation is a strategy usually used for research where
experiential data and quite a deep level of involvement are required in order for that
data to be obtained. It may also be seen as a means of gaining information without
recourse to more de-personalising or dehumanizing research techniques such as
questionnaires and large-scale surveys. In each research situation, the mixture of
participation and observation will differ according to the circumstances of the
research situation, the researcher's wishes and aims, and those of the group (as it
usually is) under study.
In this research situation, participant observation entailed attendance at
regular Campaign meetings between May 1988 and September 1990. Because I
49johnston, RJ. (ed) (1986) The Dictionary of Human Geography. Blackwell, Oxford.
Second Edition. p.339.
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attended meetings so regularly, I became well known by the group and my face
was recognised by people outside the group; I became a member of that
Campaign. The ratio of participation to observation changed over time. During
the first eighteen months of my involvement I was an active participant, which was
useful in terms of the amount of information I was able to obtain. My role as
observer was minimal, through necessity; I had to be seen to be participating rather
than watching from the sidelines in order to make it clear to the Campaign that I
was not just interested in attending meetings because I needed some material for a
Ph.D thesis, but that in addition I was supportive of their goals and wanted to
contribute to the construction of their arguments. During the later stages of the
research after I had decided on a cut-off point for data collection, and during the
writing-up period, I still attended meetings but was less willing to become so
actively involved in group activities. This was due to the need for a certain amount
of 'distance' between myself and the subject. Writing a critique of something so
close to me necessitated this. I did not formally 'exit' from the field, on the
grounds that it would have been churlish to remove myself after the collection of
information. Furthermore, I enjoyed the company of the people who constituted
the subject of my research and did not want to cut myself off from them totally.
One often reads in accounts of participant observation a set of intentions
formulated by the researcher prior to entering the field. I must admit to having had
no clear-cut idea of precisely how I would carry out that research, and was guided
instead by certain notions of the ethics of such research strategies. I made my
position clear to all members of the Campaign at the start of my involvement with
them, on the grounds that dishonesty about my intentions would have been highly
unethical. I also felt that in such a research situation I had to 'do as I would be
done by'. That is, I had to approach them with the same degree of of honesty that
I would expect were I in their position. An upshot of this was my efforts towards
the end of the research period to explain my critique of the Campaign. I did this
by giving people papers that I had written, and those portions of the thesis which
contained quotations from interview transcripts.
As to the feelings of the group towards me, although it would be arrogant
for me to claim any great knowledge of each individual's precise feelings towards
me and my involvement in the Campaign as a researcher, in general I understand
my involvement with the Campaign to have been welcomed. Not only was I
another member, boosting numbers at meetings, and an active one at that, but I
had certain uses to the Campaign. As a member of the Campaign with an
alternative persona (a research student) I was able to to get information for them, at
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times through rather devious means. I was able to attend Committee sessions in
Parliament at times of day when other members were working. I was able,
because of the nature of my work, to produce short reports for the Campaign, for
distribution.
In summary, I was an active participant. I would not however term my
research strategy 'action research' which has been defined by Byrne as:
a form of social scientific practice in which investigation is
carried out in order to inform and facilitate a programme of
social change as part of that self-same programme of social
change.5°
To my mind the term implies a more conscious, systematic and institutionally
sanctioned involvement with the subject and the research topic than was the case in
this research. I was highly involved, but did not consciously plan my involvement
to that degree or decide which actions I would take once I had achieved that
involvement. Further, I did not actually have the power to induce change through
my efforts alone, either within the group or with regard to what that group was
fighting for. I was, after all, only a research student.
The ease with which I became a participant observer, and my experiences
with the Campaign were fundamental to the other aspects of the research and data
collection, namely which documentary sources became open to me, and how the
interviews I conducted were carried out and used. I shall discuss each in turn.
A variety of documentary sources were used in this research. Firstly, there
were those on open public access in various record offices, such as the Tower
Hamlets Local History Library. These included newspaper cuttings about the
market, council and planning documents from the local authority and publicity
material from the SDG and other development companies.51
 Certain voluntary
sector groups such as the Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service were
also integral to the story, yet their records were not available in full to me.
Workers from that organization, and others, did however give me copies of all the
documents that they felt to be of relevance. A systematic search was made through
the ifies of the Spitalfields Project and Spitalfields Local Committee which were
very useful in providing information on the background to the Campaign and its
50Byme, D. (1989) Beyond the Inner Cily. p.3.
51Conined in the bibliography is a complete list of all the documents used and where they may
be found.
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arguments against redevelopment. 52 Unfortunately, full minutes of the
Spitalfields Ward Labour Party were not available. All that existed was a floppy
disc containing very brief minutes and agendas of meetings.
Other sets of documentation were made available to me by the Campaign.
These included the papers produced by all parties during the Parliamentary
Committee sessions, including transcripts of the proceedings. 53
 I also had access
to the vast pile of papers accumulated by the co-ordinator since the inception of the
Campaign, which included letters, minutes of meetings, reports, newsletters and
petitions, and newspaper cuttings.54
My experiences as an active participant with the Campaign shaped the way
in which my interviews were carried out. 55 My interviews were of two types.
Firstly, there were those undertaken with around twenty different individuals over
the course of two years, conducted in order to solicit opinion and obtain factual
information. They were recorded by way of notes during the interview and
written up in full immediately afterwards. They were not taped because at the time
I did not have access to a tape recorder. They were semi-structured, and all
questions were tailored to that specific individual's position. Interviewees were
chosen on the basis of the role that they played in the Spitalfields Market story,
and were contacted either because I had heard about them, because they were key
figures (planners, for example) or because other interviewees had suggested I
contact them. I did not know these people prior to interview, and they were
accordingly quite formal. There was also a defmite power relation at work during
the interview, which I felt to be their power over me as a research student.
Because I was in some instances unknown to these people, I was able to present
my involvement with the Campaign as I wished, either concealing it or making it
explicit. There is of course an ethical question here - perhaps I should have been
more open about my position, but I was not because in most cases I was not asked
about my own position on the redevelopment.
Secondly, eleven in-depth interviews were undertaken during the summer
of 1989 with Campaign members, the local MP and a representative from the
52The Spitalfields Project and Spitalfields Local Committee were state-aided non-statutory bodies
which undertook a variety of activities in Spitalfields between 1974 and 1986. They will be
discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
53These are referenced in the text as follows: House of Commons/Lords Commitee, date, ME
(Minutes of Evidence) day, page.
54At time of writing the intention is to deposit this entire collection with the Tower Hamlets
Local History Library, Bancroft Road, London El.
55A full list of interviews undertaken for this reseaith is given in Appendix 1.
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development company. Most members of the Campaign were interviewed with
the exception of a couple of people who had by that time moved away from the
area. Due to my familiarity, and in some instances friendship at that time with the
people concerned, they were quite informal and relaxed occasions. They were
semi-structured, and in each interview the same key set of questions were asked.
In addition, at each interview questions specific to that persons' knowledge and
experience were asked. Certain leading questions were asked on the grounds that
due to my familiarity with the people and their opinions, the interviews were to act
as a source of clarification and recording of things I already knew. The interviews
at times contained an element of farce, for example, when asking questions that I
knew my respondent knew that I knew the answer to. 56
 The interviews lasted
from between 45 minutes to two and a half hours. They were all tape recorded.
They were transcribed in full, but with the exclusion of totally irrelevant parts of
the conversation which were noted briefly. The interviews were edited slightly.
Because I was not going to undertake conversation analysis on my transcripts,
some of the 'urns' and 'ers' were removed, except where such figures of speech
were integral to the sense of the phrase or sentance.
These interviews are a key source in this examination of the Campaign's
discourse. Quotations from the interviews are used throughout this text, in order
to allow for greater accuracy in the presentation of the discourse under scrutiny, in
order to make my interpretations of that discourse as open, clear and obvious as
possible, and so as to allow people to speak in the text, albeit with my power
giving them space in which to do so. In the text the reader will be able to observe
for herself those comments which occur in public, those which constitute
reflection on the activities of the Campaign, and will be able to distinguish between
them. I have not separated the two rigidly, because I did not feel that I could make
such a clear distinction between the two; many quotations back up or confirm
public statements. All respondents were given copies of their transcripts and told
to inform me of any points they wished to reword or clarify. Three people, I later
discovered, discussed their transcripts between themselves, finding a great deal of
similarity between responses, which they later reported back to me. One person
annotated her transcript and one, dissatisfied with his performance during the
56c.f. Oakley on so-called feminist interviewing strategies, which aim for the involvement of the
interviewer with the interviewee. Oakley, A. (1981) Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in
Terms. In Roberts, H. (1981) (ed) Doing Feminist Research. Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London. pp. 30-61.
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interview, wrote me a twenty page 'essay' detailing in a more coherent manner the
points covered in the interview.57
One interview which does not fit neatly into either of the above categories
is that carried out with the man in charge of the SDG's plans for the redevelopment
of the Market. This interview was carried out in the summer of 1989, and
arranged by way of letter and telephone. I presented myself as a research student
undertaking work on the opposition to the Spitalfields Market redevelopment, and
he agreed to speak to me. When I stepped out of the lift at his plush
Knightsbridge office he immediately recognised me as a member of the Campaign.
My treatment during that interview is indicative of the way the presumed power
relation of interviewer over interviewee can be reversed. Because he saw me as a
Campaign member, and thus part of a rather annoying but not really threatening
opposition, he was rude and patronizing both about the Campaign, but also about
what he assumed to be my attitudes and understandings about the issue. I was
treated - and dismissed - as a member of what he saw as a rather stupid little
group. Luckily I was able to record it all.
I spent a lot of time with Campaign members and achieved a great degree
of familiarity with certain members in particular. This led to a third important 'data
source' - conversations, either in person or on the phone with people, discussing
various aspects of the Campaign and its activities. Whilst these were not
necessarily noted down or used in this text, they provide a source of background
material and information about people that combines over time to form an
understanding of that person, their beliefs, politics and so on (this is a two-way
process of course!). It is this background knowledge which has also been
essential to my ability to make the interpretations that I have, and whilst it is not
necessarily noted explicitly in the text it is integral to that interpretation, even
through actually writing that into the text proved virtually impossible.
Conclusion
Redevelopment of cities such as London has received copious attention in
geography. People living in areas affected by redevelopment have engaged with
redevelopment processes, yet that action has not received the attention it merits.
The aim of this thesis is to begin to redress this imbalance by presenting an
57mis particular source is denoted throughout the text as Essay following interview with ex-
Spitalfields Pmject Worker, 15th June 1989'.
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account of the opposition to the relocation of Spitalfields Market and the
redevelopment of the site by the Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the
Developers.
I have chosen to examine this opposition - what, how and why the
Campaign argued the things that they did - by examining the discourse of that
Campaign. It is through the use of discourse analysis that I have been able to
conceptualise some of the themes that appear in this thesis. The themes that I
develop here were chosen because they were points that appeared to me to be the
most obvious ones to investigate whilst collecting my material for this case study.
The thesis is structured around their investigation as follows.
In Chapter Two I provide all the essential background information required
for my examination of the Campaign. I introduce Spitalfields in East London, and
present a brief history of the Market. I discuss previous plans to relocate the
market, and I then go on to describe the plans that appeared in the mid-1980s for
redevelopment and the processes by which they were implemented. I set these
within the context of the Conservative Government's policies on inner urban
redevelopment. I conclude this section by examining the ways in which the
developers presented their redevelopment plans.
In Chapter Three I examine the Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the
Developers. I look at its formation within the local Labour Party and the reasons
why it was taken out of the Party. I discuss the ways in which the Campaign
organised itself and attempted to gain support from the local population. I then
examine the arguments it presented in opposition to the relocation of the market
and the redevelopment of the site.
In Chapter Four I look at the origins of the Campaign in more detail. I
examine three organisations - the Spitalfields Project, the Spitalfields Local
Committee and the Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service, and locate
the Campaign's arguments as arising from ideas held by workers with these
groups as to the type of redevelopment needed in Spitalfields. I then return to the
Labour Party, looking at the way the Party changed in the 1980s and questioning
the reasons for the appearance of the Campaign from these origins.
In Chapter Five I look at the ways in which the Campaign represented
Spitalfields and the redevelopment. Using a variety of sources I examine the
portrayal of Spitalfields as home to a distinct group of people, a community, a
migrant place, and as a multicultural place, raising questions about that
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representation. I then discuss images of Spitalfields in a more general sense as
produced through reflection on the image held by the Campaign of the City of
London.
In Chapter Six, I develop the questions of the representation of
Spitalfields, tying this in with questions concerning the Campaign's own
representativeness. I set the Campaign's arguments on redevelopment alongside
those produced by another group who entered the debate on the future form of
Spitalfields, the Community Development Group. I conclude this chapter by
discussing the hostility from the Campaign towards the CDG and finding
explanation for this with the logic of the Campaign's portrayal of itself as
representative of the wishes of the population of Spitalfields with regard to
redevelopment.
In Chapter Seven, I conclude the thesis by summarising the main issues
raised. I then look at the ways in which material from this study might be relevent
to other debates within geography and the social sciences. I conclude by asserting
the partiality of this account because of the audience for which it was written, and
by asking for the story to be taken up and examined by the Campaign itself.
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Chapter Two
Spitalfields, the Market and
Plans for Redevelopment.
In this chapter I shall discuss the plans for the relocation of Spitaffields
Market. I shall go into the background of the redevelopment plans in some detail
in order to provide as full a context as possible to the examination of the Campaign
to Save Spitaiflelds from the Developers and their arguments against the relocation
of the Market and the redevelopment of the site. I shall start by introducing the
area, and will then present a brief history of the Market. I discuss older plans to
relocate the Market, and I shall then examine the redevelopment proposals that
precipitated the eventual relocation by setting them in the context of the expansion
of the City of London. I shall then expand the focus of the chapter by examining
the redevelopment of Spitalfields in the context of inner city renewal and
redevelopment, drawing out the links I see as relevant between the Spitalfields
redevelopment project and Government policy towards inner city areas,
particularly with regard to East London. I conclude this chapter with an
examination and assessment of the Spitalfields Development Group's claims for
the redevelopment of the Market site.
S p italfiel d s
Spitalfields, identified by the people who live there as a parish, a ward and
a locality in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, is an area of London's East
End bordering the City of London to the east. 1 As London's 'first industrial
suburb'2
 it was settled by Huguenot refugees in the late seventeenth and early part
of the eighteenth century. They established themselves in the area by building up
the silkweaving industry using skills brought with them from France. Using the
wealth from that enterprise they were responsible for the construction of the urban
fabric of the area, much of which survives today in the form of Georgian houses
11n various interviews with Spitalfields residents and Campaign Members all three definitions
were given and used.
2Samuel, R. (1987) A Plaque on All Your Houses, Guardian, 17th October 1987.
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in the Conservation Areas, dominated by Nicholas Hawksmoor's architectural
masterpiece, Christchurch Spitalfields.
The settlement in the area in the later nineteenth century by Jewish refugees
fleeing pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe is usually explained by the
availability of cheap (and substandard) accommodation and the area's proximity to
the London docks, the point of disembarkation. 3
 By that time the physical fabric
of the area was decaying, the area was overcrowded and congested, dirty, noisy
and smelly - labelled by historians as the ghetto. 4
 Jewish refugees were forced
through poverty to live in overcrowded and insanitary slum conditions, a great
many earning a living in the rag trade. After the First World War a population
movement away from the East End began as the inhabitants of the area became
able to find and afford accommodation in the outer London suburbs, a movement
that accelerated after the end of the Second World War when evacuees stayed
away, and families continued to move out.
In the late 1950s and early 1960 Spitalfields became the home of large
numbers of Bengali men, economic migrants coming to Britain in search of work
and settling in Spitalfields. 5
 They acted on a precedent set by a previous
generation of Bengali settlers - Lascar sailors who are credited with the
establishment of Bengali settlement in East London. 6
 In the 1970s the numbers of
Bengali residents grew as impending immigration controls caused further
migration of whole families joining their husbands and fathers. Currently, in
terms of 'ethnic' composition, people of Bangladeshi origin account for around
57% of the total population of the ward, with slightly lower figures in adjacent
wards; this figure is probably an underestimate. 7
 Other groups in the area estimate
the Bengali population to be around 75%•8 The economy of Spitalfields, and
hence of the Bengali population, rests on the clothing and restaurant trades. The
area has been characterized in the media as a ghetto but also as a place of colour
3Fishman, W. (1988) East End 1888. Duckworth, London.
4White, D. (1980) Rothschilds Buildings: Life in an East End Tenement Block, 1887 - 1920.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
use the term Bengali to denote people of Bangladeshi origin, although others use the term
Bangladeshi. I use Bengali on the grounds that I was informed that it is the term Bengali people
use most often to describe themselves.
6Adsms, C. (1988) Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers: Life Stories of Pioneer Syiheti
Settlers in Britain. Tower Hamlets Arts Press, London.
7Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee, (BGNC) (1987) A Count of the Ban gladeshi
Population. May 1987.
8For example the Spitalfields Small Business Association (SSBA), various conversations with
Co-ordinator, Spitalfields Community Development Group (CDG), various meetings, March -
August 1989.
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and vitality. This is frequently contrasted with the wealth of the City of London
over its western border.9
Spitalfields is an area of intense poverty and deprivation. According to
Townsend's analyses, unemployment was 2 1.95% in 1987 although this figure
masks the substantial number of people in seasonal employment and the low
waged. 1° The majority of people rent their homes (96.47%), most of which are in
the public sector. 11 Current figures for the number of people in private rented
accommodation are unavailable; in 1981, 24.2% of all households rented from
private landlords. 12 The proportion of people in this sector is estimated by
housing associations in the area to have dropped substantially. Much of the
housing in the rented sector is in a bad state of repair and lacking basic amenities.
Townsend gives a figure of 28.26% for overcrowding in the ward; again, the real
figure may be much higher, but adequate statistics are not available. 13 As Table
2.1 indicates, Townsend's ranking of 755 wards in London according to indices
of poverty and certain social indicators places Spitalfields at the top of the list as
the most deprived ward in London. The indices of poverty for wards in Tower
Hamlets bordering Spitalfields are also shown. The higher the positive Z score,
the greater the level of deprivation experienced by people living in that ward.'4
9See for example, The Lane, BBC2 Television, broadcast Spring 1990. This programme was
about the contemporary culture of the East End of London.; 'Cultural Contrasts, Financial Times
22t23 December 1990; Steve Platt 'The Ghetto Rippers' New Society 16th October 1987; 'East
End Promise: The New East Enders', Seven Days/Sunday Telegraph 9th April 1989; 'City and
Bounty' Guradian 12th April 1989.
'0Townsend, P. Corrigan, P and Kowarcik, U. (1987) Poverty and Labour in London. Low
Pay Unit, London.
1 concept of housing tenure can be misused. As Barlow and Duncan indicate, assumptions
are frequently made that taxonomic collectives of tenure, for example, 'owner occupation',
necessarily correspond with significant concrete categories, for example, housing quality and
social stratification. Further, abstract categories such as housing class and consumption
cleavages are clearly identified with specific tenures, and to theonse along these lines and take
tenure beyond the relations of occupancy and ownership is to lose information and analytical
senstivity in explanation. If one wished, however, one could identify consumption cleavages and
social stratification with reference to housing tenure in Spitalfields. Barlow, J. and Duncan, S.
(1988) The Use and Abuse of Housing Tenure. Housing Studies 3 pp. 219 -231.
12Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service (SHAPRS) and the Catholic Housing Aid
Society (CHAS) (1981) The Spitalfields Survey; Housing and Social Conditions in 1980.
SHAPRS and CHAS, London. p.18
'3Townsend, P. Corrigan, P and Kowarcik, U. (1987) Poverty and Labour in London.
14Tbe Z score is calculated from the following seven variables:
i) % of economically active employed.
ii) % of economically active and retired who are semi-skilled.
iii) % of households overcrowded.
iv) % of households lacking exclusive use of two basic amenities.
v) % of single parent households.
vi) % of households headed by New Commonwealth or Pakistan-born head.
vii) % of pensioners in one-person households.
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Table 2.1
Rank Ward	 Z score	 %	 Total
Z score unemployed overcrowded private rented no car households
1	 Spitalfields 8.42	 21.95	 28.26	 96.47
2	 St.Mary's	 6.92	 19.49	 16.53	 95.18
8	 St.Kath.'s 6.12	 15.45	 15.68	 97.06
23	 Weavers	 5.54	 16.09	 10.24	 96.66
33	 St.Peter's	 5.18	 15.34	 9.30	 95.71
79.64 1925
74.61 1990
69.01 3498
71.79 3444
70.37 3797
Source: Townsend, P. Corrigan, P and Kowarcilc, U. (1987) Poverty and Labour in London.
Low Pay Unit, London.
2.1 Map showing the location of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets within
Greater London.
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2.2 Detail from old Ordnance Survey map of Spitalfields, 1873.
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2.3 Welcome to Tower Hamlets.
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History of the Market
In 1986 the local authority asserted that the presence of a fruit and
vegetable wholesale Market in Spitalfields was generally accepted by the people
who lived in Spitalfields to do nothing for the attractiveness of the area in
environmental terms. 15 A fruit and vegetable wholesale market has been located
on a site yards from the eastern border of the City of London for over 300 years,
having originated in the vicinity of St.Pauls and relocated outside the city walls
because of complaints about rubbish and noise.' 6 The Royal Charter officially
establishing the market in Spitalfields was granted by Charles II to John Baich, a
silk thrower, in 1682 giving him the right to hold a market on Thursdays and
Saturdays 'in or near to a certain place called the Spittle Square'.' 7 Historically,
speculation has arisen as to the validity of the 'dubiously purchased Charter...
which, at least, was the bestowing, "for a consideration" of the rights over a
market which had grown up naturally lon years before'. 18 It functioned as a
general wholesale market until the 19th century - Defoe mentions it as a flesh
market 19 - and existed in its physical form as a grouping of sheds around a
congested and essentially still Medieval street pattern, the remains of which can be
traced inside the present market buildings.
In 1876 the market rights were purchased on a short lease from a
"I1Lr.
Goldschmidt family by one Robert Horer. Homer, 'the largest speculator ini'J (
the potato trade in England' and a'maif çceptioaL eminence and notoriety',21
constructed what are now known as he lorerBuildngs at the eastern end,
designed in a gabled Arts and Crafts style by George Sherrin and completed in
1893. As one commentator noted:
The old Spitalfields is being transformed into one of the
finest markets in England, and the many new warehouses,
together with the fine covering over the area of the market,
' 5Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee (1986) Spitafields Market: Report on
Consultation. 30th July 1986.
'6City Recorder, 24th October 1985.
17Spitalflelds Market Official Handbook, 1954.
' 8EtIr,n Observer, 19th April 1913.
1- 9 Defoe, D. (1971) A Tour Through the Whole Island Of Great Britain. Penguin,
Harmondsworth. Original Publication 1724.
20Fruit, Vegetable and Flower Markets of England: Spitalfields Market (1954) Showcase
Publicity Co. Ltd., London.
T. (1889) Potatoes, Potatoe Salesmen, Potatoe Markets, Past and Present. Hazell,
Watson and Viney Ltd., London. p.52.
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form a pleasing contrast to the old dilapidated and wretched
hovels of the past.22
The market was a very profitable concern for Homer, who was able to charge tolls
to anyone acting as a horticultural trader within the market area due to loopholes in
the charter, it being a market 'without metes or bounds'. 23 The City of London
Corporation (hereafter the City Corporation) became freeholders of the site and
acquired powers to regulate the market through the 1902 City of London
(Spitalfields Market) Act, obtaining the market in the rates fund as part of an
operation to assist Stepney Borough Council. The market buildings were sold by
Homer to the City Corporation for the sum of £284,000 in 1920, giving the
Corporation market rights and leasehold interests. The market became officially
operational six days a week with the passing of the 1922 City of London (Various
Powers) Act. At that time it employed around 1,500 people, housed 150
wholesale merchants, had room for 226 stands, and covered an area of 5 acres.
22ibid, p.52.
23S City Press, East London Observer and Spitalfields Press, 1913 and 1914, for further details
on objections raised to tolls and the wealth created for Homer through the existence of this
loophole.
24City Press, 12th June 1920.
25Webber, R. (1971) 'Spitalfields Market' in Agriculture, January 1971. pp. 9-11.
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2.4 Spitalfields Market from the west.
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2.5 A different view of Spitalfields Market.
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2.6 Map showing the location of Spitalfields Market.
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2.7 Detailed map showing extent of the Market.
IGI Land occupied by the Market
______ Privately owned sites adjoining
the Market with permission
for redevelopment (pam. 2.06)
Borough boundaries
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Since that time, the area covered by the market has expanded considerably.
In 1928 the western end of the market was extended, joining neo-Georgian
pavilion-style market buildings to the Homer Buildings. The Fruit Exchange was
built in 1929, Eden House constructed in the 1930s and the Flower Market in
1935. Steward Street and Spital Square were largely cleared of their remaining
18th century Georgian town houses in the late 1950s to make way for a vehicle
park. The present market site now covers 11 acres. It houses 100 traders and
employs 1,000 people. It is readily accepted by the City Corporation and
Spitalfields Market Tenants Association (SMTA) as highly successful, with an
average vacancy rate over the past five years of 0.75%. It operates between
midnight and midday, six days a week. It yielded a net income of £22,000 to the
general rates of the Corporation in 1987/88.2
Views differ as to the relation of the market to the local economy because
these different opinions are bound u with certain discourses and aims. According
to the Corporation, the Mket hdd no relation to the area, offered no local
employment, operated at a hint when the rest of the area was asleep, and generated
no local trade of any significance.27 ior the local authority, the London Borough
of Tower Hamlets (LBTh):
Tower Hi.t cotth4li ... would regard its removal as an
unnecessarily 1rãi stp and would be reluctant to lose the
employment offered by the market or the contribution it
makes to the variety and vitality of the Spitalfields
district.28
Previous Plans to Relocate
The redevelopment scheme for Spitalfields Market, with which this thesis
is concerned, must be discussed as the latest in a line of plans for the relocation of
the Market. The question of the removal of the market from its present location
has persisted for many years:
26City of London Corporation (1987) Report - The Future of Spitalfields Market. October
1987.
27Hou of Commons Committee, 8th June 1988, ME 1.
28London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1986) Borough Plan Adopted March 1986, London
Borough of Tower Hamlets, London. p.8.
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People who've lived here a long time say, "There's always
been rumours, fifty years ago there's been rumours" - it
comes up every now and thenP
There appears to have been a general consensus by the mid 1980s amongst people
working in the market and living near it that it had outgrown its site, the location
being unsuitable for its function, and its function incompatible with the buildings,
facilities and infrastructure. Furthermore, continual reports by official bodies had
emphasised the changing patterns of wholesale fruit and vegetable trade in
London, and questioned the continued existence of a number of wholesale markets
so close to the city centre. As the Greater London Council (GLC) noted in the
1976 Development Plan,
The Council is not satisfied that redevelopment of
London's markets on their traditional sites will result in an
efficient or profitable pattern of distribution. This applies
particularly to the case of Spitaiflelds Market.30
Against this background, in October 1979 Greycoat Estates made a bid for the
market site, proposing a £3() million redevelopment scheme. This plan was
rejected by the City Corporation, 3 ' and the idea was opposed by the traders who
did not want to move. 32 lntvrçingly, reports of the Greycoats bid were
vehemently denied by both the developers and the City Corporation at that time.33
Further to GLC suggestions that there should be some sort of
rationalisation of the Lonjon fruit and vegetable wholesale markets, a report was
commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food to investigate
declines in throughput, ovcr-staffmg and problems of supply in the six London
markets (Covent Garden, Spitalfields, Stratford, Greenwich, Borough and
Brentwood). The O'Cathian report was never released in full, but a circulated
summary did include the recommendation that there should be a planned reduction
in the number of markets in London over the next ten years, setting the optimum
number as three by 1991. The possible relocation of Spitalfields is
unmentioned.34
 A draft for a report by the Spitalfields Housing and Planning
Rights Service (SHAPRS) in 1980 noted that the City Corporation's Market
29lnterview with Pam Mossman, Campaign member and market resident, 4th July 1989. The
term 'market resident' refers to tenants living in flats above the Market in the Homer Buildings.
30GLC 1976 Development Plan, GLC, London. p.97.
31City Recorder 14th March 1985.
32Hackney Gazette 26th October 1979.
33SHAPRS (1980) What's Happening to West Spitalfields? SHAPRS, London.
340'cathain, D. (1981) Marketing Inquiry: The London Fruit and Vegetable Wholesale Markets.
Unpublished summary of report.
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Department was keen for it to stay where it was; the attitude of the City's planners
was however felt to be far more ambigous. 35 Further to this, in November 1982,
SHAPRS reported that the London Borough of Tower Hamlets wanted to move
the market out of Spitalfields and redevelop the area. The LBTH Planning Brief at
that time suggested possible ways of developing the site, but the idea was opposed
by local groups including SHAPRS. 36 The Planning Brief was in fact withdrawn
by the Council after criticisms by the City Corporation. SHAPRS also noted that
the GLC was in favour of the move, which appeared to contradict the GLC's own
Community Areas Policy. 37 In December 1982, a GLC Development Committee
Report confirmed this by stating that the relocation of the market was under
consideration, leaving an attractive site near the City. The Corporation were
reported to be of the opinion that 'in principle' the traders were prepared to move,
the site having potential for other uses.38 At that time, local newspapers had
reported that the leader of Tower Hamlets council was having discussions with the
London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) and the City Corporation
about a possible relocation of the market to a site near West India Docks and the
new Billingsgate fish market, recently moved from its previous city location.39
Concern was expressed at the time by Spitalfields Local Committee (SLC), over
the announcement by press release of plans to move the market.40
 The Planning
Subcommittee of the SLC later urged discussion of plans at GLC level, noting that
decisions on the market should be taken together with the workforce and the Local
Committee, recognising the impact the relocation would have on the area. 41
 There
was however no sense tif urgency about the proposals, as it was thought that
traders would only be prepared to move once an appropriate alternative site had
been found, defined as being within the boundaries of Tower Hamlets.42
However, during 1983 the Corporation concluded that the redevelopment of the
existing market site would not cover the cost of building a new market on the Isle
of Dogs, and concrete plans to move the market again failed to materialise.43
35SHAPRS (1980) What's Happening to West Spitalfields. SHAPRS, London. Draft. p.20.
36SPp,pRS 1982 Annual Report, SHAPRS, London.
37ibid, p.9.
38ibid.
39TM 1st April 1982.
40Spitalfields Local Committee Minutes 16th June 1982. I shall discuss the SLC in Chapter
Three.
41 Spitalfields Local Committee Minutes, 24th November 1982.
42Spitaluields Local Committee, Letter to GLC Director General's Department, 24th November
1982.
43East London Advertiser 5th August 1983.
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In February 1985, the Conservative Back Bench Horticulture and Markets
Committee released summaries of the confidential Wells Report, written in 1984,
which noted that Spitalfields was a 'good market for senders and buyers alike',
but pointed out the growing problem of traffic congestion 'over which there is little
hope of improvement'.44
 The report recommended the closure of one of the
London markets for the good of the trade as a whole, that market being Spitalfields
for the above reason. It also cited as a reason for closure the recent failures of four
traders, the 'Victorian Aura' of the place, and the value of the site considering that
because of the 1979 Greycoat offer 'there must be other bidders'. The Report
recommended the amalgamation of Stratford and Spitalfields markets but noted
that this would be dependent on a proper sum being obtained for Spitalfields 'with
no repetition of the planning blight that had bedevilled old Covent Garden'.45
When very brief details of the report were released market traders reacted angrily,
the Chief Executive of the Spitalfields Market Tenants Association (SMTA) stating
that 'The study was a dead duck from the word "Go" 46 , mirroring the mood
picked up in other local newspapers at that time, that the market traders were
totally against the move of the market. 47 The Corporation's committment to the
continued existence of the market in Spitalfields was shown by a £600,000
refurbishment programme agreed in that year.
The attitude of the market traders towards any proposed move is identified
by a GLC survey of East London's four wholesale fruit and vegetable markets
undertaken in June and July 1985, covering Spitalfields, Stratford, Borough and
Greenwich.48
 In a policy change over the future of London markets, the purpose
of the survey was to assess what lead the GLC as strategic planning authority for
London could give in planning for the future of these markets, and what assistance
might be needed. The GLC at this time did not wish to see the markets decline,
nor did it see any reason for them to amalgamate - it wanted to see these markets
remain on site.49
 In the survey, 70 of a possible 100 Spitalfields traders
responded. The relatively low response rate for Spitalfields was thought to be the
result of fears for the GLC heavy lorry ban proposals, 5° on top of suspicion as to
44Wells, J. (1985) London Markets Overcapacity. Unpublished House of Commons
Committee report.
45ibid.
46Et London Advertiser, 8th March 1985.
47City Recorder, 14th March 1985; City Press, 8th March 1985; East London Advertiser,
March 1985.
48Jndon Research Centre, (1986) London's Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Markets: A Survey
of the Four East London Markets. London Research Centre, London.
491b1c1, p.7.
50ibid, p.9.
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why the survey was being conducted - were plans afoot again to relocate? Sixty-
nine out of seventy did not reply when questioned about any immediate plans they
might have to relocate their businesses. Fifty-nine out of seventy felt they had
advantages in their present location.
In August 1985 the market tenants asked the Corporation to conduct a
feasibility study into the relocation of the market, and in September 1985 a
Working Committee was established. Although details are unclear or unavailable
on the precise chain of events concerning a change of mind amongst the traders
towards the removal of the market to a new site, it is apparent that the activities of
a private development company, the Spitalfields Development Group (SDG) had
had initial contacts and negotiations with the traders which had again opened a
debate on the future of the market at Spitalfields. 51 The ambivalence in the
Borough Plan towards the Market must also have indicated to the developers and
the Corporation that the LBTH wô.z prepared to consider a possible alternative use
for the site. A consensus is reported to have emerged amongst the traders to a
move to a new site in north east London with good road communications. 52 The
SDG were willing to finance the purchase of land and the construction of market
premises at Temple Mills, a site prefered by 80% of the 90% of traders who
responded to a questionnaire disiributed by the Corporation over the future siting
of the market.53 The financial incentives offered to the Spitaiflelds Market Tenants
Association (SMTA), £7million, were perhaps sufficient to prompt the traders'
sudden willingness to move.
In summary then, there had been a history of uncertainty over the future of
the market in Spitalfields. Because previous rumours had never materialized into
concrete plans the assumption was that because the market traders wished to stay,
and because the City Corporation was reluctant to move the market because of the
costs involved, the market would remain. As the MP for Bethnal Green and
Stepney observed:
I had no reason, in 1985, to think that there was going to
be a shift of policy... There was no impression coming
from the City... they themselves gave a very cool appraisal
about the present market - no passionate denunciations
saying it was no good. ... They gave a genuine appraisal
saying it was under a certain amount of pressure but its
51 Hou of Commons Committee, 8th, 9th, 14th and 15th June 1988, ME 1 - 4.
52City of London Corporation (1987) Spitaiflelds Market Offer Document. February 1987.
53CiLy of London Corporation (1987) The Future of Spitalfields Market. Report. 22nd October
1987.
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doing a reasonably good job and there was no urgency -
and I didn't feel there to be any urgency in 1985.M
Although it is possible to detect a certain amount of exasperation on the
part of the Market's owners, emerging from disatisfaction with the Market's
location, this dis/atisfaction does not explain why relocation plans drawn up by
the Corporation and the SDG came to fruition when they did. Although the traders
and Corporation were disatisfled with the facilitites and working conditions of the
Market, both bodies were reluctant to move the Market unless a move brought
considerable improvements on present facilities and conditions and the tenants
wished to relocate. Further, that relocation would have to be undertaken by a
private development company. A catalyst provided the push to relocate and
provided a development company willing to undertake the redevelopment. This
was the expansion of the City of London. It is necessary to look at that expansion
in order to understand the relocation plans. The justifications produced by the City
Corporation for its expansion also give a first glimpse of a discourse that contained
justifications for relocation and redevelopment.
54lnterview with Peter Shore MP, 1st August 1989.
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2.8 The Market in operation.
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2.9 The Market in operation.
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2.10 The 1930s extension to the Market.
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The 1986 Relocation Plans and the Expansion of the City
of London.
The City of London has changed over the past ten years as it has fought to
maintain a place in the increasingly important financial sector of the global
economy. There is no need to go into this in great detail. The reasons for that
expansion and the options open to the City are explained in literatures on global
economic restructuring. 55
 What is important here is the timing of that expansion
over the past decade, which relates directly to the Corporation's decision to
relocate the Market, and the City's own assessments of its demand for increased
office space. Both of these can be located in a discourse that justified the
expansion of the City into Spitalfields.
One aspect of the effect of economic restructuring on London has been
changes in the function of the City of London as an international finance centre,
and associated effects on the form of the City and the form and function of
neighbouring areas. The expansion of the City of London as an international
finance centre is often explained with reference to 'Big Bang' - the deregulation of
the stock exchange that occurred in practice on 23rd October 1986 and which
involved the removal of fixed commissions, changes in the way in which business
is transacted, such as the requirement of injections of large capital sums, and the
removal of restrictions on ownership of brokers and dealers 56. Big Bang was
however just one of a number of associated changes in the structure and operations
of the City's fmancial institutions that some have termed a 'revolution' in the City
of London. Pressures to force radical changes on the London Stock Exchange
included a need to become more competitive at an international level through the
threats from international (and to a certain extent, domestic) securities business to
bypass the London Stock Exchange. They also involved the increased bargaining
muscle of institutional investors, and advances in information technology that have
fundamentally altered the ways in which transactions on the Stock Exchange are
undertaken, namely with the development of screen-based trading. 57
 Enabling
legislation through the 1986 Financial Services Act resulted in the entry of
'newcomers' into securities trading. The larger Japanese and US banks
55Smith, M.P. and Feagin, JR. (1987) (eds) The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring and
Community Politics. Blackwell, Oxford. Peet, R. (ed) (1987) International Capitalism and
Industrial Restructuring. Allen and Unwin, London.
56Mlinea, A.U. (1987) U.K. Banking after Deregulation. Croom Helm, London.
57Hall, MJ.B. (1987) The City Revolution: Causes and Consequences. Macmillan, London.
p.1.
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established themselves in the City or environs, and many British banks and
financial institutions merged, with a significant increase in and altered demand for
office space. This has been realised in physical terms as a demand for a new kind
of office environment including larger dealer floors, with column-free space for
trading, and cable space between ceilings and floors. These demands rendered
obsolete much of the existing office stock available in the City, and led to very
great pressures for the redevelopment of existing sites for new office needs within
the City and on the City fringes.
The opportunity to undertake large-scale developments in the City was
enabled by the City of London Local Plan adopted on 23rd May 1986, which
included the following proposals: abandoning most of the special business areas,
which had been intended to prop up non-office uses; reducing conservation of
buildings of architectural merit outside the Conservation Areas; allowing the use of
airspace for building directly over streets, stations and other spaces; and increasing
the allowable plot ratio in new development to 5:1 throughout the City instead of
3:1 in some areas. 58 These changes facilitated a potential increase of around 20%
in floor area in the City, and made developments such as London Wall, London
Bridge City, and Paternoster Square possible. Big Bang and associated changes
caused rapid alterations in the morphology of the City, with large buildings
inserted into the existing urban structure, for example Broadgate, and the shaping
of large sites to new design principles. The City Corporation largely abandoned its
goals of the retention of small businesses, the conservation of its older buildings,
and the maintenance of small sites, all of which had been stated in the City of
London Draft Local Plan of 1976.
The creation of a single European market in 1992 may result in major
European banks wanting to establish offices in London. The importance of
establishing the position of London as an international finance centre remains a
priority for the City as a financial institution, a development the City Corporation
is keen to encourage. Yet any European city situated geographically and
temporally between New York and Tokyo could perform the same function. The
Corporation has at times taken an aggressive stance towards the promotion of
London as an international fmance centre:
The City of London is one of the three fmancial centres of
the world and I hope that by the end of the ten years it will
58M&mot, A.F. and Worthington, J. (1987) Great Fire to Big Bang: Private and Public
Designs in the City of London. Built Environment 12 pp. 216-233.
59ibid.
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be the financial centre. There's only Tokyo and New York
to take out now and, if we do not take them out, then they
are going to take us out. We either end up as the financial
centre or somebody else will.60
The City of London needs room to expand. Docklands, currently being
redeveloped from disused docks under the auspices of the LDDC, is intended to
fill this need. Canary Wharf, a massive office development on the Isle of Dogs in
London's Docklands, will accommodate some City companies. But some
companies still need to be near the centre for convenience, prestige or tradition.
So they look over the border to East London - and Spitalfields, St. Mary's, St.
Katharines wards in particular. The needs of the City of London regarding office
space explains why the relocation of Spitalfields Market was encouraged, and why
those plans surfaced when they did.
The Corporation, in justifying the relocation of Spitalfields Market, did so
by arguing for the expansion of the City of London. In arguing their case in the
two Parliamentary Committes, the City Corporation used evidence from surveyors
Hillier Parker to attest to an increased demand in office accommodation in the City
in the mid-1980s. The surveyors were critical of the ability of developments on
the Isle of Dogs to provide suitable office accommodation. Hillier Parker
commented that there would continue to be a substantial demand for new offices in
the Spitalfields area into the early 1990s and that supply of new offices that would
be constructed between 1988 and 1990 would not substantially exceed demand.
With regard to new developments under construction, they estimated that around 4
million ft. sq. of uncommitted developments in buildings in excess of 100,000 ft.
sq. were currently under construction in the City and its immediate surroundings.
They estimated that 7 million ft. sq. of office space would be required by
companies currently known to the surveyors to be considering the acquisition of
new premises in units over 100,000 ft. sq. Of this, over 3 million ft. sq. would
be required by companies seeking premises at June 1988. Demand for new office
accommodation was seen as coming from the occupiers of buildings to be
demolished to make way for new developments. There were few opportunities in
the City to provide the very large developments (over 500,000 ft. sq.) required by
multinational companies in the near future. The total take-up of offices of all size
units had increased from 4.6 million ft. sq. in 1984 to 8.6 million sq. ft. in
1987.61
60Peter Rees, Chief Planner of the City of London, speaking at the Institute of Contemporary
Arts City Conference, London. 1 - 2nd September 1988.
61 Hillier Parker, Surveyors, Letter to Deputy Town Clerk of the City Corporation, 2nd June
1988.
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Despite the Stock Market crash of October 1987, the take up of offices in
the City in the last quarter of 1987 was in excess of two million ft. sq. - 10% up
on the previous quarter. Acquisitions of units over 100,000 ft. sq., mainly in the
financial sector which should have been affected by the crash, totalled 1.4 million
ft. sq. since 19th October 1987.62 Yet it is the volatility of the Stock Market that is
a crucial determining factor in office demand, as the development of screen-based
trading has led companies to require new office facilities. 63 As a property
surveyor for the London and Edinburgh Trust (LET, the SDG's parent company)
noted:
We obviously only make money if the offices are taken up.
So it's commercial judgement that we think that there will
be a demand there in a year - two year's time... Whether
[demand is] going to be there, that's our risk at the end.M
The risk was always present. The City Corporation and development companies
were all extremely cautious:
The office market is not as bullish as it was, and there's
huge risks at stake and listening to the debates in
Parliament you'd think that there were no risks at all.
There are incredible risks. It's a big gesture of faith really.
OK, so they're all big companies and they know what
they're doing, but there are big commercial risks at
stake.. 65
Despite that risk, the Corporation was confident that a redeveloped Spitalfields
Market site would be commercially successful. They argued for relocation of the
Market and they did so on the grounds that the land which it occupied would be
better used by providing office space for an expanding City.
The City Corporation was, however, cautious in their promotion and
mangement of the redevelopment. They justified the expansion of the City into
Spitalfields by arguing for a need for increased office space so that the City could
achieve its potential as an international finance centre. Yet their pronouncements
on the form that any redevelopment might take promoted the idea of corporate
concern for the future of the area to be affected by redevelopment. The
Corporation constructed an idea of redevelopment that appeared throughout the
discourse of the 'pro-development' camp. The redevelopment of Spitalfields
market was represented as an activity which served all interests and benefitted all
62jbjd
63Foiman, C. (1988) Spitalfields; A Battle for Land. Proofs for Book.
Interview with Tim Budgen, property surveyor, LET/SDG, 24th July 1989.
65jbid
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groups. By presenting the redevelopment of Spitalfields Market in that way, and
by presenting themselves as an institution with concerns for more than just their
own profits, a discourse was used which justified their actions and at the same
time deflected opposition by incorporating that opposition's concern. This point
can be illustrated by looking at the pronouncements of the City Corporation with
regard to the SDG's first bid for the rights to redevelop the Market.
Despite two years of negotiations between the Corporation and the SDG,
leading the SIX) to feel confident in their being awarded the contract for the
redevelopment of the market site, on the 13th October 1986, the City Corporation
decided to turn down the SDG's bid leaving the question of the future of the
market and Spitalfields open:
There is no point in building slums in the '80s and '90s for
the year 2025. The argument is not all about money. The
Corporation is interested in people and London as a whole.
We will not consider a development until it is shown that
the majority of the traders are behind the move; satisfactory
arrangements have been agreed for the Corporations'
residential tenants; proper regard has been given to the
position of the Stratford traders and that the new market
will be viable. Only when those issues have been satisfied
does the question arise of disposing of the existing site for
the best return for the ratepayers.66
The Corporation is presented as concerned not only for its own financial interests
and the viability of the Market, but also for the people of the area as well. There
were also concerns about the speed at which redevelopment plans were
progressing:
It is felt that, given the vast areas of uncertainty which still
exist, it would be irresponsible to launch legislation in the
next session of Parliament... Consideration of the offer by
SDG was hedged in by the time constraint of making a
decision before 27th November 1986 when a Parliamentary
Bifi would have to be lodged. After many discussions and
much work by SDG, the lack of planning consent meant
that the bid was simply a speculation based on a consent
being given to the mix of development that they hoped
for.67
But is also probable that the concerns voiced about the relocation effects were
secondary to the desire on the part of the Corporation for the maximum return to
be made to them through the redevelopment. In October the Corporation decided
Peter Rigby, Chair of City Corporation Policy and Resources Committee, quoted in the City
Recorder, 16th October 1986.
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to put the redevelopment of the Spitalfields Market site out to tender in order to
elicit a response from the property market as to the value of the site:
There is no compelling need for the Corporation to relocate
Spitalfields. We are taking this step to see whether the
property market is interested in the site.
On the 2nd February 1987 the City Corporation published its Spitalfields Market
Offer Document, with the comments that:
Interest in the site increased dramatically in 1986 as a
number of factors combined to reveal its potential as a
natural extension to development which is already taking
place in the City... This includes an upsurge in the demand
for office space in and near the City.69
The Corporation's stated decision to invite offers to move the market was,
according to the Offer Document, prompted by a number of factors including the
willingness of a 'significant number' of traders to relocate on the condition that an
improved location could be secured which would satisfy their requirements.70
Retrospectively, in 1989, they said the following:
Basically there are two prime reasons; it is an oldish market
totally unsuitable for modern use as a fresh fruit and
vegetable market, and secondly of course with these
enormous jugernauts and general traffic, having 45 - 50 ton
lorries coming in so near to the city as a matter of regularity
every night it is really absurd; it causes an awful problem.
And the final thing is, of course, we actually have the
opportunity now to do it; it isn't something that comes up
all the time.71
68Peter Rigby, speaking for the City Corporation, quoted in the City Recorder, 18th December
1986.
69Peter Rigby, speaking for the City Corporation, quoted in the City News, 6th February 1987.
70The Offer Document is quite specific about the criteria to be fuffihled in any successful
package, these being: the provision of an alternative site satisfactory to the traders; adequate regard
for the future of Stratford Market which would be affected by any removal of Spitalfields; the
construction of a suitable set of premises for a new market; suitable terms for the Corporation on
the granting of a long lease for the Spitalfields site in the case of redevelopment of that site;
adherence, in any redevelopment of the market site, to the Development Brief prepared by Tower
Hamlets as planning authority of the market; adequate protection of existing Spitalfields Market
residents in the Homer Buildings; full consultation with the Spitalfields Market Tenants
Association; Corporation control over any legislation promoted by it in the Houses of Parliament
through the Private Bill necessary to relocate the market; and adequate safeguards in the event of
significant archaeological finds during the redevelopment of the Spitalfields site (City of London
Corporation, (1987) Spitalfields Market Offer Document. City Corporation, London.) Offers
were to be submitted by the 31st July 1987.
71David Shalit, Chair of the City Corporation's Spitalfields Market Committee, quoted from The
Week in the Lords, BBC2 Television, 9th April 1989.
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These reasons, given on television, contrast with those given in the more private
domain of the City's redevelopment industry. The public face was one of concern;
profits and expansion were unmentioned, and the discourse is silent on the
redevelopment of the site. 72
 It is necessary to question whether the Offer
Document was in fact released in order to 'test the temperature' of the property
market and gain some indication of the willingness of other developers to come
forward and compete with the SDG for the tender:
It must... be emphasised that there is no compelling reason
to relocate Spitaiflelds Market. It is a successful wholesale
fruit and vegetable market and whilst many markets are
apparently in decline, Spitalfields still continues to trade
successfully. Relocation can only proceed if a package can
be devised which satisfies inter alia the various criteria
referred to in this document and produces a significant
return to the Corporation.73
Rosehaugh Stanhope entered the competition to redevelop Spitalfields as a
second contender in November of that year, having awaited the publication of the
LBTH Development Brief before submitting their proposal. 74
 Seen by some as
72City Corporation (1987) Spitalfields Market Offer Document City of London Corporation,
London.
73ibid, p.!.
74The position of the local authority requires discussion here as I shall not dwell on it in the
main body of the text. The local authority's role has been one of facilitator, apart from the
ability to grant or refuse planning permission on the site it played no other part in the decision to
move the Market. The Borough Plan, adopted in March 1986, was equivocal on the Market. It
recognised its presence as being a positive one for the area, but was open to the idea of
redevelopment if the traders and Corporation wished to relocate. According to the Borough Plan,
any redevelopment that resulted because of relocation would have to be a mixed use scheme, and
would have to make a contribution to solving the problems of Spitalfields. In 1986 the local
authority produced its Draft Development Planning Guidelines fqr the market site in response to
announcements that the SDG were preparing plans for the site. The local authority had been
monitoring the progress of the SDG plans. The Tower Hamlets Development Committee had
considered a report in February of that year on the presumed plans of the SDG to relocate the
market and redevelop the site, and further meetings had been held with the developers and officers
of the Corporation. The Local Authority was thought to be in a relatively powerful position,
however, in determining the future use of the site:
The cost of a replacement market will be substantial and, if the City
are looking to the redevelopment of the market site to fund the
moves, the requirements of this Council as planning authority will
ultimately affect the decision to relocate or remain. (LBTH
Development Committee Report on Spitalfields Marker. 9th April
1986.)
The Draft Planning Guidelines noted the importance of the market within the context of
Spitalfields:
The relocation of the market will have the most profound effect on the
character of West Spitalfields, not just in physical and environmental
terms, but also economic and social. Activities and relationships
built up over three centuries will be removed at a stroke. (LBTH
Drt Development Brieffor Spitalfields Market, 1986)
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The tone of the Draft Development Plan Guidelines appears however to indicate a positive view
of redevelopment of the site:
The relocation of the market would provide the opportunity to 'mend'
the historic fabric of West Spitalfields in a way that would encourage
activity and visual interest and allow the area to prosper as a pleasant
living and working environment (ibid.)
The Spitalfields Market site is owned by the City Corporation and
will be developed by a private developer. The planning brief for the
redevelopment of the site will need to recognise the economic context
within which the development will take place, and ensure that the mix
of uses proposed are sufficiently attractive to allow the development
to proceed (ibid.)
A stated aim of these Planning Guidelines was to open up some sort of public debate over the
future of the market and of the site. As will be discussed in a Chapter Four, whether this in fact
occurred at the levels desired by the planning authority, or whether people felt themselves to have
been presented with afaiz accompli, and were thus either resigned or disinterested in the future of
the market, is a point of considerable interest The plans for the redevelopment of the market site
started to gain some momentum of their own at the same time that the Liberal Group took
control of Tower Hamlets after the May 1986 local government elections. They took the view
that redevelopment was inevitable, that the market was a drop in the ocean as far as
redevelopment was concerned, its relocation encouraged and redevelopment used to regenerate the
area (Interview with Jeremy Shaw, BGNC Chair, 13th December 1988). It is probably fair to say
that the view held by the planning department did not differ significantly from this.
The local authority produced planning guidelines which recommended that the
development should contain uses and facilities which met the recognised needs of the Spitalfields
area that the development should respect the scale and character of the surrounding area; and that
the development should be economically viable. The Borough, at the request of the Development
Committee, agreed to appoint external consultants to "provide a brief overview of how the
changing City office market (particularly the northern extension of the financial services sector)
will influence the redevelopment of Spitalfields Market" (Bernard Williams Associates,
Spitalfields Market Economic Appraisal. 16th June 1986) The redevelopment of the Market was
specifically linked to the needs of the City, in contrast to the later public approach to
redevelopment where the discourse of redevelopment emphasised positive local benefits of the
scheme. The Report was presented on 16th June 1986 - only a month after it was originally
commissioned. The consultants' conclusions were that redevelopment was feasible and could be
commercially viable, but that substantial risks would be involved due to the then unknown effect
that Big Bang would have on the demand for office space in and around the City.
The Bernard Williams Report was never published. It was accepted and in short space of
time, the local authority decided to put the issue of the relocation of the market Out to public
consultation. The speed with which the local authority started consultation after a nominal
assessment of the possibility of moving the market must be called into question. The Report
was strictly concerned with the viability of an office redevelopment on the site. It did not
question to effects of the market relocation on the surrounding area and its inhabitants. No
mention was made of the knock-on effects in terms of rising land values. On such a basis public
consultation was carried out.
On 30th July 1986, an Extra-ordinary meeting of the BGNC was convened to discuss the
report on consultation. The report stated that the SDG was 'energetically pursuing the relocation
of the Market', and offers an anlysis of the responses to the idea of relocation, and to proposals of
the use of the site (BGNC Spitalfields Market Report on Consultation, 30th July 1986). The
report concluded that, judging from responses received, an 'overwhelming majority of local
residents and workers would not object to the relocation of the market if the traders were happy to
move' (ibid). A mixed usage would be preferred for the site, including housing, open space and
retail, and offices should not dominate. The urban design component should be sympathetic to
the architectural heritage of the area, and the developers should be mindful of the relationship of
the development to the surrounding area. In particular, the Bangladeshi Community were said to
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the 'white knight in the lists' in the joust for Spitalfields, the scheme devoted only
45% to office space, and was based originally on the grandiose neo-classical
designs of Leon Krier, later adapted by Quinlan Terry. 75
 As a worker with Tower
Hamlets Environment Trust speculated, Rosehaugh Stanhope are a large enough
company to have the expertise to win the tender for the redevelopment of the
Market site, if they so wished.76
At a meeting of the City Corporation's Policy and Resources Committee on
17th September 1987, it was announced that subject to ratification by the Court of
Common Council on 22nd October 1987, the scheme chosen for the relocation of
the market and redevelopment of the site was that produced by the SDG. Public
pronouncements by the Corporation drew upon a discourse which contained a
accept the redevelopment of the market site in principle, although great concern was felt over the
impact of the proposals on themselves as a community.
In response to the Report on Consultation, the Draft Planning Guidelines were altered.
As to whether the Neighbourhood would support the relocation of the market and the
redevelopment of the site, it was confirmed that:
The Council will regard sympathetically proposals from the Market to
move and for the redevelopment of the site, provided there are
sufficient benefits to people of the Area, and the Neighbourhood
Committee will seek adherence by any developer to the Council's
development brief (including the provision of planning gain). (BGNC
Minutes 20th July 1986).
A motion calling for a Compulsory Purchase Order on the site proposed by the Labour Group
was rejected by five votes to three. It was agreed however that mixed usage between offices,
housing, workshops, etc. should be used as a basis for the detailed Development Brief, and that
the housing element should provide a mix of tenures and types and should cater for all sections of
the local community. On the important question of planning gain, it was decided that on-site
benefits would be prefered, although off-site options would be considered to the extent that,
compared with on-site benefits, they could combine guarantees that the planning gains would
actually materialise, would be of greater social return to the community and that the provision of
benefits would occur in advance of the redevelopment of the Market. The input of Newlon
Housing Association at this stage is important to mention, for it was at their instigation, rather
than that of the developers, that the first ideas for housing as part of the planning gain on site
started to be discussed (Interview with Newlon Newlon Housing Association Representative, 8th
November 1988).
The fmal Development Brief was submitted to an Extra-Ordinary meeting of the BGNC
on the 1st October 1986, and to the Policy and Resources Committee on the 20th October, for
discussion and approval. It was approved, and the key objectives were amended. A statement
was also made that in order to achieve its planning objectives in relation to the redevelopment of
the site, the Neighbourhood would seek to impose conditions on any grants of planning
permission or Listed Building Consent, and would make use of its powers in the form of an
agreement under Section 52 of the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act to restrict or regulate
the development and use of land, and obtain planning gains for the local area. The Development
Brief received much critical appraisal, both from within Spitalfields and the borough, and from
the planning profession.
75Observer, 2nd November 1986.
76lnterview with Jon Aldenton, Tower Hamlets Environment Trust worker, 10th June 1988.
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representation of redevelopment as the solution to the problems of all parties
concerned.
The City will (also) benefit significantly from the long term
investment we are providing for it... Crucially it will offer
a great many benefits to a very hard-pressed community.
That is not the least important element of the scheme.'77
As part of the Section 52 Agreement completed between the developers, the City
of London Corporation and the local authority, a package of benefits was agreed
on to be given to 'the community'. Section 52 of the 1971 Town and Country
Planning Act gives local authorities the power to make Section 52 Agreements
with any person interested in land in their area for the purpose of restricting or
regulating the development or use of the land, either permanently or for a period
prescribed by the agreement. These agreements may contain provisions, including
fmancial provisions, that may appear to the local authority to be necessary or
expedient for the purposes of the agreement. Local authorities have seen these
agreements as a means of bargaining for planning gain and developers have at
times, according to Cullingworth, viewed them as a kind of sanction in return for
planning permission.78
The Section 52 Agreement for the Spitalfields Market redevelopment
scheme, legally guaranteeing the provision of planning gain for the local authority,
was signed in March 1988. As planning gain 118 residential units would be built
on the site by the developers, to be handed over to specified housing associations
for a peppercorn. 'Elder Gardens' and 'Homer Square', two of the open spaces
included in the scheme, were to be provided for and their maintance costs met,
including the provision of children's play facilities in Elder Gardens and full public
access to these spaces. A Fashion centre, community centre, creche and law
centre were to be provided and assisted in their management. Provision would be
made for access for archaeological investigations. A Community Trust of £2.5
million (later increased to £5 million by the House of Commons Committee)
would be established within 56 days of the Private Bill receiving Royal Assent.
This Trust would provide funds for developments in the local area, including in
particular the laying out of Allen Gardens, a recently-established open space on the
northern boundary of the Ward. Initiatives would be taken for the provision of
training including construction training, with the provision by the developers of
£50,000 (later increased to £150,000 by the House of Commons Committee) for
77Peter Beckwith, SDG Chair, quoted in City Recorder, 24th September 1987.
78Cullingworth, J.B. (1985) Town and Country Planning in Britain. Allen and Unwin,
London.
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five years for an agreed training scheme to be supervised by local agencies.
Market Garages, a company reliant on the market for custom, would be relocated.
Some of the retail units within the new development would be reserved for 'local
shopping'. Full public access to all roads and paths would be maintained.79
As the Bethnal Green Planning Department noted, obtaining these benefits,
especially after the increases had been called for by the House of Commons
Committee, had been like trying to get blood out of a stone.80
 The developers and
local authority were keen therefore to emphasise the size of the benefits that would
be provided to the 'community' by the scheme. The benefits were worth over £20
million, and the SDG emphasised in their publicity brochures their generosity, and
their committment to the scheme and the area through the provision of such
planning gains.8 ' Because certain elements in the Section 52 Agreement had to be
given 'up front' such as the £5 million community trust, the developers naturally
saw themselves as taking risks by providing so much money with no hard and fast
guarantee that the scheme when built would bring the returns envisaged when it
was first designed. 82 The Liberal Chair of the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood
Committee admitted on reflection that the benefits, although large, could have been
increased because they had let it be known to the developers too early in the
negotiations that the local authority was politically prepared to grant planning
permission. 83
 The Chief Planner of the Neighbourhood gave a more cautious
appraisal of the benefits, indicating the council's desire to obtain the maximum
benefits possible and the developers' motivation to keep such costs to a
minimum.84
The Section 52 Agreement, and the concept of planning gain more
generally, were thus deemed by the three co-signatories as a positive aspect of the
scheme. Planning gains were emphasised as a mechanism by which private
money can be used to provide for facilities and amenities in the local area, as part
of a larger commercial development. The contribution that the scheme could make
towards the regeneration of the area was stressed repeatedly:
79Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee (1987) Report: Spitalfields Wholesale Market,
Commercial St. El. 19th November 1987.
80lnterview with Peter Studdert, Chief Planner, Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, 1st September
1988.
81SIYJ A Solution to Spitalfields and What it Means to You. July 1986; SDG Update. April
1987; SDG Spiralfields: A New Chapter. October 1989.
82lnterview with Tim Budgen, consultant surveyor, SDG, 24th July 1989.
83 lnterview with Jeremy Shaw, Liberal Councillor and then Chair of the Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood Committee; 13th December 1988.
84lnterview with Peter Studdert, Chief Planner, Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, 1st September
1988.
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The redevelopment of the existing site will not only provide
additional office accommodation for the financial City, but
will also produce a vast social benefit for the Spitalfields
area. In accepting SDG's offer, the Corporation is
effectively making a massive contribution to inner city
regeneration - more than £24 million as a planning gain to
the borough of Tower Hamlets.85
Redevelopment was represented within this discourse as being in the interests of
all those affected. It attempted to deflect opposition through incorporating a key
oppositional argument.
Because Spitalfields Market was established by Royal Charter 300 years
previously, the relocation of the Market had to be legislated for by Act of
Parliament. It is worth setting out the chronology of events, because the passage
of the Bill and the delays in its passage are fundamental to the later redevelopment
story. The City of London (Spitalfields Market) Bill was lodged by the
Corporation on 27th November 1987, to enable the necessary legislation to go
before Parliament during the 1987/88 Session. The Bill stated that the market was
to be relocated due to the fact that:
The age and condition of Spitaiflelds market is such that the
market fails to meet modern needs and practices and the
situation of the market is inconvenient for transport
facilities and proper regulation.
The impracticability of providing satisfactory
accommodation for the market in new premises on or near
the site of the existing market makes it expedient that
provision be made to move the market to a new site
available at Temple Mills in the London Boroughs of
Hackney and Waltham Forest86
The wording of the Bill was crucial and deliberate. Whilst the promotion of
redevelopment as serving the interests of all affected parties had been a prominent
feature of previous pronouncements, such ideas were silenced in the Bill. The
Corporation, promoters of the Bill, included in this legislation only the idea that
relocation was required for the good of the Market. The expansion of the City of
London was not menioned. As the Campaign found to its cost, the powerful were
able to delimit the tenns of the debte as it suited them. The Bill was debated in the
House of Commons, sixteen Labour MPs having been prompted to sign a
blocking motion by the Campaign. During its Second Reading on 12th May 1988,
various points were raised criticising the plans to move the market by the two local
85Cizy Recorder, 3rd December 1987.
86City of London (Spitalfields Market) Bill 1987 p.1.
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MPs, who had been asked to object by the Campaign. These included the
undesirability and lack of necessity for moving the market; the problems of
Spitalfields itself in social, economic and housing terms; the pressing needs of the
Spitalfields community in relation to the 'solutions' being offered through
planning gain as part of the redevelopment scheme; the office boom and the
unpredictability of future office requirements; and the gains being made by the City
Corporation through this scheme. 87
 These comments were deemed to lie outside
the scope of the Bill and it passed its Second Reading on 109 votes to 21.
The Bill then passed on to its Committee stage on 8th June 1988, where
evidence presented by the City Corporation for the removal of the market was
heard by four MPs, two Labour and two Conservative, over a ten day period.
There had originally been six petitions against the Bill. Traders from the New
Covent Garden Market had petitioned because of concern about the relationship of
the new Temple Mills Market with their own sphere of influence, but later
withdrew their petition after their concerns had been 'satisfactorily addressed' by
the Corporation. The London Borough of Newham had petitioned because of
their concern about the effects of the market removal on trade at Stratford Market,
but again, their petition was withdrawn after suitable terms had been agreed
between them and the City Corporation, namely the opportunity of joining the
Spitalfields traders at the new Temple Mills site if they wished. Market traders
from Stratford had petitioned in their own right but withdrew their petition on the
7th July 1988, just before the Committee session commenced, having been
satisfied with the provisions that had been offered to them at Temple Mills, and
with various other fmancial arrangements. The Transport and General Workers
Union had petitioned because of concern over the effect of the move on employees
in the market and possible redundancies, but after the negotiation of satisfactory
undertakings and terms, and the offer of £300,000 for possible redundancies, their
petition was also withdrawn.
Therefore, out of six petitions originally submitted, only two were finally
presented at the Committee stage. Alan Thomerson, the director of four
companies trading in the market, petitioned in an individual capacity on the
grounds that in his view the proposed new site did not have the facilities required
for his business, that the new market lacked suitable protection from the elements,
and that the traffic problems at the new site would be just as bad, if not worse, at
the new site. Secondly, the Campaign to Save Spitaffields from the Developers
87Hansard Vol. 1449, CIm. 520 - 562.
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(CS SD) petitioned as an umbrella group, presenting themselves as representative
of a variety of local residents, retailers and community action and pressure groups
in the area. Their petition concerned the implications of the market removal and
the probable effects on the surrounding area of the redevelopment, including
employment and housing issues, the implications of office development
encroaching still further on the area, and the effects of redevelopment on the local
community in general terms. 88 They addressed in their petition exactly those
points on which the Bill was silent. The Corporation, Alan Thomerson and
Campaign all called wimesses.89
After hearing evidence for a total of nine days, the committee announced
on 30th June 1988 that it accepted the principle of the Bill, and did not wish to
obstruct the removal of Spitalfields Market to Temple Mills. However, the
88CSSD. House of Convnons Petition, October 1987.
89The City Corporation called a number of witnesses to support their case. Tom Simmons,
Deputy Town Clerk of the City of London, was called to give evidence from his experiences in
the officer team dealing with the question of the market removal since 1983, and explained City
policy in relation to the market and the evolution of the market relocation proposals. Peter
Studdert, Chief Planning Officer for Bethnal Green Neighbourhood was called to give evidence on
the redevelopment scheme, the benefits, to give details of the council's support for the scheme,
and to answer questions arising from the Campaign's petition. Edward Charman, The Clerk and
Superintendent of the Market, was called to give evidence dealing with the problems of the
existing market. Gordon Henderson, a Project Director with Ove Arup, engineering consultants,
was involved in studying the traffic problems on the existing and new sites, and was therefore an
important witness on current and potential traffic problems. Marius Reynolds, the Co-ordinating
Architect with the City Corporation, was called to give evidence on the physical problems of the
existing site and the evolution of the proposals for the new site. Arthur Hutchinson, Chair of the
Spitalfields Market Tenants Association and Jim Hepple, SMTA Chief Executive, both gave
evidence relating to the position of the market traders, their reasons for wanting to relocate, and
the consultation process that the City Corporation carried out with the SMTA. Richard
MacCormac, one of the architects for the redevelopment scheme at Spitalfields, was to have been
called but this was later thought to have been inappropriate. With the exception of Studdert, all
witnesses were people who could only speak on the question of Market relocation, thus
supporting the Bill as being purely concerned with precisely that
Alan Thomerson called a number of traders in support of his case. The CSSD called a
number of diverse witnesses; Pam Mossman, a resident of the market, Kay Jordan, Co-ordinator
of the Spitalfields Small Business Association (SSBA); Derek Taylor, a director of Market
Garages; Robbie MacDuff to speak on education and the role of the former Spitalfields Local
Committee in the consultation process; Councillor Phil Maxwell of Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood to speak on the matter of the consultation and the workings of the decentralised
Tower Hamlets planning departments; John Eversley, from the management committee of the
Davenant Centre to talk on training needs in the area; Patience Butler to speak on behalf of
Spitalfields Farm; Raphael Samuel to speak on the history of the area; Rosemary Sheldon to
speak as a local owner occupier about her fears of the impact of the redevelopment scheme; Myra
Garrett of the Spitalfields Health Campaign to talk in general terms about the needs of the area;
Derek Cox from Avenues Unlimited to speak about youth needs; John Johnson of the Campaign
for Homes in Central London to talk about the impact in more general terms of such
redevelopments on local communities; and Councillor Abbas Uddin of Bethnal Green
Neighbouthood to speak about the processes by which planning permission for the redevelopment
scheme had been decided. In contrast to the Corporation, these people spoke on the effects of
redevelopment on the area. This caused difficulties; the Campaign's questions were cut short
repeatedly because they did not speak to the Bill. The Corporation had the power as originator of
the Bill, to determine the discussion of it.
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Committee expressed the feeling that it shared the concern of the petitioners, and in
reponse to that it recommended a number of points. It recommended alterations be
made to the Section 52 Agreement providing planning gain in the area as part of
the redevelopment. Certain arrangements were made for Market Garages, a garage
company relying exclusively on the Market for trade. The Committee wanted to
see the commitment regarding Elder Gardens and Homer Square strengthened (the
two open spaces in the redevelopment scheme plans) in a convenant to maintain
these sites as open spaces in perpetuity. The Committee did not believe £50,000
per year an adequate amount for training schemes and recommended the sum of
£150,000 per year. Regarding the Community Trust, the Committee believed in
the light of the evidence regarding the needs of Spitalfields, that the sum should be
increased from £2.5 million to £5 million. Additionally, although outside the
scope of the Section 52 Agreement, the Committee believed that the future of Allen
Gardens should be made more secure, but was unsure as to how this could be
effected. The Committee wanted investigations carried out as to whether or not
some guarantee or equivalent covenant could be established by the local authority
to ensure that Allen Gardens would be similarly protected for the future.90
A Revival Motion was put down for the Bill on the 1st December 1988,
necessitated by the Bill not having passed through the Commons by the end of the
1987/88 session. Parliament, including (to the Campaign's dismay) the Labour
front bench voted for the Bill to be revived.91 The Third Reading in the Commons
was held on the 24th January 1989, and the Bill passed to the House of Lords.
The Second Reading in the Lords was held on 3rd April 1989, previous to which
petitions had been submitted against the Bill, including that of the CS SD, handed
in on 3rd February 1989. Lord MacIntosh at the request of the Campaign, and
agreed to object to the Bill and thus force a debate, where he spoke for the
Campaign. The deadline for petitions had to be kept open beyond the closing date
of 25th April 1989 after disclosures about a letter from the SMTA were revealed
suggesting that any petitioners against the Bill would not be given suitable
accommodation on the new premises. The final deadline for petitions was
extended therefore to the 4th of June allowing further protests to be registered. A
House of Lords Committee of five peers was appointed which began in session on
15th May 1989 and sat for a total of 12 days. A total of eight petitions were
deposited. The Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers had decided
that after the gains they had made in the House of Commons that it would be
90Housc of Commons Commitlee, ME 10, 30th June 1988. ME 11, 20th October 1988.
91Hansard, Vol.142, Clni.929. The vote was Ayes 107, Noes 23.
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worth petitioning in the House of Lords in case similar improvements to the
scheme could be enforced there. Alan Thomerson submitted two petitions, one in
his own right and one representing the interests of other market traders. Again he
argued that the new facilities at Waltham Forest were no improvement on
conditions in Spitalfields. In addition he incorporated into his arguments the fact
that the relocation was being undertaken for purely commercial reasons by the City
of London:
You've got to realize first of all that you're standing here in
the middle of a 9 - 10 acre site which is probably the most
valuable site in the world for redevelopment, right on the
edge of the City of London which I understand is now the
financial centre of the world, and obviously i?s a very
valuable site. But in spite of that and the Corporation will
get something like £60 million for the development plus a
percentage of the rents for 150 years, and then they get the
site back, they haven't got any risk. The developers will
make a lot of money out of this site and the tenants
association have agreed for us to move for a few thousand
pounds for each tenant to a market ill-designed for the
purpose.92
Three petitions from Waltham Forest, representing the protests of nine residents
about increased traffic caused by a relocated Market in their area, were deposited.
The caterers in the market petitioned, as did Market Garages. 93
 The City
Corporation gave similar evidence as it had in the Commons, calling exactly the
same witnesses. The Campaign were obliged to call fewer witnesses following
brusque treatment from the Chair: Peter Shore MP; Charlie Forman, former
worker with SHAPRS; Phil Maxwell, Abbas Uddin and Kay Jordan. Again the
Campaign were arguing precisely on the points about redevelopment upon which
the Bill was silent.
The Committee announced on the 26th June 1989 that it had rejected all the
petitions, and only required small changes in the wording of one clause of the Bill
before it could be returned to the House of Commons for final consent. The Bill
fmally received its Third Reading on 19th February 1990, and passed. It then
went on to receive Royal Assent. It took the SDG far longer than they had
anticipated and this delay had consequences both for the planned redevelopment,
92Alan Thomerson, director of Jonathan Hurst Ltd. quoted from The Week in the Lords. BBC2
Television, 9th April 1989.
93'me caterers' is a generic term used in the Market to denote those firms which process produce
for the catering trade on the site of the market. Thus they are not involved in the trade of
produce, only the purchase and pmcessing thereof.
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and for the ways in which arguments for that redevelopment were drawn from the
discourse of redevelopment.
In conclusion to this section, I have shown how the aims of the City of
London to consolidate its position as an international finance centre appear as the
real reason for the relocation of the Market. The discourse of the City concerning
redevelopment constructed the central problematic of redevelopment as
redevelopment combining the interests of all parties, including capital and local
people. The discourse allowed no recognition of the problems and contradictions
inherent within such a stragegy. This discourse is not only present in the
statements of the Corporation; in fact it appears with more force in the arguments
of two powerful institutions, the Government and the SDG. The form of that
discourse in justifing a particular type of redevelopment is the focus of the next
two sections.
Redeveloping the Inner City
The redevelopment of Spitalfields Market must be seen in the context of
Government policy towards inner urban areas and their redevelopment. The
redevelopment of Spitalfields Market could not have proceeded without the
existence of government policy towards the inner city which endorsed the
involvement of the private sector and which encouraged the economic (and thus
physical) expansion of the City of London. As Savitch notes, peculiar to the UK
has been the salient role of political parties in providing cues for the response to
post-industrialism and how to plan for it. The Conservative Government certainly
set the ideological tone for the debate. 94
 As the SDG themselves said, 'we're not
sure we'd be so confident of the scheme under a different government'.95
This is not the place to commence a comprehensive analysis of urban
policy and the underpinning ideology used by the Conservative government or its
predecessor with regard to urban redevelopment.96
 It is however possible to draw
94Savitch, H.V. (1988) Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris and
London. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. p.10.
95Meeting between Brian Cheetham and Peter Bradley, representatives of SDG and members of
the CSSD, 20th March 1990.
96For an account of the 1974 - 9 Labour administration, and the first two years of the present
Conservative administration, see Gibson, M.S. and Langstaff, MJ. (1982) An Introduction to
Urban Renewal. Hutchinson, London. Final Chapter. For a less comprehensive but useful
introduction to more recent urban policy, see Robson, B. (1988) Those Inner Cities. Clarendon
Press, Oxford. See also Harrison, P. (1983) Inside the Inner City: Life Under the Cutting Edge.
Penguin, Harmondsworth.
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Out some of its more pertinent featues as they relate to the subject matter of this
chapter by examining statements made in the Government's Action for Cities
brochure.97
In it, the Government represented the inner city in a specific way and
through this analysis pointed to private sector investment as the only means by
which the problems of inner urban areas could be resolved.
The term 'inner cities' conjures up an image of a run-down
urban environment. It covers towns as well as cities and
areas ranging from those which have seen better days to
acutely depressing examples of crime-ridden dereliction.98
The regeneration of inner cities is named as the responsibility of private enterprise:
Success cannot be imposed by central Government.
There is no universal formula which can be dictated from
Whitehall. The spark of regeneration must come from
within the inner cities themselves. This does not mean
leaving it all to the local authorities which for many years
were allowed to decide the priorities and be the main
channel for finance. It means firing the enthusiasm of local
businesses, local leaders, local people: those who know the
cities from the inside and have the will to change them.99
The City, as I illustrated above, represented the redevelopment of
Spitalfields market as serving the interests of all parties in the area. The
Government portrayed the redevelopment of inner city areas in a similar fashion:
The Government wants inner city residents to have more
opportunities to share in the new prosperity. They - just
like everyone else - should be able to enjoy greater freedom
and choice. They, as much as anyone, want good homes
for their families and good schools for their children. They
want to live and work in a safe and decent environment.
The inner cities must also be places where businessmen
want to invest. They also want to be able to get on with
their business; to press ahead with sensible development
without unnecessary red tape; to keep their costs as low as
possible, and not be punished by excessive rate demands;
to be made welcome. For this to happen, the inner cities
need to rediscover their sense of civic pride that once united
residents and business.1
97The Action for Cities venture, launched in March 1988 by the Prime Minister as a means by
which existing resources could be 'reconcentrated'. The work of six Government departments
(Envimnment, Health, Employment, Education, Trade and Industry, and Transport) was to be co-
ordinated, a land register created and unused local authority land would be bought under
compulsory purchase.
98Action for Cities. October 1988. Cabinet Office, London. p. 2.
99ibid. p. 5.
100ibid. p.3.
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In this quotation we see the encouragement of urban regeneration through private
enterprise, and portrayed as a process that would benefit everybody living in inner
city areas. This policy of redevelopment led by the private sector has been
legislated for, for example in the establishment of Urban Development
Corporations, such as the London Docklands Development Corporation.
Encouragement of redevelopment in Spitalfields had come through the
general endorsement of private sector involvement in redevelopment schemes. In
Spitalfields the Government has also employed specific policies to encourage this
process. The Government Task Forces constituted part of the government's
programme for inner city aid. The Spitalfields Task Force was established in April
1987o-ordinate the resources of Government departments, local businesses,
local authorities, and other charitable, voluntary and non-profit making
organisations. The Spitalfields Task Force's advertised its specific remit as aiming
to create employment for local people, encouraging the growth and development of
small and new businesses in the area; improving the employability of local people
through skills training; and improving the local environment, including the
renovation of derelict buildings, measures for crime prevention and the
development of leisure facilities and other local amenities. 101 Specifically, the
high levels of unemployment and skill mismatch in the area were to be tackled with
matching labour power available in the area with jobs in information technology in
the City. The Task Force had declared publicly that its role in the area was to
enable benefits in the forms of job opportunities to be obtained from such
developments as Spitalfields Market. 102
 The location of the Task Force in
Spitalfields thus indicates a government presence in the area, encouraging the type
of urban policy it endorsed.
Redeveloping Spitalfields
The SDG won the City Corporation's tender for redevelopment. In this
section I shall examine the SDG's representation of redevelopment, which in many
ways paralleled that of the City. We should locate the plans for the removal of
Spitalfields Market and the redevelopment of the site within the context of the
expansion of the City of London. Thiborne out if the plans for a redeveloped
market site, drawn up by the SDG, are considered. However, the plans were not
101 What is the Spitalfields Task Force? Action For Cities publicity brochure. Undated.
102Meeting of the Community Development Group (CDG), 9th May 1989.
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necessarily counched in those terms by the SDG. We should also examine the
SDG's statements on redevelopment by looking at the claims made about their
proposals, specifically with regard to the benefits that would accrue to the local
population, because the SDG's portrayal of redevelopment constitutes the
discourse against which the Campaign had to compete in order to argue against the
redevelopment of the market. I shall emphasise here the ways in which the SDG
emphasised the benefits of their scheme to the area.
This particular part of the story commences with the interest shown by two
freelance surveyors in the market site during 1983.103 Noting the central location
and its good public transport and road connections, they proposed on the site a
shopping centre that could attract a large amount of custom from both Tower
Hamlets residents, who were particularly ill-served in terms of large retail outlets,
and from City office workers. At that time the plans for a shopping centre at an
empty site in Whitechapel appeared to be coming into fruition. 104
 Because of
these plans, the Borough indicated that any attempts to redevelop the Spitalfields
Market site for retail would be met with opposition from the local authority, but
that offices, restaurants and speciality shops would be deemed more appropriate.
Approaches were made by this pair to the London and Edinburgh Trust, an
expanding property company, who adopted the idea.' 05
 Through a company
known as London and Metropolitan, jointly owned by LET and Balfour Beatty,
and in anticipation of plans as yet unformulated for the market site, London and
Metropolitan started to purchase properties on the Bishopsgate frontage - a cafe on
the corner of Bishopsgate and Spital Square, and 284 - 294 Bishopsgate.
Important sites on the frontage were owned by County and District Properties, a
subsidiary of Costains, so in order to expand the venture this company joined the
LET and Balfour Beatty scheme, becoming the Spitalfields Development Group,
and bringing with them the Central Foundation School site and St. Botolphs Hall.
The 'Big Bang' and the success of Rosehaugh's Broadgate scheme over Broad
Street and Liverpool Street Stations (across the road from Spitalfields Market)
provided a crucial boost to the plans.
The first plans submitted to the Corporation for the redevelopment of
Spitalfields Market had as their major component a large amount of office space -
1,320,320 ft. sq. - with 158,050 ft. sq. residential accommodation, 65,705 ft. sq.
103lnterview with Tim Budgen, Property Surveyor, LET/SDG, 24th July 1989.
104These plans have a long and complex history. The latest plans were dropped in December
1988.
105lnterview with Tim Budgen, Property surveyor, LET/SDG, 24th July 1989.
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retail space and 87,502 ft. sq. for small businesses. Peter Beckwith, Chair of
SDG, speaking on the occasion of the unveiling of the plans clearly was quite keen
to see the plans as acceptable to the local authority and local population. This
image of the redevelopment was manufactured in the following way:
It clearly isn't just a commercial site - it is a community of
people as much as it is bricks and mortar - there will be
shops, houses and so on. There will be a tremendous
boost for local jobs. The existing market employs 1,500
people whose jobs will be secured on a new site. The new
development will generate 6,000 extra jobs not only in
white collar banking work, but in clerical, maintenance and
other service functions. The intention is to create a living
environment, something that doesn't just end at 5 o'clock
when office workers leave. Because this will be so much
more than an office development it will be used by the
whole community.106
This quotation stresses the importance to the local economy of the redevelopment.
It does perhaps imply that low status, low skill jobs will be provided for the local
population, but the SDG's Chairperson by-passes this problem by stressing the
benefit to the area of the scheme. The possible incompatibility of large scale office
development in the area is not considered.
The employment of Richard MacCormac, a self-styled 'community
architect', was part of this process of image manufacture. The developers
portrayed themselves as anxious that the redevelopment should not be seen purely
as an office block, despite the overwhelming dominance of office uses in terms of
floor space:
When one speaks of office blocks, one speaks of the most
hated kind of architecture. Our idea is of a kind of
'chameleon' - it will be difficult to tell where existing
buildings end and the new scheme begins. The office area
will never engage the pavements except at the centre of the
site, and it is possible to have the skirts of the office block
inhabited by retailers.107
Redevelopment, according to my reading of this quotation, is promoted in
naturalised imagery. The new structure would be organic, would blend into the
existing urban fabric, would not constitute a large ugly piece of architecture. In
the spirit of this idea, the developers set in motion a public relations machine
geared towards the construction of a public image of 'community-aware' 'socially
106Peter Beckwith, speaking for LET/SDG, quoted in the City Recorder, 11th October 1986.
107Richard MacCormac, architect of part of the first SDO redevelopment scheme, quoted in the
City Recorder, 11th October 1986.
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responsible' redevelopment. This representation had as a major component a
justification of redevelopment of the area for the good of the people who lived
there.
In December 1986 the company aquired 274-280 Bishopsgate,
consolidating their hold on the frontage of the site. In April 1987 they published
revised plans for a scheme which 'would become an blue print for other inner city
developments in Britain and perhaps abroad'.' 08
 In a series of exhibitions held in
April 1987 the plans were displayed to the public as part of a public consultation
exercise; the response was poor. In September 1987 the Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood Committee (BGNC), with the proviso that certain
recommendations were to be met, granted planning permission to the SDG and to
Rosehaugh Stanhope by a vote of 3 to 2, other committee members being absent.
A crucial precondition for the City Corporation's plans to release the site for
redevelopment had been decided on the casting vote of the Liberal chair of the
Neighbourhood Committee. The Spitalfields Market Bill then went before
Parliament; the SDG were not invo1ved.'9
108Spitalfields Development Group Update. April 1987 Publicity Brochure.
'09By 1988 it was not just the Market that was being planned for redevelopment. Spitalfields,
the SDG declared, is an area:
...which for a century has been isolated by the market from the
prosperity of other, more priviledged neighbourhoods. The market's
relocation to Temple Mills at last provides the opportunity to re-
establish Spitalfields' relationship with the City to their mutual
advantage. (SDG Spitalfields Marker: A New Chapter, October 1989
Publicity Brochure.)
That relationship, if it is re-established, will be cemented by the fact that the redevelopment of
Spitaffields, five years from the first interest of SDG in the Market site, now involves the
wholescale reshaping of up to 20% of the ward area. Amongst some people watching as the
Market redevelopment plans unfolded, an assumption had been made that although further
redevelopment of the area was likely, it would not be immediate but would 'slip-stream' on the
success of the market scheme. (Interviews with Kay Jordan and David Brown, SSBA workers,
21st July 1989). Although the historic buffer of the market would go, other developers would
wait and watch the success of that scheme before tackling other derelict or 'developable' sites in
the area, such as Trumans Brewery or Bishopsgate Goodsyard, the Nicholls and Clarke site or
Great Eastern Buildings site.
The first indication that this would happen came with the announcement in the summer
of 1988 by the British Rail Property Board, that they were inviting tenders for the redevelopment
of the old derelict Bishopsgate Goodsyard, at that time used as a car park. In response to this, the
Bethnal Green Neighbourhood and Hackney Council, as joint planning authorities for the site,
produced Draft Development Guidelines that were then put Out for public consultation in June
1988. Following suggestions elicited during the public consultation in September and October
1988, the two local authorities published their Development Brief in December 1988. The Brief
stated that a mixture of local employment should be offered, with housing and shops around Brick
Lane and offices at the western end. A substantial part of the plan hinged around new railway
lines, the plans for which at the time of writing are unclear. The London and Edinburgh Trust
submitted for the tender, and were shortlisted. It is through the development of the plans for the
Bishopsgate Goodsyard site that changes in the discourse of redevelopment start to appear quite
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The scheme as it stood included 885,000 sq. ft. of office space
incorporating 80,000 sq. ft. for which planning permission had already been
obtained on the Central Foundation School site on Bishopsgate, owned by
Costains. 200,000 ft. sq. was to be devoted to housing, both for sale and for
local needs under the Section 52 Agreement. 120,000 sq. ft. was to be set aside
for retail, 70,000 ft. sq. reserved for public buildings of various kinds under the
Section 52 Agreeement and 65,000 sq. ft. for small business units.' In
November 1988 the SDG advertised for a Chief Executive to direct the Spitalfields
Market scheme. The chosen candidate, earning £150,000 per year, would be 'a
dynamo', and he (sic) would have to show ability in public relations and
negotiations matters:
Obviously some political agility will be necessary because
Tower Hamlets are notoriously difficult to deal with.111
Rumours about substantial changes to the SDO's plans for the redeveloped
site abounded, following an article in Estates Times on 28th October 1988 hinting
at a reduction in office space and a substantial increase in retail facilites on a
clearly. In the January of 1989, a 'community planning weekend' was convened by Hunt
Thompson, the architects responsible for the design of the scheme. Public Relations tactics such
as listing 'invited speakers' on the programme (whether they had accepted or not) and publishing
details of all 'invited groups' (whether they appeared or not) were used in order to legitimize the
exercise. Groups such as the CSSD boycotted the weekend due to their reservations about its
validity in terms of public consultation. Yet their logo was used in a video promoting the
scheme suggesting endorsement from the Campaign for the plans. Ultimately, it was the
developers, LET, who were able to gain through this, by presenting their plans to British Rail
and to the Neighbourhood planning officers as being apparently 'publically endorsed'.
In February 1989, Grand Metropolitan announced that Trumans Brewery on Brick Lane
was to close, and that the 10 acre site would be redeveloped, excluding those parts which the
company wished to keep for their Listed Buildings status and/or for their head offices. A Draft
Development Brief was published by Bethnal Green Neighbourhood in June 1989, stating that a
variety of uses would be acceptable - housing, open space, local shops, restaurants, showrooms,
small warehouses, workshops, leisure facilities, training facilities, community facilities and
small professional offices. Further details are not known as yet. On the Whitechapel site,
uncertainty remains. A strong possibility is that a school will be built, the educational needs of
Tower Hamlets over the next decadSIy great.
The future of the Great Eastern Buildings site, sandwiched between the Bishopsgate
Goodsyard to the North and Trumans Brewery to the south, remains uncertain. A Development
Brief had been prepared in October 1987, but no further information is available. Sites such as
Selby St, designated for housing association homes, have uncertain futures whilst plans by
bodies such as London Regional Transport and British Rail are prepared for possible extensions to
London's rail network through the western part of Tower Hamlets. Speculation over the very
future of council housing in the area continues. Although government plans for a Housing
Action Trust have now been defeated, the possibility of the takeover of entire estates by private
landlords remains. The environment and social structure of the area, whatever happens, is likely
to change.
' 10Bethp,j Green Neighbourhood Chief Planner, House of Commons, ME 2, p.8. 9th June
1988.
111Job Specification for post of Chief Executive, SDG, October 1988.
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redeveloped site. The new plans would include a 'Galeria' modelled on a larger
and more famous arcade in Milan. 112 As would be expected, the changes over the
previous two years in demand for office market, the development of Canary Wharf
as a major office development in Docklands with an estimated 10 million sq. ft. of
space, and the collapse of the Whitechapel shopping centre scheme, had all
contributed to a decision to change the plans for Spitalfields market. The
resignation of Richard MacCormac, 'community architect' in the scheme, was also
associated with the changes in the plans. The SDG had employed a large
American architectural practice, Swanke Haydn Connell, to oversee the new plans
and the eventual construction of the scheme. As Forman noted with reference to
earlier developments in Spitalfields, with the demand for office space being so
closely related to the volatility of the stock market, development of office space for
this market automatically becomes a gamble. 113 Odds on the success of such
schemes are improved by, for example, holding land with existing planning
permission,114 or by utilising construction expertise that will facilitate the rapid
construction of office buildings. This appears to be exactly what occurred for the
SDG. Having been delayed, much to their chagrin, by the lengthy Parliamentary
procedure of the Private Bill, time was, if not running out, running short:
.from our point of view we've got a lot of building to go
up in a short space of time. Swanke Haydn are used to
American methods and large buildings... We had to have
somebody with experience...'15
The developers were eager, however, to appear grateful for the delays bought
about by legislation, having been given a second bite at the cherry by a:
...lengthy Parliamentary process allowing SDG to review
its earlier proposals measuring them against current
demands both from the City and from Spitalfields and
adapting them to meet those needs and expectations."6
The redesigned scheme included a small reduction in the total amount of
office space, but a greater variation in the size and type of units. The new plans
had a massively increased retail component in the form of 'a major food store' and
more speciality shops. The housing and open space components remained the
"2Estates Times, 28th October 1988.
' 13Fonnan, C. (1989) Spitalfields: A Battle for Land.
114The are several sites in the area which hold planning pennission which will not be used, for
example, the Nicholls and Clarke builders' merchants site, and Costain's holdings on
Bishopsgate.
' 15thview with Tim Budgen, LET/SDG Surveyor, 24th July 1989.
116Spitalfields Development Group Spitalfields: A New Chapter. SDG, October 1989.
(Publicity Brochure).
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same, as did arrangements for the fashion centre, creche and workshops. The
Section 52 Agreement remained, but unsurpiisingly, the commerical components
of the scheme would provide the resources for social benefit. 117
 The SDG were
keen to see this scheme as evidence of their commitment to the regeneration of the
area, not only in terms of improved design, but also in terms of their continued
plans for the site. The SDG emphasized in their publicity material and public
statements their gratitude to groups such as the Campaign for holding up
Parliamentary proceedings in order to give the SDG enough time to reformulate
more 'suitable plans' and establish a greater degree of contact with various groups
active in the area.118
The representation of redevelopment constructed by the SDG clearly
parallels that of the Government with regard to inner city redevelopment. The
earliest SDG publicity brochures distributed to every household in Spitalfields in
June 1986 portrayed the needs of the area and its residents in terms of a problem,
the solution of which:
..means finding a scheme which will respect what already
exists in Spitalfields - a community of people as much as
its bricks and mortar - but at the same time generate enough
money to help finance itself and cover the immense costs of
providing the market traders with a new home.119
The question of whether a commercial office development could be compatible
with providing for the needs of the residents and the area was glossed over.
Community is a word given particular positive values, and is linked to a particular
economic argument on the best type of aid for the area. The necessity of
commercial development is normalised, taken as given, assumed as shared
knowledge and therefore unquestioned. The 'problem' is presented in terms of
finding suitable solutions rather than questioning the source of the problem. A
year later the emphasis is still on 'getting it right', on finding a 'solution' for the
'problem' of the area that is:
'Right for local people, architectually sympathetic to the
Spitalfields environment and at the same time economically
realistic. 120 (i-I -
'17Ibid.
"8Inview with Brian Cheetham, SDG Chief Executive, 27th November 1989.
119StY3 A Solution for Spitalfields and what it means for you. Spitalfields Development
Group, June 1986.
120s1y3 Spitalfields Market: Update. Spitalfields Development Group, October 1987.
Publicity brochure.
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Conflicts of interests are however recognised; the type of scheme that Tower
Hamlets council would have liked on the Spitalfields Market site (although exactly
what this would have meant is unstated) would, according to the SDG, not finance
the purchase price the Corporation would expect, let alone the cost of moving the
Market. The problem is thus presented as one between the interests of two
institutions, with the interests of the residents of the area sandwiched inbetween.
The only practical solution is to fmd a middle ground
between what the Corporation wants and what Tower
Hamlets wants; and to ensure that this middle ground
offers the people who live and work in Spitaiflelds the best
deal possible in all the circumstances.121
Nothing is promised, no concrete assurance is given, only the SDG's word that it
would attempt to do its best for the residents.
Over a period of two years, the SDG did however change the ways in
which it portrayed development. In later statements the best interests of the
community were promoted, upfront, as being part and parcel of the regeneration of
the area. There was no bashfulness in stating the need for commercial
development, but the community's needs were pushed to the fore in order to
represent the company as 'community conscious'. Private redevelopment was
presented as the mechanism by which public gain could be ensured:
SDG's scheme is not only designed to meet the City's
needs. It will also make a very significant contribution to
both the economic and environmental regeneration of
Spitalfields and its community; for the commercial
components of SDG's plans will provide the resources for
a wide range of social benefits.122
I would attribute this subtle change in the discourse of the developers to the
appearing of an opposition group - the Campaign - arguing against redevelopment
on the grounds that it would disrupt the 'community' in Spitalfields, and that
redevelopment wà's being carried out in the interests of the private sector. Over
time the SDG's statements incorporated this criticism and by so doing tried to
remove from the Campaign their main arguments.
This representation of redevelopment was not the sole preserve of the
SDG. For example, a publicity brochure for the joint Grand Metropolitan/LET
development of the Trumans Brewery opens with the following statement:
i22yJ Spitalfields - A New Chapter.
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By pooling resources and undertaking a continuing
dialogue with the local community the companies believe
they can regenerate the area both economically and socially
in a way which will be of long term benefit to all those
involved and especially those who live and work in the
area.123
The emphasis is on continuous dialogue, giving a public appearance of community
consultation - which in actual fact had occurred in a meagre and private way
between the developers and selected groups in January 1989 and during the
summer of the 1989. The legitimacy of the developer's plans is granted through
their ability to include in their glossy brochures information on the involvement of
the Community Development Group, established as a mechanism for involving
local people in the redevelopment process and achieving what gains it could. The
result is a brochure presenting the developers as working for the people of the area
and as endorsed by all the existing residents to do so. At a meeting between the
CSSD and the SDG in March 1990, we were told how the scheme would 'bring
the wealth of the City into Spitalfields and the value of Spitalfields to the City';
how the developers 'see out there great needs and a great need to get out there and
do something'; 'essentially we're developers, we're here to do something'.'24
A further example of the development of 'community consciousness'
comes from the London and Edinburgh Trust's joint initiative in establishing
Avatar with Balfour Beatty. Avatar was a company formed specifically for inner
urban redevelopment working mainly outside London. It styled itself as being
'formed as a response to the new opportunities and challenges presented by the
call of both central and local government for public-private sector partnership in
the regeneration of our inner cities and their communities'. 125 It claimed
partnership as the key to its success which ensured that 'development schemes are
profitable for the private sector while being socially and economically desirable for
the public sector."26
 Their 'community consciousness' was thrust to the fore, for
example with their emphasis on public consultation at every stage of a project.
Precisely what this public consultation implied, for example in the construction of
their Arcadian Scheme in the centre of Birmingham, was of course never raised.
Finally, LET's 1988 Annual Report succinctly illustrated the ways in
which lip-service to ideas of 'community' awareness could be used to give the
'23thndon And Edinburgh Trust Building a Partnership from Brick Lane to Bishopsgate.
London and Edinburgh Trust and Grand Metropolitan. Publicity Brochure November 1989.
'24Meeting between representatives of the SDG and CSSD, 20th March 1990.
1 LET Avatar: Urban Venture Partnerships. Publicity document, 1989.
6ibid.
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company some kind of philanthropic credibility. The 'corporate statement' listed
'social responsibility to the community' as a key point, after such concerns as
creation of value for shareholders, quality of product and mangement,
diversification into businesses compatible with property and global spread of
interests. The Annual Report also had a section on tET in the community' giving
details of money donated through its involvement with the Per Cent Club - (half of
1% of its UK profits before taxation are spent on charitable activities). Schemes
supported include Save the Children, and grant assistance to what it terms 'local
community projects'.'27
It would be more satisfactory for my arguments were I to have at my
disposal more than anecdotal evidence for the SDG's private views of
redevelopment in the area. Whilst the opposition to redevelopment is examined in
detail below with reference to many interviews and conversations with Campaign
members, I obviously was not privy to such detailed knowledge from the SDG.
To paraphrase P.J. O'Rourke, these people do not get where they are today by
being dumb enough to tell research students the truth. 128
 The Chair of the SDG is
credited by two sources at being bemused by the 'problem' of a 'Bengali ghetto'
on his doorstep, and puzzled as to 'why they could not all move to Bradford
where they surely must have friends'. 129 Bengali settlement in the area was
understood as a great inconvenience for the development plans:
Part of the problem is the Bengalis all want to live in a little
huddle together - I can understand why, for security, but I
mean.. • we hope that they'll all thrive and do well out of
it...13°
This surveyor in the SDG thought quite sincerely, he said, that redevelopment
could only benefit members of the Bengali community in Spitaiflelds:
There's all this talk of "we've got to defend Commercial
Street" and "we mustn't let all this increase the values", but
as the area improves surely the people in the area are going
to benefit. I appreciate that not everybody gains, but say a
little chappie who owns a little property in one of these
streets around here; he gets a very good price and he goes
and buys a bigger patch.'3'
l27 pj and Edinburgh Trust (1988) Annual Report. LET, London.
1280Rourke, P.J. (1989) Holidays in Hell. Picador, London. p.12.
129Pers. Comm. SSBA Employees, various.
130lnterview with Tim Budgen, LET/SDG Surveryor, 24th July 1989.
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Not everyone benefits from such redevelopment schemes. The SDG
representative knew that. Redevelopment schemes that are financed by the private
sector have to be profitable to that sector, and although trickle-down benefits may
be available to a few, that is not their primary intention. Redevelopment of
Spitalfields Market was therefore represented in such a way as to emphasise the
possibility of 'community' benefit, and to silence the possibility of conflicts of
interests between groups over the use of the Market site.
Conclusion
In this chapter, to summarize, I have introduced Spitalfields as an inner
city area in central London. In this area a fruit and vegetable wholesale market
was located on a site in buildings which were less than satisfactory for its
function. Despite this, until the Market's owners were required to look for ways
of enabling the expansion of the City as an international finance centre, the future
of the market on that site seemed secure. When the SDG deposited relocation
plans at the Corporation for their approval the Corporation was cautious, but made
the decision to move the Market and open up a large area in central London for
redevelopment. It justified relocation on the grounds that the requirements of the
Market necessitated this step and was to a large extent silent on the expansion of
the City, apart from within the close confines of the City's development industry.
The relocation of the Market and development of the site occurred under a
government whose policies towards the problems of inner city areas had been
directed at the solution of such problems though private investment. A
development company drawing on the same discourses of redevelopment as the
City Corporation and Government, articulated its redevelopment plans in a
language that emphasized the scheme as inner city redevelopment rather than as
expansion of City office space.
I have now set the context for my examination of the Campaign to Save
Spitalfields from the Developers as a group that argued against the redevelopment
of Spitalfields and the relocation of the Market. In the next chapter, I shall
introduce this group and their arguments. In Chapter Four I shall examine the
origins of the Campaign. In Chapter Five, I shall discuss the ways in which
Spitalfields was presented and the images the Campaign held about the area and
used in support of their arguments against redevelopment. In Chapter Six I shall
examine how the Campaign coped with the appearance of another group that drew
upon the same constituency yet viewed redevelopment in a very different way.
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Chapter Three
The Campaign to Save
Spitalfields from the Developers
In this chapter I shall discuss the Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the
Developers, the group that formed to oppose the relocation of Spitalfields Market.
I shall examine its origins and establishment and shall then look at its tactics of
opposition. I go on to present the arguments it made against the relocation of the
Market and the redevelopment of the site.
The Birth of the Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the
Developers.
On the 8th October 1987 at a meeting of Spitaffields Ward Labour Party,
and a month before planning permission on the first Spitalfields Market scheme
was to be finalised by the Liberal-controlled Bethnal Green Neighbourhood
Committee, Councillor Phil Maxwell bought to his ward a report on the
implications of the redevelopment of Spitalfields Market following a briefing by
planners. After discussion of the matter, the meeting voted to organise a campaign
around the issue, with one member to act as co-ordinator. 1
 A first public meeting
was held on the 9th November 1987, following a mailing to tenants groups and
local organisations in the ward from the Ward Labour Party:
We hope that out of that meeting will come a broad based
campaign group, which would work closely together over
the coming months and possible years, to try to stave off
the worst effects of the City developers on Spitalfields.2
An initial logo declaring 'Homes not Offices' adorned the publicity handout.3
1 Spitalfields Labour Party, Minutes. 8th October 1987.
2j	 from Spitalfields Ward Labour Party to community organisations, 4th November 1987.
3CSSD notice of a public meeting on 'The Implications of Spitalfields Market Redevelopment',
November 1987.
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3.1 Notice advertising a public meeting on the redevelopment of Spitalfields
Market.
THE IThIVELOPNFS MOVE IN!
tP GO LA!]) PRICES	
I	
'.3R icthi .9fflThe current cost of land in the
BethnalGreen area is - 	 __________________________________________________
SPITALFIELDS WARD 1.ABOUR PARTY
is holding a PUBLIC NETING
ON
LJflI r ri T';
MONDAY NOVEMBER 9th at 73OD.rr
Industrial land = £3-400,000 /acre
Residential land - £ million /acre
Office land = £600,000+ /acre
In the Spitalfields Market area,
the average price is
With the onset of the development
of the Market, prices are likely
to 'go through the roof '. It is
estimated that office space in the
developed market area will have a
starting rent of £30/sq.ft. Potential
office space on the east Bide of
Commercial Street will probably
attract a starting rent of £25/sq.ft.
The value of land in the surrounding
area to the market has soared
spectacularly in the weeks following
the Council's decision to grant
planning permission.	 A house in
Wilkes Street is currently on the
market for £350,000.
UNEMPLOYINT
It is the intentions of the Liberal
Councillors in the Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood area to change the
bulk of West Spitalfields into a
Business Improvement. Area. This
will further escalate the price of
land. The Council has already
earmarked the Great Eastern Buildings
on Brick Lane for "small office
business suite&'. A short time ago
small traders were evicted from these
premises. A number of businesses
which employ local people have already
indicated their intention to move
out of Spitalfields. The majority
of the aix principal owners of the
leather industry (not Bengali owned)
will certainly sell their properties
to developers. The main source of
local employment (the rag trade)
will all but disappear within the
next 4 years. We face the almost
certain future of unprecedented
unemployment coupled with the selling
off of council accomodation - Herbert
and Jacobson blocks have been secretly
earmarked	 for	 "development
improvements".
TB FIGBL'BLCKUnless the office development
proposals collapse or the cosmunity
in Spitalfie].ds Unites in Opposition
to the pressure fros the developers,
then our community and housing will
be decimated jtjj the next 7 or8 years.
Come and join us to work out
how we're going to CAMPAIGN
against the threat to OUR
community. The three Spital-
fields Councillors (Phil Max-
well, Ghulam Mortuza and Abbas
uddin) and Mark Adams from
SRAPRS will be there to answer
YOUR questions and talk about
what we can do TOGETEER to
START TEE FIGHTBACK.
rat
The Montefiore Centre,
Deal Street/Hanbury Street, El
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Interviewed 18 months later, those responsible for the establishment of the
Campaign, amongst them Jil Cove and Robbie MacDuff, said that they had no
clear ideas as to what such a Campaign could achieve, the arguments they would
make, or the fora available for their presentation. The founder members stated that
they had taken the decision to organize a campaign against the relocation of the
Market because they felt the issue of redevelopment to be an important one. This
stated uncertainty about the Campaign is perhaps false modesty given the
experience of many founder members of the Campaign in the Labour Party, and
their knowledge of possible tactics of opposition. Either way, in October 1987 at
a later Planning Group meeting of the Labour Party the decision was taken to press
ahead with a campaign. Although informally very close connections between the
Campaign and the Labour Party would exist thoughout the course of the
Campaign, it was taken out of the Labour Party with the aim of establishing the
Campaign on as broad a base of support as possible. 4 As the first circular letter
pointed out:
Whilst Spitalfields Labour Party is starting this action, we
want as many members of local community groups, tenants
associations, trades unions and all those who live and work
in the area and care about Spitalfields to join together in an
attempt to preserve the very special character of the area.5
The founder members of the Campaign were ambivalent, on reflection,
about its Labour Party roots. The choice to take the Campaign out of the Labour
Party was made specifically because it was felt its link with the Party would have
affected participation and people's views of the Campaign. For its credibility it
needed to be seen as a 'community group'. 6 It was a conscious decision, as one
member put it, 'so we couldn't be charged with being a politically motivated
campaign'.7 Another member considered the implications of market removal to be
of concern to everyone in the area and not just the Labour Party; the Campaign
should therefore be open to other groups and individuals. 8 Another member was
unconcerned about the Labour Party roots of the Campaign, and more interested
upon joining to find that someone was actually starting a Campaign:
I think the initiative might have come from there, but
certainly the people that went to the meetings I don't think
4lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
5Leuer from iii Cove, a founder member of the Capaign and subsequent co-ordinator, to
community organisations, 4th November 1987.
6V&ijs interviews and conversations with various Campaign members.
7lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, a founder member of the Campaign, 11th July 1989.
8Convjons with Campaign members, 1989, various.
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were Labour Party people. I'm not. It's my feeling that it
was people that were interested and they just - perhaps it
was just one or two people from the Labour Party who set
the forum for it, so it was obviously a need. You know,
like ourselves, we were desperate to get ourselves to get a
group together to oppose the Bill. So it was really good
that it was done.9
Reflecting on this decision 18 months later, some members of the
Campaign were undecided as to whether this had been a useful strategy or not.
Their prominence in local Labour Party politics had led to their being labelled as a
Labour Party Campaign in any case. 10 The Labour Party would not get any credit
for the gains the Campaign had made - potentially a useful strategy against the
Liberals in the May 1990 local authority elections. A Labour Party campaign
could perhaps be more aggressive in its opposition than one based in the
'community'. Robbie MacDuff considered that they had done all they could to
'disassociate' themselves from the Labour Party. Nonetheless, a 'problem' had
remained, in the view of Campaign members, due to the inability of the Liberal
councifiors to perceive them as anything other than their opposition:
I'm sufficiently involved in community organisations to
know that there's a different tone that you take between a
highly profiled campaign, that is a political party, and a
community campaign, and I don't think we led the
Campaign on political terms, I think we led it on
community terms and unfortunately the Liberals on the
Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee could not see
the difference between the two, and I think that's worrying
for the way in which the committee is run.
The view held by the Liberal members of the Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood Committee about the CSSD was scathing. One member was quite
adamant that the Campaign should be seen purely as a Labour Party front, who
were viewed as hypocritical because they claimed the gains made to the Section 52
Agreement in the House of Commons, yet opposed the development outright.12
Another was positively abusive:
...the CSSD is an unrepresentative, narrowly based,
undemocratic, secretive and doctrinaire clique of
malcontents... When the market is relocated, thus ensuring
its prosperity as well as the prosperity of the Spitalfields
9lnterview with Pam Mossman, Campaign member, 4th July 1989.
'°Interview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
thterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
12lnterview with Liberal Councillor Jeremy Shaw, 13th December 1988.
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area, people will look back at the antics of this coterie and
liken you to the Flat Earth Society.'3
As this quotation indicates, the Campaign were seen by the Liberal members of the
BGNC as a threat, because of its political origins.
It is instructive to look at the opinion of others towards the Campaign.
Just after the Campaign had made its first appearance in the House of Commons
Committee, a worker for the Tower Hamlets Environment Trust denounced the
Campaign's work as 'stable door stuff - shutting it after the horse had bolted, an
allusion to the late appearance of the Campaign during the unfolding of the
redevelopment plans. He wondered aloud what the organisers had been involved
with at that time with the Labour Party that had prevented the earlier establishment
of a Campaign.'4 He was later to change his view after the Campaign had
managed to get additions to the Section 52 Agreement, and had proved their worth
by continuing to involve themselves in the plans for the future of the Market and
the area.15
The two representatives from the SDG that I spoke to gave different
interpretations of the role of the Labour Party in the establishment and management
of the Campaign. One was scathing and possibly slanderous:
• ..isn't Jil Cove - part of her ambition is to take over where
Peter Shore retires - but isn't that part of her reasoning
behind it all? At the early public meetings that we went to
Jil Cove didn't appear for a year, until she formed the Save
the Spitalfields Campaign. I went to public meetings, or
council meetings at Bethnal Green, and the Labour Party
didn't turn up at all. MacCormac showed his plans and
there wasn't a single Labour there.16
Another was more sympathetic, probably because of his own affiliations with the
Labour Party.'7
The Chief Planner of the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood whilst not
prepared to dismiss the Campaign as just a Labour Party front, initially saw their
critique of the redevelopment process as being representative of the views of only
a small proportion of the local population. In his view they had entered to debate
to Campaign from Liberal Councilor Paddy Streeter, 10th January 1989.
14lnterview with John Aldenton, worker with Tower Hamlets Environment Trust, 10th June
1988.
15John Aldenton, Tower Hamlets Environment Trust Worker, various Community Development
Group meetings during 1989.
'6lnterview with Tim Budgen, LET/SDG, 24th July 1989.
'7lnterview with Brian Cheetham, SDG Chief Executive, 27th November 1989.
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on the redevelopment of the Market far too late for their comments to be of any
use. 18 His view changed as he became aware of their tenacity. He initially
mocked their view of Spitalfields as 'nice, messy, dirty and noisy', and
understood their motivation to 'keep the area grotty' and to 'put something nasty
there to stop the City spreading' as naive and ill-informed about what, for him,
was the reality of City expansion and change in Spitalfields. 19 His understanding
of their 'bleeding heart' mentality changed as the Campaign demonstrated its
willingness to maintain their opposition to the Bill and the relocation of the Market
over the next two years. His perception of the Campaign's representation of
Spitaffields was however quite pertinent, and I shall discuss this in more detail in
Chapter Five.
The Campaign had their own reasons for their late arrival as an opposition
group arguing against the redevelopment:
I don't think anyone fully understood the implications of
the move of the market, and the issue of the market hadn't
been something the commmunity had taken on board
anyway. It had been seen to be dirty, smelly, noisy and
troublesome in the place that it was in between Spitalfields
and the City of London. So people hadn't really
appreciated the Market for its worth. It had just been seen
as an eyesore and people weren't concerned about it
because of that, and because they didn't have a look at the
underlying reasons why the City wanted to move the
Market.20
As this quotation indicates, the Campaign was prepared to make that analysis, and
act on it on the understanding that as a collection of individuals they had
knowledge of the attitudes of the population of the area towards redevelopment.
The first meeting of the Campaign on the 9th November 1987 was attended
by around 40 people, and was organised by Party activists such as Phil Maxwell
and Robbie MacDuff. It was chaired by Jil Cove who subsequently became the
Campaign's co-ordinator. At this meeting two important things happened.
Firstly, the Campaign became formally detached from the Labour Party.
Secondly, there was considerable debate as to whether the plans to relocate the
market should be completely opposed, or whether attempts should be made to
maximise planning gain. Ultimately, the decision to oppose the redevelopment
outright was taken by a narrow majority although a secondary fall-back position of
18lnterview with Peter Studdert, Chief Planner, Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, 1st September
1988.
19jbjd
20lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
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closer co-operation with the developers would remain. The reasons for this were
quite specific:
We could recognise and understand the arguments for
maximising planning gain, but at the end of the day our
argument was that the community would not be there in the
future to benefit from any planning gain that you're going
to get.2'
The Campaign from its earliest inception therefore took up a position of total
opposition to the redevelopment. This is important and I shall discuss the origins
and consequences of this in following chapters. Before doing so I shall discuss
the Campaign's establishment of its aim's and objectives and examine the basic
arguments of the Campaign.
3.2 The Campaign's logo.
86
Defining objectives, establishing contacts.
The Campaign had been established from the Labour Party and then
detached from it. It therefore had to build up support for itself both within and
outside the local area. The choice of name for the Campaign was important, with
debate going on 'for so long' that 'we settled on the issues of Campaign,
Development, Spitalfields and Community'.22
The idea was to keep it completely informal and try to
encourage people to become part of it by using language
that wouldn't isolate and intimidate. ... We felt 'The
Campaign to Save' rather than prevent was more in tune
with the community, and the Developers are a readily
identifiable group of people, especially when you're sitting
right next door to the City of London.
The ideas held within this quotation are important. This quotation expresses the
idea of informality in the organisation of the group, and the wish for broadly-
based grassroots mobilization. It also presents the idea that the Campaign were
closely in touch with the wishes of those living in the area.
An initial strategy that reflects these ideas was to canvas support from as
many quarters as possible. A letter from the Campaign to Richard McCormac, one
of the architects at that time employed by the SDG, indicated the issues that were
to be campaigned around but criticised the architect's involvement with the
developers, appealing to his supposed sense of 'community':
We are surprised that someone who lives in the Spitaiflelds
area, and purports to understand the pressures on the area,
in terms of employment prospects, the condition of local
housing, rising land and house prices and creeping
gentrification, can endorse the type of development which
is being suggested by the SDG.'
Over the next few months, a whole range of local organisations were contacted by
the campaign by letters which underlined the issues the Campaign felt to be
important in the removal of the market. The arguments around which the
Campaign were to focus in later public debates in the Houses of Parliament, had
begun to be constructed and articulated:
Our position is that we cannot see that any re-development
of the Spitalfields Market Site will be beneficial to the local
23ibid
from Campaign to Richard MacCormac, 17th November 1987.
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community. The proposals before us will be catastrophic
for the community, causing massive unemployment whilst
contributing to ever increasing land and house prices.25
As the two quotations indicate, the Campaign's arguments were based on an
understanding of redevelopment as a set of economic processes. The language is
strong and denies the possibility of benefit accruing to the area as a result of
redevelopment. The Campaign set itself up as a group in total opposition to the
redevelopment of the Market. In writing to the London Group of Labour MPs, a
connection was made between the Government's policies on inner city
regeneration and the plans of the SDG:
• . .we are very wary of the proposals outlined in the
Housing Bill, for the establishment of Housing Action
Trusts; and whilst we recognise that many communities
fear they will be the testing ground for the Government's
legislation, we feel that our fears are well grounded,
especially as we are near to the LDDC developments, the
Market Redevelopment plans are before us, and Prince
Charles has spent so much time focussing in on the
problems of Spitalfields.26
The London Labour MPs were also urged to vote against the City of London
(Spitalfields Market) Bill which had just been deposited in the House of
Commons, and were requested to advise the Campaign on ways in which the
Private Bill could be opposed and delayed in the House of Commons. The letter
also stated the Campaign's willingness to develop links with the Parliamentary
Labour Party.27
Further letters from the Campaign at that time to certain traders in the
market and to a range of community and voluntary groups in the area, stated three
objectives of the Campaign 'which can be moulded and developed as the
Campaign grows'.28
 These were: that the Campaign opposed the SDG's
proposals to redevelop the Spitalfields Market site, and opposed the detail of
agreements signed between Tower Hamlets Council, the developers and the City
25Leuer from Campaign to Tony Banks, Chair of the London Group of Labour MPs, 3rd
December 1987.
27Throughout its campaign, the CSSD attempted to gain and maintain support from Labour
representatives in the Houses of Lords and Commons. This was often undertaken through
personal contacts, as the Parliamentary Labour Party did not adopt support for the Campaign as a
matter of course. For example, Paliamentary SERA (Socialist Environment and Resources
Association) secretary, Joanne Whalley, MP signed a letter supporting the Campaign that was
mailedtoallLabourpeerspriortotheCampaign'sappearanceintheHouseofLorcls. Thiswas
done purely through informal contact Robbie MacDuff.
from Campaign to various organsiations and businesses, December 1987.
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of London; that the Campaign recognised that the development of a banking and
finance centre on the site would be 'disastrous for the local people and for those
who presently work in the area; it will lead to the break up of the community'; and
that the Campaign recognised the need for homes, shops and workspaces for
Spitalfields' existing and growing population above and beyond any other
proposals.29
From the outset the Campaign attempted to publicize itself to other
organizations and groups in the area. Market traders were contacted, but only
those who were known or suspected of being against the removal of the market
were approached:
We recognise that the Market traders may have different
aspirations.., but we hope that if we are able to unite in our
opposition to those who would decimate this area, then
both groups of people, residents and traders may benefit
from that opposition.3°
Contact between the traders and the Campaign was however limited because of the
differing sets of interests between the two. The Campaign did however become
known amongst the traders. This operated to the Campaign's advantage when it
was able to reveal in the House of Lords via Lord MacIntosh that the SMTA had
threatened to expell from the Association any trader found to be openly opposing
the move to Temple Mills. This information had come to the Campaign from a
trader who had contacted the Co-ordinator anonymously.3'
Contact was also made with the Government's Task Force. Although the
Campaign had declared their opposition to the redevelopment on the grounds that it
symbolised the Government's approach to inner city problems, (ie. by the use of
private sector money for the expansion of the City, against the best interests of the
people who lived in the area), it contacted the Task Force with the intention of
arranging a meeting in order to examine ways in which the Campaign and the Task
Force could unite in an attempt 'to help provide more jobs and opportunities for
the people of Spitalfields'. 32
 The implications of the market removal were
articulated with regard to the potential increase in unemployment that such a
development could cause. Parallels with the experience in the LDDC area were
30Letter from Campaign to Kenya Vegetables, Spitalfields Market Trader, 12th December 1987.
31CSSD meeting, 9th January 1989.
from Campaign to the Spitalfields Task Force, January 1988.
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drawn, and the £50,000 offered by the developers under the Section 52 Agreement
for training were compared with the £500 million cost of the development:
Set alongside the amount for the development, the training
proposals are an insult to the community, and will do
nothing to help alleviate the unemployment presently being
suffered by the people of Spitalfields in particular, and
Tower Hamlets in general.33
Other organisations contacted by the Campaign included Newham Council,
to urge them to petition against the Private Bill on behalf of the Stratford Market
Traders, the Prince of Wales, local newspapers, and trade unions. The local
heritage organisations, such as the Heritage Centre, Friends of Christchurch, the
Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, the Georgian Society, and the
Spitaffields Trust were all urged to support the Campaign. Wapping and Stepney
Neighbourhood Committees and the two local MPs gave their support.
Responses to the Campaign's initial appeal for support varied greatly.
Herbert and Jacobson House Tenant's Association, on the Holland Estate near the
Market, were unequivocal in their support, linking the redevelopment of the
market to the possible breakup of the residential structure of the area:
About the redevelopment of Spitalfields Market by money
making financiers. We the Tenants of Herbert and
Jacobson Houses are taking a serious view of this move as
this move will provide Accommodation for the City
Workers and at the same time affect Council Tenants.
There is one way that the entire developed area be allocated
to the uprooted families and families living in very bad
conditions and this is not the case. It is therefore we the
tenants association disaproves of the whole development
plan. As this is one sided fraud for the benefit of a rich
class of the society. Besides the whole object is for taking
the flats from Council Tenants and Council Control.M
As this quotation shows, a certain degree of agreement between the tenants
association and the Campaign was apparent. Redevelopment was seen as an
invasion of capital to the detriment of the people living in the area. Theories on
redevelopment shared by the Campaign with other groups brought together certain
groups under the umbrella of the Campaign, as I discuss below.
331b1d.
34Letter to the Campaign from the Herbert and Jacobson House Tenant's Association, 29th
January 1988.
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Others were less enthusiastic about the Campaign's strategy of total
opposition, urging instead a strategy of obtaining the best deal possible from the
development:
...it seemed to me a commonsense approach and that
energy and time would best be spent in working on the
things we regard as important, for example, ... the
provision of low-rent housing.35
Arguments such as these were dismissed by the Campaign because they appeared
to endorse the principle of redevelopment. 36
 In setting itself up with a stategy of
outright opposition to the redevelopment it closed itself off from any prospect of
negotiation with other groups in the area as to possible alternative responses to
redevelopment. This was a Labour Party Campaign, comprised of political
activists in the main, whose strategy reflected its origins. Opposition to
redevelopment was a principle because of what redevelopment stood for, and I
shall argue in following chapters, the meaning of redevelopment in the minds of
the members of the Campaign was strongly rooted in particular ideas. The idea of
negotiation over objectives was not entertained. I shall discuss that here.
In contacting the wide variety of local community groups and
organisations, the Campaign was also attempting to gain a wide range of
signatures for a petition that would eventually be presented to the House of
Commons against the City of London (Spitalfields Market) Bill. The decision to
petition against the Bill was made after one of the Campaign's members, Robbie
MacDuff, a researcher for a Labour MP, discovered through his knowledge of
Parliamentary procedure that such an avenue was open to them. The Campaign in
its petition was able to use as signatories an array of local organisations, a large
proportion of which came from the voluntary sector and non-statutory welfare
agencies. The Campaign at this point named itself as an umbrella organization. In
addition to local residents signing the parliamentary petition in their own personal
capacities, the Campaign held under its umbrella businesses such as Market
Garages and Acre Produce, both associated with the market. Herbert and
Jacobson House Tenants Association, Wheeler House Tenants Association, and
the Tower Hamlets Federation of Tenants signed. These were all groups who
were known to the Campaign via personal contacts. The Inner Area Programme-
funded Chicksand Community Action Group signed, as did Spitalfields Small
Business Association, Spitalfields Community Farm, Avenues Unlimited (a youth
35Letter from Rev. Eddy Stride, Rector of Christ Church, Spitalfields, to Campaign. 3rd
February 1988
36 take up this question again in Chapter Six.
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and community project), Christchurch Gardens Adventure Playground, The
Davenant and St. Mary's Centres, The Spitalfields Careworkers Service, the
Campaign for Homes in Central London, Tower Hamlets Homeless Families
Campaign and the Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service. All these
groups either had members who attended Campaign meetings, were involved in
the local Labour Party, or were known personally to members of the Campaign.
The 24 Labour Councillors of Tower Hamlets, the two Labour ILEA members and
the two Labour Tower Hamlets MPs all signed. The Governing Bodies of local
schools such as the Osmani, Thomas Buxton, and Canon Barnet schools signed,
along with the Montefiore Community Education Centre and the East London
Teacher's Association. Certain members of the Campaign were on the governing
bodies of the schools and were thus able to persuade them to sign. Individuals
cited as 'owner occupiers' and 'tenants of rented accommodation' signed.
It is important to note that all these groups were part of the voluntary or
non-statutory welfare sector in the area. Many had links with each other via their
work, and individuals formed networks based on shared interests and friendship.
For example, Pam Mossman and Patience Butler who were associated with
Spitaffields Farm later became active with the Campaign, and both were known
personally by the founder members of the Campaign. The Spitalfields Housing
and Planning Rights Service worker Mark Adams was a member of the local
Labour Party. Many of the groups named above, had been members of
Spitaffields Local Committee, which I discuss in Chapter Four, in which both
Abbas Uddin and Robbie MacDuff had been active. Similarly, Avenues Unlimited
had been involved in the Local Committee and a worker, Claire Murphy, later
active in the Campaign, had had close links with other members during her time
working in the area. The Campaign styled itself an umbrella organisation on the
basis of the support it had from the above groups.
What is also important to note at this stage, however, is the existence of
many other groups in the area concerned with what might broadly be termed
'youth' and 'community' and 'welfare' work, who were not included in the
Campaign's petition. The reasons for this are unclear to me. I would suggest that
political differences lie at the root of it. From interviews and conversation with
Campaign members it appears that it was mostly groups known and 'approved' by
the Campaign that were contacted, that is, those in the voluntary sector seen to be
organizing grass roots mobilization in a number of areas, which the Campaign or
the Labour Party supported because of their aims and objectives. Many of the
organisations that did not sign the Campaign's petition were predominantly
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Bengali groups, such as the Bangladeshi Welfare Organisation. These are
important organizations amongst the Bengali population, who constitute the
majority population in the area, and who themselves had argued in the local
authority's 1986 consultation that they would be the group most adversely affected
by the 'wrong' type of redevelopment.37
 The fact that many Bengali organizations
did not sign undermines the Campaign's rhetoric about its claims to be a
'community group' with a broad base of support. It had to present itself as
representative of the population of SpitalfieLds because of the logic of its own
arguments in establishing itself. It was founded by Labour Party activists but
taken out of the Party in order to give it more credibility and so that it could argue
that it represented 'the community', something a party political grouping could not
do. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Six, the political consequences of this
argument for representativeness were enormous. Yet in terms of personnel and
supporting bodies, the Campaign was selective and not representative of the entire
population of the area, as it claimed to be. It was representative, but only of those
living and working in the area who shared similar identities through their
allegances with the left and the Labour Party, and those who shared similar ideas
on the consequences of redevelopment for Spitalfields.
Given that the claims made by the Campaign for the grouping as an
umbrella organization are undermined by evidence of the limits for the Campaign's
support, it is crucial to look more closely at the Campaign's composition in terms
of active membership. The Campaign met every 2 - 3 weeks as a core group of
around 12- 15 regular attenders. It was co-ordinated by Jil Cove, who also acted
as the main contact point of the Campaign and its spokesperson in the
Parliamentary Committees. Robbie MacDuff and two of the three Spitalfields
Coundilors Phil Maxwell and Abbas Uddin all attended when their own work
commitments permitted. Pam Mossman, a member of the Spitalfields Farm
management committee and a resident of one of the flats above the Market attended
regularly.38
 Ian Worland, the only lifelong resident of tine area in the Campaign
and the only member to style himself working class attended very regularly,
sometimes with his partner Paula Worland, who worked in the Market. Claire
Murphy, in whose offices at Avenues Unlimited we met, attended every meeting.
With the exceptions of myself, my fellow researcher and a member who had
37Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee (1986) Spilalfields Market: Report on
Consultation 30th June 1986.
38Pn's membership of the Spitalfields Market Residents Group meant that an important link
was established between those fighting to prevent the relocation of the Market and those most
immediately affected by redevelopment work.
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worked in the area for many years but didn't live there, the Campaign's
membership all lived locally. There were of course other members who attended
sporadically, some of which have asked not to be named. In terms of its class and
race composition, the Campaign was unusual within the wider context of the social
structure of Spitalfields. With one exeption, a Bengali, all were white. With one
exeption the members defined themselves as middle class. The Campaign was
therefore not representative in its core make-up of the wider population, and
members were highly aware of this. As a consequence it legitimized itself as a
representative group by highlighting the range of groups and individuals which
supported it and by defining itself as essentially locally based.
Its internal organization reflects a basic adherence to discourse of the left
and community activism in that it attempted to gain a high degree of participation
amongst its membership, even if it could not achieve this amongst its constituency.
It functioned without formally organised positions, most of the administrative
work falling on the shoulders of Jil Cove. All the other members contributed their
skills and time as other commitments permitted. Meetings were loosely structured
around an agenda and were co-ordinated by encouraging as much participation
from each individual as possible.39
The Campaign used certain tactics to advertise itself in the area and to
attempt to gain an appearance of broader support. Door-to-door petitioning was
one strategy. A questionnaire was produced in the winter of 1987/88 but few
responded, possibly because the schedule asks more about the respondents
knowledge of local politics and local political representation, appears more as a
Labour Party research exercise and includes only minimal details on the Market. It
is also possible that few people from the Campaign were actually prepared to
undertake the groundwork of finding respondents to this questionnaire. A petition
obtained many more signatures and this was produced in the House of Commons
Committee as proof of the level of support that the Campaign had in the area.
Another door-to-door petition was undertaken in the Spring of 1989 prior to the
Campaign's appearance in the House of Lords. The aim of this exercise was to
39As Susan Smith argues, the way the research shapes the researcher is crucial and should be
noted. (Smith, S. (1988) Constucting Local Knowledge: The Analysis of Self in Everyday
Life. in Eyles, J. and Smith, D.M. (1988) Qualitative Methods in Human Geography. Polity
Press, Cambridge. pp. 17-38. This research changed me in many ways, most of which I don't
want to discuss here. Being forced to speak in meetings in order to report back information is
one example of an experience gained during this research which changed me as a person. This is
not an experience exclusive to me I don't think - other women members have commented that
they have gained in confidence through having to do things in the Campaign. See also
Bronwnill, S. (1987) The Politics of Change: A Case Study of the People's Plan for Newham's
Docklands. Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham.
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obtain the maximum possible number of signatures as 'proof of local support for
a Campaign that resented the appellation 'unrepresentative' pinned to it in the
previous Committee. The strategy in order to do this was to leaflet as much of
Spitalfields as possible and then go out two or three weeks later to the same areas
and collect signatures for the petition. Together with another member I went
around Hughes, Treeves and Lister houses along Vallancead on two occasions.
The response to our petition was generally favourable. No-one refused to sign.
Going around the Conservation Area around Elder St. and Fournier St with
another member, responses were not so sympathetic - on two occasions we had
refusals to sign, and on five people signed more to send us on our way or shut us
up, than out of any sympathy for the Campaign's arguments. We were seen by
these as wasting our time in the face of inevitable processes (or progresses?).
Very few people had heard of the Campaign, however, despite having been
leafletted.40
 One household was unsure where they'd seen the name before,
another person was uncertain as to the origins of the Campaign and therefore
uncertain as to how to 'categorise' us. Although not at all hostile about the
Campaign's objectives, he appeared to want some kind of indication of who we
were above the information given in the leaflets and petition.4'
The Campaign was acutely aware of the disparity between their own
composition and that of the population of Spitalfields. Their strategy to overcome
criticism for this was to get over 700 signatures in support of the cause to present
to the House of Lords. This of course gave them much greater public credibility.
Their response to their own self-identified conception of themselves as
unrepresentative did not however lead them to adopt different languages or
rhetorics or strategies in order to get support.
40See comments from Campaign members in Chapter Four on how leaflets from developers
tended to be ignored.
411 often felt during the fieldwork for this thesis, and whilst still unsure about some of my
objectives in analysis, that an interesting exercise might be to undertake a survey of perceptions
of local people in Spitalfields to both the redevelopments mooted at that time, and to bodies such
as the Save Spitalfields Campaign in order to find out the level of awareness of the changes
planned for the area, and conceptions of opposition to such things from people who by their
absence from active campaigning groups were obviously not given to vocal protest either through
disinterest, language difficulties or lack of time and energy for such things after long days of
work. Such a piece of research would of course have been very difficult to undertake, in terms of
time, resources for interpretation and translation of interviews, as research carried out at QMW by
Alison Kaye on Bengali Women Homeworkers indicates. Furthermore, I was disinclined to
undertake such research given my belief in the case study of the Campaign of active participation
and understanding, and empathy, which would not have been matched. Further, and most
nnportantly, as an adopted member of the Campaign, my own position would have been
and I would not have felt uncomfortable in that situation. I therefore left my
investigations of local peoples' views to those conversations I had on door steps with people
whilst petitioning.
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Flyposting was another strategy used by the Campaign to advertise
themselves in the area. The intention in this case was two-fold. Firstly to
advertise themselves to local people with a logo that they hoped people had seen
before. Secondly, to 'get up the noses of the Corporation and the SDG', which
they did quite satisfactonly.42
 Flyposting is a lot more fun than petitioning.
When going door-to-door the possibility of abuse and the hurling in one's
direction of vile opinions is an ever present worry (not to mention dogs and
individuals who want to let you stand in the cold and talk incessantly about their
life histories in the area for over half an hour). In contrast, flyposting involves
physical activity, the vague thrill in the knowledge that you are committing an
offence reportable to the police, and a chance to be slightly irresponsible with the
hoardings so carefully erected, painted and maintained by the development
companies. Accordingly, on the night of the 5th December 1988, clad in woolly
jumpers and armed with buckets of paste and a supply of posters, we decorated
Spitaffields thus:
42Pers. Comm. Campaign Member, January 1989.
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As a mobilizing strategy very little came of it. As an 'advertising gimmick'
for the few days before the posters disappeared beneath those for car sales
magazines and prior to their removal by the SDG and the City Corporation,
Spitalfields cried out to be saved from any spare space of wall or corrugated iron.
People noticed that. By petitioning and flyposting, then, a conscious attempt was
made to attract attention amongst the populace to the Campaign's presence in the
area, and even if it did not draw active support, it publicised the Campaign.
The summarise this section, I want to emphasise firstly that the Campaign
was established by Labour Party activists. This is important because of the ideas
that people like Jil Cove, Phil Maxwell, Robbie MacDuff and Abbas Uddin
brought tothé construction of arguments against the redevelopment of Spitalfields
Market. It was tken out of the Labour Party and established as a community-
based campaign in an attempt to grant itself more legitimacy and claim support for
its arguments from the people of the area. I shall now examine those arguments
that the Campaign pr&ltud againtMdevelopment
The Arguments.
The Campaign argued against the redevelopment of Spitalfields Market in
many different ways, and separating out the strands of argument for discussion
and comment here is not straightforward. Arguments against redevelopment
ranged from those that refuted the idea that the market was redundant on its site
and no longer economically viable, to statements on the likely future of the area
should redevelopment be allowed to happen, incorporating very strong images of
Spitaffields as perceived by members of the Campaign. The arguments against
redevelopment were made in a variety of places, ranging from Campaign meetings
to parliamentary committees, council meetings to interviews with me. In this
chapter I shall examine these arguments by looking at two main themes that I have
identified in the Campaign's discourse. Firstly I examine the idea that the increase
in land values as a result of redevelopment would harm the economic base of the
area, and the idea that this land values increase, coupled with existing structural
problems in the housing market, would result in some sort of housing crisis.
Secondly, I shall look at the arguments the Campaign made against the public
consultation. I have picked these themes out because they stand out to me as the
basis of the Campaign's case against redevelopment, upon which other arguments
were built. I have left discussion of the images and representations of Spitalfields
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that were used in arguments against redevelopment to Chapter Five, separating the
two with a consideration of the Campaign's origins, as I wish to demonstrate the
point that the arguments discussed did not fall from the sky into the laps of the
Campaign to be used as appropriate, but have their roots in groups and discourses
to which the Campaign owed its origins.
Land Values, the Economic Base and Employment.
The Campaign took as its starting point the idea that the redevelopment
plans promoted by the City Corporation and the SDG were misleading on the real
impacts of the Market redevelopment. It argued that the redevelopment proposals
were couched in languages that were silent on the 'real' reasons for relocating the
Market, namely the provision of space for the expansion of the City of London,
rather than relocation for the good of the Market.43
It seemed to us obviously the question of moving the
Market was nothing to do with either providing the Market
with a better trading base or providing the local community
with a better environmefit, it was entirely to do with the
market value of that particular site, what that particular site
was worth with a different use on it.
The thrust of the Campaign's arguments therefore came via consideration of land
values and the relationship between rising land values and the socio-economic
structure of the area. Put simply, the Campaign's argument was that with the
development of the Market land values would rise, leading to the displacement of
the mainly Bengali population.
The Campaign argued that the Market, being an unpleasant and negative
feature of Spitalfields, had held down land values. The establishment historically
of sweated labour and a migrant haven had, as noted in Chapter Two, been
contingent on the existence of low land values in Spitalfields. The Market was
seen as performing a function that maintained low land values in the area. The
am, of course, aware that the arguments the Campaign used against redevelopment, which I
discuss here, in places echo the analysis given of the redevelopment of the Market in Chapter
Two. This is no coincidence. My own analysis of the redevelopment was made on the basis of
my understanding of this event as caused by the expansion of the City of London, a view I share
with the Campaign, and which developed through conversation with members of the Campaign.
My ideas and the Campaign as a group were born at the same time (October 1987) and grew up
together. I don't know how much the Campaign's arguments owe to my input, if at all, but
mine certainly owe plenty to those of the Campaign.
44Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator, House of Commons Committee, 23rd June 1988, ME 7
p.27.
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Campaign argued that the removal of the Market would do two things. Firstly it
would open up an 11 acre site for office development. Offices were understood to
be detrimental to Spitalfields, preventing the use of sites for local needs such as
housing and workshop space. Office developments, as the Spitalfields Local
Committee had argued:
• . .pose a serious threat to the area in that it neutralises and
often blights available sites that could be used for low
rented local authority or housing association housing or
local industry; it artificially drives up site values; it makes
no contribution to the need for public open space; it does
not create new local jobs matched to the skills of local
people or contributes to the local industrial base.45
Secondly, the Campaign argued that once Spitalfields Market was redeveloped
other sites would follow. This prediction was realized with the development of
Bishopsgate Goodsyard and Trumans Brewery. The removal of the Market was
presented as having a detrimental effect on the local economic base - the clothing
industry:
...the vegetable market and the clothing trade have mutually
suppressed land values. A particular relationship, and
whilst the two of them have existed round here it's an
unattractive proposition for development. Having cleared
one the rag trade will be forced out through rising land
values making the rest of the area much more attractive to
developers.
Spitalfields is a major centre of the clothing industry, and whilst a
registered 22.6% of the Tower Hamlets workforce are employed as clothing
workers,47 over 50% of the working population of the ward are employed in that
industry.48 The clothing industry relies on intensive production techniques,
located in small workshops in the area. The industry caters for the lower end of
the market and exists by keeping overheads such as wages and rental costs to a
minimum. The availability of low-cost rented workshop space in the area was
understood by the Campaign to be integral to its survival. Were land values to
rise, rents on workshops would increase and the industry would be driven out of
the area. Whilst rental costs for the manufacturing industry could range in this
area from between £3 - £6 per square foot, office rentals would range from
45Spitalfields Local Committee Proposed Criteria for Acceptable Planning Gain in Spitalfields.
9th May 1984.
46Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator, in evidence to the House of Commons Committee, 23rd June
1988. ME 7 p.29.
47Kaye, A. (1988) The Clothing Industry in Tower Hamlets: A Report Presented to the Task
Force. May 1988.
48Spitalfields Small Business Association estimate.
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between £10 to £40 per square foot. 49 Owners of buildings in which workshops
were located had already started to cash in on the rise in land values, that started
with confirmation of redevelopment plans for the market and the area, by
increasing rents or selling properties at increased profits. The clothing industry
was seen as being under seige. This was understood to threaten the Bengali
population in particular - the SSBA estimated that around 80% of the Bengali
population of Spitalfields have recourse to the clothing industry for employment at
some time during the year.5°
...with the kind of development that is now happening in
Spitalfields the Bengali community is not going to be given
the space and time to develop in the same way that the
Jewish community did. It is actually being blown apart.51
The Campaign argued that the knock-on effects of the redevelopment of the
market would lead to a rise in unemployment, despite the opportunities for clerical
work in the new development.
Unemployment in Spitalfields is 24.4%. Tower Hamlets
has the second highest unemployment rate of Greater
London. According to the Home Affairs Select Committee
Report, "Bangladeshis in Britain", these figures are likely
to conceal considerable hidden unemployment. The
employment that does exist centres around the clothing and
leather industries, and those seeking employment are
predominantly either semi-skilled or unskilled. With this
skill base local employment is unlikely to be created in the
proposed development. Existing local employment will be
threatened and undermined by rapidly rising land values
created as a consequence of the development proposals.
The effect of this will be to curtail the expansion of the
existing manufacturing base and loss of premises.52
The lack of retraining opportunities on a sufficient scale would do nothing to
ameliorate these conditions.53
 The SDG had stated in their initial publicity
brochures that 6,000 jobs would be created by the redevelopment scheme. It was
unclear to the Campaign whether these would be in the construction, white collar
49Kaye, A. (1988) The Clothing Industry in Tower Hamlets: A Report Presented to the Task
Force.
50SSBA estimate. An exact statistic is difficult to quantify because of the the seasonality of
employment, unofficial employment, and the the concealed employment of a large number of
women homeworkers rendering ennumeration impossible.
51Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator, House of Lords Committee, 25th May 1989, ME 9 p.37.
52(mpwgn to Save Spitalfields from the Developers, House of Com,nons Petition Against the
Spitalfields Market Bill October 1987.
53John Eversley, Member of Management Committee, Davenant Centre, House of Commons
Committee 28th June 1988. ME 8 p.32.
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or clerical service sectors.54
 The Campaign argued that job opportunities in the
construction industry would not be of benefit to local people because of the levels
of skill demanded by contractors and sub-contractors that the unemployed in the
area did not possess. The experience of construction in Broadgate was cited as an
example of this.55
 John Eversley, from the Management Committee of the
Davenant Centre, a consortium of eight local groups concerned with employment
and training, used anecdotal examples to the parliamentary committees of previous
experience in and around Docklands to underline the Campaign's doubts about
increased employment opportunities in the new development. Local people were
not, he said, taken on for work experience by City employers, and further, even
when such employers moved into the area, they still did not employ a locally based
workforce. Such companies were known to bring their own workforce with
them.56
 Other writers have also commented on this phenomenon of the structural
disqualification of inner city residents from city centre jobs, which tend to be filled
by commuters - people with experience, education and training. 57
 Any new local
employees would require training, for which insufficient funds were available.
Furthermore, such companies were understood to be unwilling to provide
language support for what would be a trainee and Bengali workforce, and would
not recognise any obligations they might have to the local population, to do so.58
The evidence given was not backed up with any concrete examples in the way of
reports or surveys independently commissioned to assess employment
opportunities. The witness spoke from experience and knowledge gained through
work in attempting to co-ordinate training and employment schemes for
predominantly Bengali unemployed. This argument was underpinned by a belief
that redevelopment iniatives that would occur in the area had to be directed, as a
priority, to the development of the local economy and maximising gains that could
be made by local people, obviously not a primary motive of the developers.
The £50,000 for five years originally proposed for training was, the
Campaign argued, insufficient - a mere drop in the ocean in relation to training
needs for the local population.59
 A witness in the House of Commons argued that
54Spitaifields Development Group (1986)A Solution to Spitalfields and What it means to You.
Spitalfields Development Group Publicity Brochure, July 1986.
55House of Commons Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 28th June 1988, ME 8 p.32.
56Management Committee Member, Davenant Centre, in evidence to House of Commons
Committee, 28th June 1988, ME 8 p.30.
57Peck, J.A. (1989) Reconceptualizing the Local Labour Market Space, Segmentation and the
State. p.44 Progress in Human Geography 13 pp. 42 - 61.
58Jo1m Eversley, Management Committee Member, Davenant Centre, in evidence to the House
of Commons Committee, 28th June 1988. ME 8 p.29.
59lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
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training in the clothing industry was essential. The survival of the rag trade in the
area (leaving aside the issue of its decimiation in the wake of redevelopment) was
contingent on it going up market and producing garments with higher quality
added value in order to survive competition at the cheaper end of the market from
overseas. Training was therefore required. Additionally, retraining was seen as
important - the skill base of the local population had to be diversified away from
clothing if unemployment rates were to come down. Further, a recognised need
was to get more women into waged labour in order to start combatting poverty.
The training proposals of the SDG did not mention this need.60
Interestingly, the SDG were forced to be more realistic in their claims
about the redevelopment schemes when these arguments were made in the first
parliamentary committee. The House of Commois Committee had already
enforced an increase in money from £50,000 to £150,000 per year for five years
as a pre-condition for returning the Bill to the House. The SDG lessened its
claims, stating in October 1989 that 2,000 jobs would be created. 61
 The
Campaign continued to argue against the validity of the SDG's claims.
Finally, with regard to service employment that might be on offer to local
residents, these, the Campaign thought, would be low status, low paid clerical and
data entry jobs; surely 'the people of Spitalfields deserve better than service
jobs'. 62
 The Campaign saw the possibility that the development would contribute
towards the creation of an underclass in the area around the development, offering
people little hope of employment and increasing dependence on benefits. This was
seen as detrimental to the young people of Spitalfields 'who have equally valid
aspirations of decent jobs and homes as others from other traditionally well off
areas'.63
 And anyway, as one member noted with reference to the possible
availability of computing and data entry jobs in the redeveloped scheme, "The
people of Spitalfields deserve more thai.that sort of work".M
The relationship between the arguments of the Campaign and those of the
developers and Government with regard to inner city redevelopment must be
pointed out. Both argued that redevelopment would increase land values; they
differed on whether this would have a positive or negative impact on the area and
60John Eversley, Management Committee Member, Davenant Centre, in evidence to the House
of Commons Committee, 28th June 1988, ME 8 p.28.
6tSpitalfields Development Group (1989) Spitalfields - A New Chapter. Spitalfields
Development Gmup, October 1989.
62Ji1 Cove, House of Commons Committee, 29th June 1988, ME 9, p.46.
63 ibid. p.45.
Pers. Comm. Campaign Member, May 1989.
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its population. The developers argued that the construction of an office complex in
Spitalfields would reduce unemployment by creating jobs; the Campaign denied
this by arguing for the threat to an existing economic base by the insertion of a
new one. They argued against jobs in services and new technology and advocated
the clothing trade as the sole economic base of Spitalfields, possibly reflecting
traditional socialist discourses emphasising manual work and the protection thereof
in the face of the growth of new technology. Both groups argued that the
residents of this inner city area deserved better prospects than those deemed to be
currently available to them; the two differed however in their views on the ways in
which an alternative solution could be found. Both insisted that they had the
solution. There was a tension between the two arguments arising as a
consequence of their proximity.
Housing
The Campaign argued that the rise in land values would also have an
impact on housing in the area.
If [the scheme] goes ahead the effect of the re-development
on the housing situation in Spitalfields and Tower Hamlets
will be disastrous. The local community is facing some of
the worst conditions in Britain and new homes, not offices,
are needed. The proportion of the borough's households
with more than one person per room (10 per cent) is the
highest in London and rises to over 28 per cent in
Spitalfields. At the moment there are 1,300 homeless
Tower Hamlets families living in bed and breakfast hostels
across London, over 12,000 households on the Council's
waiting list, with over 10,000 of its tenants needing a
transfer. The worst of these conditions are concentrated in
the Wards in the west of the Borough, next to the City.
The 118 homes being promised by the developers to meet
this local housing need is totally inadequate. There is no
guarantee that even these homes will be built. And the
redevelopment will push up land and property values in
Spitalfields. Housing for sale will be much too expensive
for local people.65
This process had just begun to be observed:
It really hit home when a little local house which was sold
for £4000 derelict five years ago went for £200,000.
Average earnings around here are £7000 and people can't
65Cpaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers, House of Commons Petition Against the
Spiralfields Market Bill October 1987.
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afford those prices. The area is already becoming
gentrified and prices will go up and up.
This was not denied by the developers or the local authority. For example, in a
letter to Councilor Phil Maxwell, dated September 1987, the Chief Executive of
the Neighbourhood Committee confirmed that increases in the value for both
private and public housing would occur as the 'desirability of the area
increases'. 67
 This increase in land values and housing costs had, for the
Campaign, to be set in the context of the housing crisis in Tower Hamlets and
Spitalfields. Housing conditions are the worst in the Borough over all indicators
for overcrowding, homelessness and levels of disrepair. Precise figures for
Spitalfields on the extent of housing problems are unavailable, the 1980
Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service (SHAPRS) survey now being
considerably out of date.68 Figures for 1987 for Bethnal Green Neighbourhood
showed that 15% of all households were statutorily overcrowded, and 28.3% of
all households had more than one person per room. (The figures for Greater
London were 1.3% and 5.3% respectively, for Inner London 2.1% and 7%
respectively). 35% of all households in the Neighbourhood did not have exclusive
use of a bath and 11% had no exclusive use of both bath and WC. There was a
pronounced mismatch between household size and size of dwellings available in
the Neighbourhood. Only one household in nine needing more than seven rooms
could satisfactorily be accommodated. 69
 Homelessness, and the accommodation
of homeless families in bed and breakfast hotels in other parts of London was a
particular problem. The redevelopment of the market site would do nothing,
according to the Campaign, to solve this housing crisis or 'alleviate the plight of
local residents who live in squalid conditions'.70
Over 85% of households in Spitalfields were estimated to live in rented
accommodation, with around 15% still in the private sector wherein the worst
housing conditions in the ward were found. Were land values to increase, those
renting from private landlords, the Campaign argued, would face large rental
Ji1 Cove quoted in the Evening Standard, 31st December 1987.
67Letter from the Chief Executive of Bethnal Green Neighbourhood to Phil Maxwell, leader of
the Labour Party, 10th September 1987.
68Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service and the Catholic Housing Aid Society
(1981) The Spitalfields Survey: Housing and Social Conditions in 1980. SHAPRS and CHAS,
London.
69Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee Public Consultation on Report on Housing in
Spitalfields. 8th April 1987. All these figures are based on information from the 1981 Census
and were assessed as being an underestimate of current conditions.
70Letter from Campaign Co-ordinator to the Chief Executive of the Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood Committee, January 1988.
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increases and would be gradually squeezed out the area. This process had already
started to happen. Tenements in Hanbury Street, sold by a private landlord to
Gand Metropolitan in 1988, had doubled their value in six months. Rents for
workshops there had increased by 500%, and some tenants were faced with the
prospect of eviction because they did not carry rent books which otherwise would
afford protection through evidence of their status as tenants.71
Those in council accommodation, the Campaign argued, faced rental
increases due to the effects of recent housing legislation, particularly the 1988
Housing Act. In addition, the proximity of certain estates to the City and the
proposed developments raised fears of bids for the takeover of the estates by
private landlords, targetting the area and the huge amount of public housing for
takeover under the provisions of the 1988 Housing Act. This would result in the
constant harrassment by private landlords of tenants, with continual ballots over
the transfer of estates to the private sector, 'sapping people's strength, time and
ability to deal with those pressures on them'. 72 The Campaign insisted, as other
voluntary sector groups had in the past, that takeovers under such 'Pick-a-
Landlord' schemes would entail much-needed refurbishment of homes at the
expense of vastly increased rents, which tenants would not be able to afford.
Tenants would be gradually squeezed out.
The proposed establishment of a Housing Action Trust in the area brought
these arguments into the debate on the removal of the Market.73 During the first
Committee stage in the House of Commons in June 1988, the first rumours were
heard concerning the establishment of a Housing Action Trust (HAT) in Tower
Hamlets. This was confirmed, and tenants in six estates in the borough were
faced with the prospect of the takeover of their estates by private trusts for their
refurbishment and later sale to private landlords. This was to happen without the
tenants' right to a ballot. One of the targetted estates - the Holland Estate - was in
Spitalfields and another, the Boundary Estates, lies just over the northern
border.74
71 Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator, House of Lords Committee, 25th May 1989. ME 9, p.34.
72lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
73The plans for a Housing Action Trust in Tower Hamlets were subsequently dropped by the
Department of the Environment on the grounds that there was insufficient land available for
purchase at a suitable price to accommodate all those who would be required to leave their homes
during refurbishment, and to rehouse those families currently sharing flats and experiencing high
levels of overcrowding.
74For an more detailed examination of the HAT plans in Tower Hamlets see Woodward, R.
(1991) Mobilizing Opposition: the Campaign against Housing Action Trusts in Tower Hamlets.
Housing Studies 6 pp. 44-56.
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These arguments, stressing the impact of redevelopment on land values,
the economic base of the area and on the housing problems of the area,
underpinned the Campaign's opposition to the redevelopment of the area. Other
arguments were constructed from this understanding. The Campaign argued that
the redevelopment would adversely affect the Bengali population of Spitaiflelds:
The Home Affairs Select Committee Report "Bangladeshis
in Britain" stated that 'Bad housing is not just a severe
disadvantage in itself, but contributes to a range of other
difficulties ... and a high incidence of physical and mental
illness'. Already bad health is a major issue for the local
community and this problem will worsen as their local
environment, employment conditions and overcrowding
worsens.75
The redevelopment would not provide open spaces that were needed by the
residents of the area for recreational use:
Spitalfields is in need of more open space for community
use. The proposals outlined by the Developers will
adversely affect existing open spaces, where land - because
of its rising value - will be highly sought. This threatens
the continued existence of the Spitalfields Community
Farm and open space which is presently under-developed
for community use. There is a need to protect, improve
and create strategic open space to meet the needs of local
people. The Developer's proposals outline open space
provision which will be passive and inaccessible to the
community at particular times. An expanding, and an
increasingly younger, population needs more open and
green spaces. This also ensures a contrasting variety of
landscape to minimise the visual impact of development on
the area.76
Public Consultation
A second theme which I have identified as important in the Campaign's
arguments concerns the Campaign's objections to the public consultations that
were carried out by the developers and the local authority. The Campaign claimed
that redevelopment had been planned for people without their consent and was
therefore anti-democratic. In this final section I shall examine this claim.
75Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers, House of Commons Petition Against the
Spitalfields Market Bill October 1987.
76ibid.
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In the summer of 1986 a public consultation exercise was carried Out by
the Planning Department of the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood. In June and July
1986 4,000 copies of a newspaper printed in English and Bengali, entitled
"Spitaffields Market to Go?" were distributed to homes in the area of Spitalfields
bordered by Brick Lane to the east, the Holland Estate in the south and to the
railway lines in the north. 77 Copies were also distributed to libraries, community
centres and the health centre. Details were advertised in the local and national
press, professional journals, and local television and radio were informed.
Between 18th and 24th June 1986 an exhibition was mounted at the London Fruit
Exchange in Brushfield Sreet, highlighting the issues surrounding the future of the
market and the possibilities for redevelopment. Three hundred and ninety eight
people attended. The exhibition was then moved to the Montefiore Centre on
Hanbury Street for the period 25th June - 21st July 1986, although no precise
record was kept of attendance, as it was staffed only during lunchtimes and
evenings. Comments sheets and questionnaires were made available, of which 63
were returned by the 22nd July deadline. On the 21st July 1986, at the request of
the then still functioning Spitalfields Local Committee (SLC) an open meeting was
held with the local authority on the Flower and Dean estate, attended by roughly
50 people, to discuss the issues involved. Throughout the consultation period,
around 60 meetings were held with a number of national and local groups and
representatives of the Council. Considerable effort was made, according to the
local authority and the planning department, to hear a variety of views during the
consultation period. Retrospectively, in September 1988 the Chief Planner of the
Bethnal Green Neighbourhood saw the exercise as one of the best they had
undertaken. 78 But as an ex-worker for the Spitalfields Project tartly replied,
wasn't this because it was the only consultation exercise they had ever been
allowed to undertake?79
The SDG had also undertaken a public consultation exercise as part of the
'competition' for the development, and later over the redesigned plans. Their
publicity brochures emphasised the lengths to which they had gone in order to
obtain as many ideas as possible, as did representatives from the company during
77Peter Studdert, Chief Planner, Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, House of Commons Committee,
9th June 1988. ME 2, p.29.
78lnterview with Peter Studdert, Chief Planner, Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, 1st September
1988.
79lnterview with ex - Spitalfields Project worker, 15th June 1989.
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interviews.80
 "We went to see a lot of groups", one interviewee from LET kept
pointing out:
I think everybody had plenty of opportunity to come along.
I must admit that a lot of the public meetings were not
terribly well attended. But isn't that what happens
generally? It's not unique to us I don't think. And
particularly you have the Bangladeshis - all our leaflets
were in two languages. Then we had a full public relations
team on our side. We felt were were doing all that we
could. 81
The Campaign was highly critical of the consultation process, both of the
exercise in the summer of 1986 undertaken by the developers at the time when
both Rosehaugh Stanhope and the SDG were competing for the City of London's
tender for the redevelopment of the market, and of that undertaken by the local
authority. The criticisms of the consultation emphasised the narrowness and
selectivity of the exercise.
The council's consultation included a questionnaire that visitors to the
exhibitions were invited to fill out and return. The council received 63 replies.
This was seen as ridiculous. What was needed, in the Campaign's view, were
large numbers of both public meetings, and private discussions with targetted
groups from all sections of the population living and working in the area. At the
meetings organised both by the Neighbourhood and the developers, Campaign
members remembered seeing 'the same people', 'people from the conservation
areas', 'mostly white people', 'market residents', and 'not many Bengalis'. 82 The
consultation process was seen as being appealing to only a small section of the
population.
Abbas Uddin, a Spitalfields Councillor with many years of experience of
voluntary and political work in the area, was particularly scathing about the
apparent lack of inclusion of a broad cross-section of the local population in the
consultation process:
80As indicated in Chapter One, my close involvement with the Campaign led to my being
identified in the eyes of the property surveyor for LET as one of the Campaign. This obviously
shaped his reaction to me and my questions during the interview, in which he was very defensive
about his company's activities during the consultation process, mindful of the criticisms that the
Campaign had made.
81 lnterview with Tim Budgen, consultant surveyor, LET/SDG, 24th July 1989. See also
Spitaluields News, July 1987, for a fervent denial from Peter Beckwith, Chair of SDG, to
accusations from the Spitalfields Project that the SDO had planned schemes 'without
consideration of the wider community. Beckwith reiterates the claim to depth and thoroughness
in the consultation process.
82Vadons interviews and conversations with Campaign members, 1988 - 1990.
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What was the response rate, why was the response rate so
poor for certain sections of the community? If you missed
participation - why were some women's organisations not
mentioned in the consultation? Why were Spitalfields
organisations not encouraged to hold public meetings and
hold general meetings amongst their members and their
clients? And why did [they] not turn up at those meetings
to explain to those individuals, those small groups of
people, the proposed schemes, your objections, the impact
it's going to have - the changes it's going to bring about in
this area? And they said "No-one has asked" - people
don't ask for public consultations.83
The idea that the consultation process had in fact been a purely cosmetic
exercise was made consistently. The public consultation literature was understood
to have presented the question of redevelopment of the market site as a fait
accompli and to have endorsed from the beginning the principle of the relocation of
Spitalfields Market. Accordingly, it was argued that discussion about various
possibilities concerning the future of the market had never been initiated:
We were actually presented with "You can have A or B.
You can have a hedge or a fence." When actually what we
wanted was a dustbin. If you do not ask the right
questions you can finish up with completely different
answers and that is what has happened.M
Quotations such as the two above indicate a great deal of anger directed by
the Campaign at the consultation process. It is quite possible that members were
angry with the consultation process in part because they were angry with
themselves at having missed full participation in it. It had been undertaken a full
year before the Campaign was formed. Yet some of the people who are quoted
here were involved in the consultation process, as representatives from groups
such as SHAPRS, the SLC, and the Spitalfields Small Business Association. I
would argue that rather than being angry because the consultation process came up
with the 'wrong' result as far as they were concerned, that there is possibly some
substance in the complaints of the Campaign. The consultation process was
derided because it failed to take into account the specificity of local needs with
regard to opening up a public debate about the redevelopment scheme. If we
examine the grounds on which the public consultation was damned, it is possible
to understand how the representation constructed by the Campaign of Spitalfields
was used in its arguments against the redevelopment.
83lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator and Campaign member, House of Commons Committee, 23rd
June 1988. ME 7 p.30.
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The Campaign used in their arguments against redevelopment the idea that
it should not be allowed because it had been planned without people's consent.
For example, they argued that people had not been given a chance to repond to the
plans and consultation because of the format in which it was conducted. The
Campaign members understood the lack of response to the efforts of the local
authority's consultation, as a difficulty shared by a lot of people, Bengali and
white, with the language and with literacy. Although all the SDG and council
publicity literature for the scheme and the consultation was done in two languages
- English and Bengali - there was still the problem of whether people would
actually read this information.
You can write out a wonderful philosophical leaflet and
hand it over to someone waiting on a bus stop - someone
local who's working class, unemployed, or who's never
had their proper secondary education, and you don't expect
them to give a response but you've done your duty.85
This understanding was used in the construction of arguments against the public
consultation exercise, emphasising the point that the developers should have taken
into account the ways in which people received and understood information.
Abbas Uddin was highly dubious as to whether anyone ever looked at the glossy
brochures that dropped through people's letter boxes:
..I think there are a lot of white working class people who
can't read basic English and the same thing applies to a lot
of illiterate Bangladeshis who cannot read any language,
and therefore putting it in 8 - 12 syllable words in Bengali
doesn't mean you're actually communicating to those
people.86
Furthermore, people were thought to have had difficulties in understanding the
planning process and procedure. This was a problem for both the white and
Bengali communities:
...the Bengali community - we're talking about alien issues
here - I mean, when you're talking to the Bengali
community, their understanding of planning doesn't - I
mean, when you're talking to the white community it
doesn't get through that much, but to try to get across to
something that has no tradition in Bangladesh is nil.87
But an understanding of the planning process was not understood to be any easier
for more educated and articulate people. Campaign members themselves saw their
85lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
86jbid
87lnterview with ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
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lack of understanding of planning issues as detrimental to their understanding of
the whole process, and thus of their ability to respond effectively:
I wouldn't say that any voluntary organizations that were
actually listed in the consultation had the necessary
resources and skill and knowledge to analyse the schemes
that were put in front of them and be critical of it or give a
fair assessment of the impact. You're talking about
community workers, you're talking about health visitors -
how on earth can they legitimately comment on a million
pounds' architectural scheme? I certainly couldn't do
that.88
The Campaign was also painfully aware that as individuals, back in 1985 and
1986 they had to an extent ignored the consultation process. As one member
pointed out:
I do remember the consultation documents coming round
from the council about what we thought about whether the
market ought to go or not, and I do remember them
announcing that the decision of the traders was to go. I
still thought it wasn't anything to get too excited about. So
I didn't take much notice.
The developer's approach to the consultation process was heavily
criticised. It was understood and promoted as 'crass' and 'patronising', a pure
public relations exercise that perhaps indicated a lack of concern on the part of the
developers to actually take note of anything that was said to them:
It's appalling - they pour thousands and thousands of
pounds into supposedly consulting the community, but the
net effect of it is to in no way really find out what people
think and what people's aspirations are in the area, and it's
a gloss to justify an attack on the community really.90
The public relations exercise was however a very skillful one:
...what was really interesting is that I think the Spitalfields
Development Group did a brilliant public relations exercise.
Because good public relations means you assimilate the
protest and the dissent, and they did that.91
The listing by the SDG of all the people and groups to whom they had publicised
their scheme was seen as a particularly dubious consultation strategy:
88lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
89lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
90lnterview with Phil Maxwell, 6th September 1989.
91ibid.
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I was always amused that in that big brochure that they
produced my name appears as someone who was consulted
etc. Getting a letter in the post saying "Come along to an
exhibition" isn't my idea of consultation. And by including
local coundilors names, it gives a little more credibility to
the mock consultation that occurs.
The criticisms the Campaign made of the consultation procedures of the
local authority and the developers did not fall on deaf ears. Perhaps because it was
the first public consultation the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Planning
Department had carried out, they appeared to be receptive to feedback and
constructive criticisms. As a consequence, perhaps, of the Campaign's criticisms,
during March and April 1990, as part of a consultation process on the Bishopsgate
Goodsyard and Trumans Brewery sites, the old police station on Brick Lane was
opened to the public, staffed in the afternoon by members of the planning
department. The notion was that people could make their comments known in a
more accessible way. This of course still does not solve the problem of
consultation for people who cannot leave their work during the day, or for people
who do not understand either English or the language of the planners. Although in
interview, a representative of the planning department was quite defensive about
the consultation process, 93
 the planning department later started to approach the
Campaign for informal discussions about both the Spitalfields Market scheme and
the other developments that had subsequently come on line, particularly after a
very disappointing response to consultation on the Bishopsgate Goodsyard site.94
I think with the planning department, because of their lack
of response, if you think when they did their consultation
they got 63 or 64 responses, are actually quite pleased that
people are beginning to take action and interest in the
planning.95
The Campaign were appreciative of these moves by the local authority.
The arguments made by the Campaign about consultation ultimately had a
use in that they were picked up and acted upon by the local authority. However,
they also had another use. They acted as a mobilising strategy by providing a
common complaint with which their constituency could identify. Although as a
Campaign we never sat down and decided that this line of argument would prove
92ibid.
93lnterview with Peter Studdert, Chief Planner of Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, 1st September
1988.
94CSSD meeting, 20th February 1989, at which the planners had an open and frank discussion
with the Campaign about the proposed redevelopments.
95lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
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effective in mobilisation and constructing an opposition, we knew implicitly that
the complaints were well grounded and that many people in the area appreciated
that consultation had been lacking, judging by the complaints about the
consultation process made to us when we went petitioning door to door. The
public consultation was criticised because its organisers had ignored the specificity
of local needs with regard to opening up a public debate about the redevelopment
scheme. Redevelopment was therefore to be opposed because this failure had
allowed plans for the area to be made without the consent of the people who lived
there. The Campaign had an image of a local population who were unable to
respond to the consultation process and this prompted oppositional action.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the establishment of the Campaign and its
arguments. The Campaign argued against redevelopment on the grounds that that
an increase in land values as a consequence would destroy the local economic base
and have an adverse impact on the local housing situation. It argued that
redevelopment would affect health, recreation and leisure in the area. It argued
that the population of the area had not been properly consulted about the
redevelopment. Importantly, it presented itself as representing these views on
behalf of the population of the area, claiming knowledge of that population and
asserting that it could speak on its behalf:
Spitalfields is a unique and historic area. The area has a
high degree of social and communal cohesion; of racial
tolerance, industry and enterprise. This uniqueness is
characterised by a high concentration of local residents who
live and work in the area, the majority of residents living
within ten minutes of their place of employment. The area
houses a community for whom living, working, schooling,
shopping, cultural and religious needs are contained and
sustained within the locality. All these features will be
threatened by the proposed relocation of the Market and
redevelopment of the site; it would pose the most serious
threat to the continued existence of the multi-cultural
community that makes up the local residents who live and
work in Spitalflelds.96
Yet the arguments that the Campaign made against the redevelopment were never
negotiated with these local residents. Although the Campaign had a large base of
96Cpaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers, House of Commons Petition Against the
Spitalfields Market Bill October 1987.
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support within the local population, as evidenced by the numbers of people
prepared to sign their petition against the removal of the Market, it did not
formulate these arguments through intensive consultation within the area. The
Campaign's mobilization strategies may be contrasted with those of the tenant's
anti-HAT campaign in Tower Hamlets in 1988-1989. This campaign, organized
by tenants associations in the area, aimed at persuading the Government not to
establish a Housing Action Trust in the area. As a mobilization strategy, the anti-
HAT campaign used posters and petitions combined with languages that were
specifically constructed in order to bring as diverse a number of people together as
possible. Certain discourses, for example of racial equality, were used, but
subsumed under others such as 'housing rights' because the former did not appeal
to certain white tenants. However distasteful the co-ordinators found this they
were prepared to silence such discourses. 97 This was not a strategy followed
through by the Campaign. Although attempting to gain broad support they did so
on terms of their own choosing, laid down by the core of the Campaign and not
negotiated amongst a wider constituency. This is because the origins of the
Campaign's arguments lay with the origins of the Campaign itself, the discourses
from which it grew and the images and representations held by the Campaign
about Spitalfields. I shall deal with these two themes in the next two chapters.
97see Woodward, R. (1991) Mobiising Opposition: The Tenants Campaign Against a
Housing Action Trust in Tower Hamlets.
115
3.4 The threat hanging over Spitalfields.
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3.5 Man and Child - a photograph taken by Phil Maxwell and printed onto
postcards for the Campaign.
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Chapter Four
The Origins of the Campaign
In the previous chapter I discussed the establishment of the CSSD and
examined its arguments against the redevelopment of Spitalfields and the Market.
I indicated that the arguments the Campaign made and their mode of construction
lay with the Campaign's origins. In this Chapter I shall examine the origins of the
Campaign in order to illustrate where those roots lay. The Campaign's critique of
redevelopment had been constructed over time and the Campaign was able to draw
on already established and well rehearsed arguments about the implications of
redevelopment in terms of land values, employment and housing disbenefits for
the local area, and the need for wide consultation on planning and redevelopment
matters, from the voluntary sector and various community groups. Three groups
within the voluntary sector may be identified as vital to the origins of this
discourse of opposition. They are the Spitalfields Project, the Spitalfields Local
Committee (SLC), and the Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service
(SHAPRS). Other groups had been involved in the same movement and had
contributed towards the arguments, such as Avenues Unlimited, a youth and
community project, and the Spitalfields Housing Co-operative. The three
mentioned here were in the course of their work explicitly concerned with housing
and redevelopment issues, and I shall confine my examination to them. The
questions I am asking in this Chapter concern the nature of these groups and the
contribution they made to the Campaign. I shall then develop this part of the
narrative by examining the nature of the local Labour Party. The Campaign was
established by the Labour Party with the encouragement of the SLC and
SHAPRS, and would not have existed without it. It was to the Labour Party that
the co-ordinator of the Spitalfields Project turned, just before its closure, in the
hope that some sort of opposition would still be raised against redevelopment
despite the absence of the SLC and SHAPRS. 1 Charlie Forman, a SHAPRS
worker, notes the significance of the Labour party in filling one of the big gaps left
by the demise of the SLC in terms of opposing the redevelopment scheme. 2
 So
what sort of Labour Party existed in Spitalfields that cared enough about the future
of the area to want to enter into the debate on redevelopment?
'Interview with ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
2Fonp
 C. (1989) Spitalfields: a Battle for Land. Hilary Shipman, London. p.167.
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The Spitalfields Project
The Spitalfields Project was established in 1975 as a programme aiming to
undertake a variety of new local area initiatives that would be derived through the
voluntary sector and be geared and targetted towards the relief of deprivation. 3 Its
parentage was a mixture of ideas and aims, including the Home Office Community
Development Project experience which had, according to Spitalfields Project
Workers, provided 'a great burst of ideas (and ideology!) about community and
local development - and power'. 4
 The CDP projects had been stopped, the reason
being their radical analysis; they saw the 'social pathology model as inadequate
and inept and substituted a more rigourous Marxist model of anlaysis'. 5 The GLC
who had started the Project was, according to one interpretation, concerned for the
inner cities, viewing the growing alienation of its residents with dismay. This was
particularly frightening for a Labour administration 'losing votes in rundown inner
city wards in what was a working class heartland'. 6
 Tower Hamlets had been
reluctant to become involved in the Project:
Labourist parochialism was rife, to define an area such as
Spitalfields as 'deprived' - which it was on every count,
was very much a case of the truth that should not be told!7
The GLC was seen with suspicion, as Big Brother figure:
..everyone outside the narrow coterie of Tower Hamlets'
white rightwing Labourite politics was an alien intruder and
to be treated with suspicion.8
Eventually however they took on the idea, seeing the Project as a way of providing
money for Spitalfields and releasing funds for elsewhere in the Borough -
although Project money was intended as supplementary. It was funded by the
Home Office (75%) and the GLC (25%) with additional contributions from Tower
Hamlets. The Home Office and GLC at that time worked, if not in harmony, then
quite closely over the funding of the Project:
3The Records of the Spitalfields Project are kept in the Tower Hamlets Local History Library. I
have not referenced any particular items because the information given to me about the Project by
an ex-worker proved to be a far better source. The 'Essay' given to me in this way will be
deposited, with the permission of its author, with the Campaign's archive.
4Essay following interview with Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
5ibicl.
6ibit
7ibid.
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Can you imagine that happening today with the hostility
and complete mistrust of local authorities by central
government?9
The aim of the Project was to:
• ..undertake a variety of new local area initatives, that
would be derived through the voluntary sector, and be
geared and targetted to relieve deprivation.'0
They would have to be subject to public involvement, and were intended to be
derived from grass roots intiatives etc. 11 A secondary aim was to co-ordinate local
and statutory authority programmes so as to focus additional resources on the area.
Public involvement not only enabled local people and
community groups to have contact with councillors and
officers but also, through the decisions to spend Project
funds, enabled them to set up efficient local schemes. It
raised the social and local political consciousness that is
still apparent today. Local people do want to participate in
local democracy and care about the future of their area.12
For one ex-Project worker with whom I spoke, there was still a lot of doubt in his
mind as to the ultimate effectiveness of the Project in terms of its aims.
Departmentalism and lack of local authority support effectively reduced the ability
of the Project to carry out its work successfully to a minimum. However:
...at a local level, it produced an explosion of involvement,
organization, participation etc, among local people and
some voluntary agencies. From an area that had been
apathetic and powerless due to blight (planning and
economic) and neglect by local authorities etc. It suddenly
became a mass of meetings, demands for better services,
recriminations against neglect, calls for more local power
and say over local issues. People really began to identifly
themselves with the area and began proposing all sorts of
schemes to enhance the area - community development! 13
Release of local energy and involvement was seen as phenomenal, and the Project
was seen retrospectively as vital therefore in bringing about 'community' feeling,
defined as a degree of political cohesion and consensus. Crucially, it was an
organisation that encouraged the involvement of the expanding Bengali population
9ibicl.
'0ibid.
1
' 2Spitallields Local Committee (1981) Comments by Spitalfields Project Workers on the GLC
Policy and Resources Committee Report PR3J 7. Spitalfields Local Committee, 11th June
1981.
' 3Essay following interview with Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
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in the area. It developed public involvement, generated a framework and support
system enabling and encouraging local people to be involved in developing their
own schemes, and provided money for voluntary agencies to develop work with
the community. The rightwing Labour administration at the LBTh was cautious
of the project:
Needless to say, we were not allowed to call ourselves
community workers officially - LBTH interpreted
community workers as communist workers. 14
The Spitalfields Project is important in understanding the Campaign.
People who had been involved in the Project later became involved with the
Campaign bringing with them ideas on organization and languages of
empowerment and community action. Some Campaign members who had not
been involved in the Campaign nevertheless knew about it, its aims and its
'philosophy'. Brought from the experiences of the Spitalfields Project were two
things very important for the Campaign's arguments. Firstly there was the idea of
a policy specifically targetted towards establishing a framework for the
development of diverse projects (eveything from youth to health via housing) with
local input. The ideas of local action established by the Project surface again in the
arguments of the Campaign. Secondly the Spitalfields Project drew upon
discourses highlighting the importance of grassroots action as a means of
achieving change in deprived areas. The encouragement of grassroots activity was
understood to politicize a population resulting in demands for self-determination,
which the Project was keen to encourage.
There's no doubt about it that the great success of the
Project was in terms of developing public involvement, and
generating a framework and support system which enable
and encouraged local people to be involved in developing
their own schemes.15
This idea of self-determination was fully endorsed by the Campaign. Tensions
between this idea and the reality of later political organisation in Spitalfields later
surfaced, and I indicate where the consequences of this lie in Chapter Six where I
discuss the conflicts that emerged between groups of individuals who had been
politicized via the Spitalfields Project and involved in its work. Not all the ideas
inherited from the SLC were unproblematic in their later form.
14ibid.
'5ibid.
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The Spitalfields Local Committee
The Spitalfields Project ended its first phase in 1980. The Spitaffields
Project during its second phase (1980 - 1986) worked very closely with the newly
established Spitaiflelds Local Committee (SLC) which had grown up out of the
rump of the Project's Consultative Committee and Steering Group. It aimed to
'improve the environment and other conditions affecting the quality of life of the
residents of the West of Spitalfields' and to 'promote co-operation and mutual
understanding among local residents and members and officers of the authorities in
tackling problems, issues and proposals for action'. 16
 As an 'un-official sub-
committee of the council' it had its own budget and remit for environmental
improvement works, social activities and educational issues, with a full-time
council officer and a clerk servicing the committee. 17
 It had representation from
over forty local groups (see Appendix 2) as well as councillors, and was open for
attendance to all members of the local population. It encouraged the involvement
of workers from various voluntary organisations on the grounds that:
.people whose work is with residents are often those that
represent the interests of the less vocal.18
It involves people working together to benefit their area and
enabling local organizations, through their delegates, to
have a voice in many of the local issues that affect their
lives.19
An ex-worker with the Project summarised the work of the SLC thus:
I am not sure that the SLC had a "philosophy" as such - it
did have aims and these were (very generally) to ensure
that local people had a say in the decisions that affected
them/their lives; to develop the area in a way that provided
homes, jobs, amenities including environmental quality
(open space) for local people. An underlying assumption
was the need for the "community" to retain a stake in the
area.20
As with the Spitalfields Project, former SLC representatives joined the
Campaign and were highly influential in determining its arguments. Part of the
remit of the SLC was to submit views to the central council planning committee on
planning applications. The experiences of former SLC members in doing this was
16Proposed Constitution. Spitalfields Local Committee December 1979.
'7lnterview with ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
18SLC Formation Meeting. Notes. 20th August 1980.
19Genj Letter from Project Co-ordinator to member groups, 16th September 1983.
20Eay following interview with Spitalfields Project Workers, 15th June 1989.
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essential to the Campaign later, as was the position taken on the question of
redevelopment by the SLC. As the following will indicate, the Campaign drew
extensively for its own arguments on a critique developed by the SLC. On its
establishment, the Local Committee drew up a list of guidelines indicating the
policy stance to be taken on planning and redevelopment. The list indicates the
SLC position which it took when considering planning proposals such as the
Spitalfields Market schemes submitted by the SDG and Rosehaugh Stanhope. The
guidelines for planning applications are as follows:
1. There should be no further office development in
Spitalfields.
2. Where, in spite of local committee opposition, office
planning permission is granted, the developers should
provide a housing gain for Spitalfields the size of which
should be equal to or greater than the square footage of the
office development.
3. No consent should be granted for the demolition of
listed buildings unless agreed plans already exist for their
replacement and these plans are certain to be carried out. In
general the listed buildings of the area should be conserved
wherever possible.
4. Buildings inside and on the periphery of the
conservation areas should all be preserved and
rehabilitated.
5. There should be no loss of residential usage whatever.
6. New industrial schemes should be judged bearing in
mind the following points: number of local jobs created;
degree of visual, chemical and noise pollution; degree of
traffic generated; whether or not the development is in an
existing industrial development zone.
7. Change of use of small business premises and shops
should be judged bearing in mind the following points;
local jobs created/lost; local need for the new shop/service
being proposed degree of pollution as above.
8. There should be support of local housing schemes
which are designed to local housing needs.21
In their submission on the Borough Plan in February 1983, the SLC firmly
rejected the view that office development could be seen as beneficial to the area:
Office development is contrary to the needs of Spitalfields
and West Stepney. There are already vast amounts of
21 Spi1fie1ds Local Committee SLC Planning Criteria for the Consideration of Planning
Applications. 18th November 1981.
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unused office space vacant in the locality and immediate
areas. The nature of the development is such that it
destroys the opportunities for much needed alternative uses
ie. housing and local industry, because it forces up the
surrounding land values. It does not contribute to local
employment in any way. It blights whole areas, causing a
loss of both residential and the local working populations
through the takeover of privately rented sites and buildings.
Any additional income gained through increased rates is
penalized by Central Government policies. The concept of
planning gain has not produced benefits or facilities that are
needed by the community.22
In 1984, a realisation of its lack of policy for considering planning gains as
part of its criticisms of planning permission applications, prompted the local
committee to draw up a list of three main areas where 'acceptable planning gains'
could be considered. I would argue that this policy initiative came with a growing
realisation at that time of likely future pressures for redevelopment in Spitalfields:
Hitherto, any planning gains which may have been made in
relation to planning permission sought and/or granted in the
Spitalfields area, have never been considered in the context
of meaningful consultation with the local community or the
SLC about possible priorities or needs. Moreover, the
SLC has long recognized the fact that office developments
(for which planning gain is usually offered), poses a
serious threat to the area in that it neutralises and often
blights available sites that could be used for low rented
local authority or housing association housing or local
industry; it artificially drives up site values; it makes no
contribution to the need for public open space; it does not
create new local jobs matched to the skills of local people
or contributes to the local industrial baseP
The areas in which planning gain were acceptable were housing, industrial
workspace and open space. In the case of housing, money should be made
available to finance either local authority, housing association or co-operative
purchase of a local site or properties and cover the cost of construction,
rehabilitation or conversion. The SLC would expect a larger floor space devoted
to housing than to be granted for office space, and would never expect to see less
than equal space being provided. In the case of industrial workspace, any
replacement workspace should be within 10 minutes walking distance from the
point of displacement of the firm in question and should be specific to the needs of
the firm displaced. The construction of provided workspace should be completed
before displacement occured. Again, more industrial workspace should be created
22Spitalfields Local Committee Minutes 23rd February 1983. Comments on the Borough Plan.
23Spitalfields Local Committee Proposed Criteria for Acceptable Planning Gain for Spitalfields.
9th May 1984.
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than office space. Open space should be provided by developers at twice the
permitted plot ratios for office development. These criteria were adopted. I
would argue that these criteria were underpinned by a belief that the existing
economic base and social life of the existing population should be maintained in
order to strengthen its position in the face of redevelopment.
This critique of redevelopment, constructed by the SLC, was drawn upon
by the Campaign. The above list was never formally adopted or discussed by the
Campaign, but the ideas contained therein, concerning the problems associated
with redevelopment and the conditions that should be imposed on any
development, are echoed time and again in the Campaign's statements. For
example, as I showed in Chapter Three, a main concern of the Campaign was the
impact of office development on the rag trade. The SLC's criteria for assessing
planning applications detail the steps that could be taken to lessen the impact on the
rag trade of office development. The SLC had developed ideas on how planning
gain should be dealt with and arguments as to why office development should be
opposed. As the quotations in Chapter Three illustrate, the SLC had its own
critique of public consultation exercises. Crucially, certain individuals active in the
SLC, such as Abbas Uddin, Robbie MacDuff and Phil Maxwell, brought these
ideas with them to the Campaign.
It is important to emphasize the consequences of such wide representation
on the Local Committee. A great variety of people were given the chance to voice
their opinions on matters concerning their lives in the area. It also provided a
model for the future ideas of the Campaign and other groups as to how groups
could best work together within a co-ordinated and democratic structure, serviced
by professionals, directed by a steering committee and formed as a group by
representatives from the local area. I may be wrong on this point, but I would
suggest that some Campaign members previously active in the SLC saw the
umbrella function of the SLC as something that could and should be replicated by
a campaign such as the CSSD was to become. Importantly, the SLC claimed to
represent the views of the people of Spitalfields, as this quotation illustrates:
People feel that the area was "under attack" from city
developers who care nothing for the real needs of the area.
ibid.
25Spitaffields Local Committee SLC Planning Criteria for the consideration of Planning
Applications. Revised 9th May 1984.
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People thought resources should be put into improving
existing workshops and houses in the area.
This confidence in the support of their constituency lies with the membership of
the SLC.
The ... make up of the SLC also enabled the Bengali
groups to become more involved, not only in seeking
grants but also in the discussion of issues and debates.
Gradually over a short space of time, they gained equal
weight in the Committee and towards the end
preponderated, thus the SLC mirrored the local
demographic mix much more closely than did the Council
itself.27
I have pointed out already that the Campaign represented itself in public as
representative of the views of the people of the area. I would suggest that this idea
has its roots in the experiences of certain members of the Campaign within the
SLC. The quotation above suggests where problems with that self-understanding
of the Campaign lie.
In accordance with its belief in public debate and involvement in the
planning process, a public meeting was called by the SLC on 21st July 1986 in
order to discuss the Market plans with which the Committee had finally been
presented by the council. It was billed as 'THE LAST CHANCE TO MAKE
YOUR VIEWS KNOWN PUBLICLY'. 28
 The local needs that the meeting was to
address included protection for existing residents; fair rent housing for local
people; community gardens and children's playspace; shops to meet local needs
and small workshops offering employment opportunities for local people. Again,
the Local Committee's stance was aimed at maintaining what it understood to be
the economic base and conditions of the existing social organisation of the local
population. Again, this position was to be taken up by the Campaign two years
later.
In response to this meeting, the SLC submitted its reaction to the public
consultation carried out by the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood planning department
on the future of the market. Around 50 members of the public had attended the
meeting. The views of the meeting appear in the Spitalfields Market Report on
Consultation compiled by officers of the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood planning
26Tower Hamlets Inner Area Programme (THIAP) Consulting the Community - a Report of the
1 985/6 Consultation Programme. THIAP Report
27Eay following interview with Spitalfields Project Workers, 15th June 1989.
28Spitalfields Local Committee, poster advertising meeting on 21st July 1986 to discuss the
future of Spitalfields market.
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department. The meeting concluded that relocation of the market traders was
acceptable provided the traders were happy with conditions on the new site.
However, although the market was smelly, dirty and thought to be dangerous to
residents, it was valuable as it allowed the community to survive. There was
concern that market residents should be allowed to stay in their homes. The site
should be redeveloped so as to address the needs of local people, although the
meeting apparently accepted the need for the development to be self-financing.
There was a 'primary demand' for one bedroom and large family unit housing for
fair rent by housing associations. Shopping facilities to meet local needs were
wanted, open space was required, particularly for young children, and workshops
for local businesses at affordable rents were needed on site, bearing in mind the
employment needs of the area and the lack of attention to employment over
housing issues. Further:
Offices were not bringing jobs to local people. Although
workshops were needed to provide local businesses and
therefore jobs for local people, training was also needed to
help local people get office jobs.29
The needs of the area were presented as mechanisms by which the vibrancy of the
area could be maintained, even if the redevelopment were to proceed. An
alternative to this would be an incorporation of Spitalfields into the City of
London.
Office dominated areas were dead and lifeless in the
evening/weekend - like Aldgate. Spitalfields should be like
Continental Cities where people lived in the City.3°
A clear theory of precisely why office developments could work to the detriment
of an area such as Spitalfields can be seen to be emerging from these early
discussions:
Office development could destroy the area by pushing up
land values, rents and pushing residents and workshops
out. This was well researched and described by the GLC's
Community Area Policy. However, offices could create
jobs. Offices weren't bad per se, but their effects should
be carefully controlled and the amount of offices kept to the
minimum needed.31
29Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee, Spitalfields Market Report on Consultation. 30th
July 1986.
30ibid.
31ibid.
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The summary included in the Report noted that the scale, size and type of
development proposed would be likely to have an enormous and detrimental
impact on the character and local economy of the area. The SLC noted that the
massive increase in land values that would follow a purely commercial
development would put pressure on the surrounding area, seriously threatening
residents and the local employment base. It was felt that the first principles of the
development should be local needs and views which would underpin the
community and not undermine the community by appearing as useful additions or
benefits. Planning benefit, if sought, should be on site and should be of
maximum benefit to local people. Fair rent housing, shopping facilities, open
space and workshop premises were all needed as part of the development. The
report from the consultation meeting held by the SLC does not condemn the
scheme outright, although it is extremely critical of it.
The SLC itself, a year later, adopted a strongly worded resolution:
The SLC rejects both schemes for the development because
they represent a further incursion of the City into Tower
Hamlets which in no way benefits Spitalfields or the
Borough in terms of housing, jobs or services. We believe
the proposals threaten the local community and businesses
through the inevitable rise in land values. Support for the
development will ultimately mean that local people and
businesses are driven out from the surrounding area. We
finally resolve to defend our community from the further
incursion of the City developers.32
It is possible that more radical individuals had become members of the SLC by this
time, people who were later to become members of the Campaign. The similarities
of idea and language between this quotation and others from the Campaign are
striking.
Shortly after the submission of these comments, the SLC was cut by the
BGNC. Certain members of the Campaign were retrospectively swift in hinting at
an element of causality between the former event and the latter. 33
 The disbanding
of the SLC was justified as a rationalisation exercise given the establishment of the
new decentralized Neighbourhoods. The council proposed that the Local
Committee function could be brought into the newly created Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood. This was also, according to some commentators within the
32Resolution agreed at an Extra Ordinary meeting of the Spitalfields Local Committee, 8th May
1987.
33See comments of the Robbie MacDuff, Ex- Vice Chair of the SLC, to the House of Commons
Committee, 28th June 1988. ME 8 p.9.
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Campaign, a mechanism by which the new Liberal administration could get rid of
an opposition that had consistently confronted the Borough's planning policies,
both as a Labour and as a Liberal administration. The SLC was viewed by certain
members of the planning department as being 'very left wing and partial' and had
ultimately 'fallen apart under its own steam'. 34
 The new Neighbourhood
structure, former SLC members argued, did not replicate in any way the
democratic aims of the Local Committee, with its remit of accountablity, and
empowerment through the establishment of a very wide constituency in the area.35
The SLC was thought to offer a consistent forum for discussion of redevelopment
plans, and ultimately the seedbed from which ideas about opposition to
redevelopment grew. As a former delegate commented:
Some of the measure of the Project's worth is in its loss
too - for example, no locally accepted body to co-ordinate
and agree future structures, for example with BIC and the
CDG.36
The lack of the Project and Committee during the time that the redevelopment plans
started to materialise was understood to hamper effective opposition, and the
'burn-out' of workers with these two groups after years of consultations that had
come to nothing were understood to have affected the way these two groups felt
they could fight the redevelopments in their last year. 37
 But just before it was
disbanded, at a meeting on 8th May 1987 the committee resolved to oppose the
redevelopment of the Market, and recognised the need for:
a Campaign to get the development altered to recognize
local needs of housing, employment, amenities and the
support of the local economy and the community.38
People supporting that resolution were later involved, via the Labour Party, in the
establishment of the Campaign.
What did the SLC bring to the Campaign and why is a discussion of it
important for an understanding of the Campaign's arguments? I would argue that
the contribution was similar to that of the Spitalfields Project in terms of the idea of
34lnterview with Peter Studdert, Chief Planner, Bethnal Green Neighbourhood, 1st September
1988.
35The question of the limits or extents of community empowerment as aided by local state
structures and the voluntary sector is of great relevence here, although 1 shall not cover this
through lack of space. This needs a separate research project.
36lnterview with Claire Murphy, 6th July 1989. Both Business in the Community (BIC) and
the Community Development Gmup (CDG) are discussed in Chapter Six.
37ibid.
38jj letter to all members, 12th May 1987.
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an umbrella organization expressing the 'local will' although the SLC had a far
wider range of groups and individuals supporting it. I would suggest that this idea
was very appealing to the people who later founded the Campaign. I am not
suggesting that they tried to emulate the SLC. I do think, however, that the model
it provided of a locally-based and democratically organised grouping was
important as an example of a possible style of community-based politics. I think
that this influenced the way in which the Campaign went about organising
opposition. The SLC also brought in, crucially, a principled stance of opposition
to redevelopment and a range of arguments to support this assertion.
Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service
The third group which I would identify as being instrumental in the
development of this oppositional movement against redevelopment in Spitalfields
was the Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service (SHAPRS). The
Service was established through the work of a few individuals who had been
involved in the voluntary sector and community organisations in Spitalfields in the
late 1970s. At that time, the Spitalfields Law Centre was still reasonably active but
in the minds of some of these workers, was not fulfilling its remit. Accordingly,
after rewriting the job specifications of the Law Centre workers, the Service was
established in 1979, with funding from the GLC and Tower Hamlets Council. Its
remit included firstly fighting for tenants rights and dealing with case work for
individual cases over housing issues, and secondly, monitoring and criticising
where required the council's planning policies in the area, mainly with relation to
housing and office developments.
The policies that the Service followed in relation to its work on housing
and development in the area were publicised as a manifesto that the Service was
mandated to pursue. The intentions behind the manifesto may be seen as an
indication of the policy of the Service towards the establishment of SHAPRS as a
democratic, accountable and locally-required organisation, committed to
maintaining what were preceived as the bases upon which economic life and social
organisation were founded.
MANIFESTO
1. All housing development should be pushed forward as
soon as possible.
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2. Plans should be drawn up and carried out as soon as
possible for every area of the ward where there are none.
Preferably this should be part of an overall scheme for the
ward drawn up either by the people living within it or at
least with their full consent.
3. No council or housing association homes to be sold.
4. In the allocation of all modernised and newly built
council and housing association homes priority should be
given to local Spitalfields people in most housing need.
5. All people forced to move out of the area because of
clearance schemes or modernisation programmes, in the
past, now or in the future, should have the right to return
when new housing becomes available.39
The parallels between this and statements of the SLC are apparent. Again the
Campaign reflected these arguments but did not necessarily reproduce them in full.
SHAPRS has been seen by those working in and associated with it, as a
radical organisation, commendable for its principled opposition to office
development and advocacy of local housing needs as a priority.40 Two of its
initial activities indicate this. Firstly, the undertaking and publication of The
Spitalfields Survey was an attempt to analyse the precise nature of the housing
problems in the area in 1980 in order to establish a base point from which their
arguments could be launched.41
 It aimed to compensate for the lack of adequate
recent statistics on the demography of the local population, its employment base,
its aspirations and the conditions of the housing stock in the area. Secondly, a
SHAPRS report, What's Happening to West Spitalfields?, published in 1980,
documented the threats posed to the local population by encroaching office
development, and noted the Labour Council's and GLC's involvement in this
process.42
 Both these reports were unequivocal on the nature of the problems
faced by people in the area - terrible housing conditions - and the source of these
problems - developers encouraged by a local authority whose primary motive was
the conversion of Spitalfields from a residential and light industrial area to an
extension of the City of London.
Both the tone and content of these two reports were inflammatory to the
local council and the GLC. In particular, What's Happening to West Spitalfields?
39SHAPRS Annual Report, 1981. p.4.
40lnterviews with ex-SLC workers and ex-members of SHAPRS Management Committee,
Summer 1989.
41 Spitalfields Housing and Planning Rights Service and the Catholic Housing Aid Society.
(1981) The Spitalfields Survey. SHAPRS and CHAS, London.
42SPAPRS (1980) What's Happening to West Spitalfields. SHAPRS, London. May 1980.
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was understood to be the prime motive for the cutting in October 1980, at three
weeks notice, of SHAPRS's funding. 43
 The council did not initially give the
Service the reason for their decision, but later announced that the authorities were
going to establish a new housing advisory service for Spitalfields, rendering the
work of SHAPRS redundant.'1 The newly established Spitalfields Local
Committee voted, at one of its first meetings, to give its entire £15,000 budget to
maintaining the Service,45
 and SHAPRS was able to continue until the 1981 local
government elections when the new Labour GLC administration restored funding
to organizations such as SHAPRS. The Service was then able to continue until
1986 when its funding was cut by the new Liberal administration in Tower
Hamlets, having made specific allegations about the political involvement of
S HAPRS 46
Due to constraints of space and time here, SHAPRS' work with regard to
case work for individual tenants, and general campaigns with and on behalf of
local residents around housing issues, will not be discussed. 47
 Rather, it is their
activities and campaigning with regard to office development that is important
because the Service developed a critique that was later adopted by the Campaign.
The Service had a policy of systematically lodging their objections to planning
applications that had been put before the council for office developments in the
area. These would have been either new-build offices, or conversions of
buildings from light industrial, retail or residential to office usage, which until the
changes in the use classes orders in 1987, entailed an application for planning
permission to do so. Retrospectively, Forman concluded that ultimately, if the
council supported a planning application, it went through. The objections of
community organisations such as SHAPRS were only taken into account if the
43Forman, C (1989) Spitalfields: A Battle for Land. Hilary Shipman, London. p.167. Eade
also attributes the borough council and GLC's withdrawal of funding to the publication of a third
report, New Houses in Spitalfields: The Big Sleep?, written and published by SHAPRS in
October 1979. Eade, J. (1989) The Politics of Community: The Bangladeshi Community in
East London. Avebury, Aldershot. p.32.
SHAPRS, Annual Report, 1981. SHAPRS, London. p.6.
45 'mis Local Committee.., considers the closure of SHAPRS to be a CUT IN SERVICES TO
THE PEOPLE OF SPITALFIELDS. This is unacceptable at a time of massive Government
housing cuts.' SLC Press Release, 31st October 1980. Emphasis in original.
46Forman, C. (1989) Spitalfields. p.66. At an interview with a former worker for SHAPRS, I
was told that certain Liberal councillors had confirmed that the withdrawal of funding from
SHAPRS was indeed political: "Why should we fmance our ol#sition? " they were reported to
have said. Interview with Mark Adams, St.Mary's centi worker, 14th October 1988.
47For a clear idea of SHAPRS activities with regard to housing issues, see SHAPRS Annual
Reports, 1980 - 1986, Forman, C. (1989) Spitalfields SHAPRS Reports: Too Little, Too Late -
A Different View of the GLC (Summer 1986); Selby Street: Make it 200 Council Homes
(September 1984); Bengalis and GLC Housing Allocation in El (March 1982 and March 1984);
and various proofs of evidence to the Public Inquiry on the Borough Plan, May 1984. See also
Eade, J. (1989) The Politics of Community. Chapter Five.
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council was unhappy with the details of the scheme and used such objections as a
justification for refusal.48
Forman, a former worker with SHAPRS, has himself critiqued this aspect
of their work. He assesses local loyalty to SHAPRS as being based more on its
housing work than on its confrontations with the council over their office policy.
Much of the SHAPRS documentation indicates a powerful self-belief that the
organisation acted on behalf of a supportive local population, and in the best
interests of that constituency. Forman notes however that whilst arguments
against office development were readily accepted by community activists, there
were always more immediate and easier issues to organise around. 49
 The efficacy
of SHAPRS with regard to its opposition to office development was perhaps
doubted, and recognised as a consequence of the difficulties of conceptualising
and dealing with such large schemes. This I think indicates a source for the
Campaign's arguments against public consultation. Despite his reservations about
the efficacy of SHAPRS' activities against office development, the arguments
proposed require examination here, not least because of their contribution to the
discourses of the opposition.
SHAPRS had from its establishment argued that the redevelopment of
Spitalfields Market constituted 'the biggest question mark hanging over the future
of West Spitalflelds'.50
 The Service claimed that the development of the market
site would result:
in the irreversible destruction of West Spitalfields as a
viable residential community, placing as it would a wall of
offices between the north and south of the area. ... such a
development would see the destruction of the homes of
another 93 of West Spitalfields residents.51
The report went on to document the rumours that Greycoats were considering the
redevelopment, encouraged by the local authority. In 1982, SHAPRS accused the
Council of actively encouraging the relocation, holding discussions with the
LDDC and drawing up a planning brief for the market. This brief did however
contradict the Borough Plan, as SHAPRS pointed out. SHAPRS were
particularly displeased by the GLC's support for the relocation of the market at that
time, as the Service had been counting on the support of the GLC to oppose the
48Foim. C. (1989) Spitalfields. p.167.
49ibid.
50SHAPRS, (1980) What's Happening in West Spitalfields. p.23.
51ibid.
140
idea, bearing in mind the GLC's own Community Areas Policy 'under which they
are committed to preventing any further damage to communities in Central London
such as Spitalflelds'.52
In 1986, when the discussions over relocation were underway, SHAPRS
had by then been involved in advice work and organising and resourcing meetings
for locally based groups and residents associations to ensure some discussion of
the matter, and had submitted their views in full to the local authority's and
developer's consultations. 53
 SHAPRS response to the Neighbourhood's request
for comments on the redevelopment of the market arrived in great detail, to then be
cut and summarised by the planning department. SHAPRS pointed to the
desperate need for housing and land to meet that need, noting that:
• ..the Spitalfields Market site is an opportunity to provide
many more new homes. If the site is used for other uses
where is the Council planning to build the homes to meet
these needs? The Council should refuse any scheme which
does not provide for housing on the vast majority of the
site. The Council should join with the local community
organisations in putting the housing needs of Spitalfields
and the Borough to the City.54
The Service was adamant on the lack of benefits that offices and associated
planning gains would provide to Spitalfields:
Offices do not raise extra income for the Council or jobs
for local people. Offices have sometimes provided useful
planning gains but this is no substitute for proper planning
to meet the needs of the area. ... If the Council does not
stop further office development, speculators will continue
to expect office permissions putting pressure on existing
uses, forcing up land values. Has the Council carried out
any research on the effect of office development especially
on local clothing firms and residential premises?55
George Nicholson, an architect of the GLC's Community Areas Policy and
worker with the Campaign for Homes in Central London (CHICL), a group of
which SHAPRS was a member, presented a view allied with that of SHAPRS:
It cannot be argued that the development is proposed
through concern for the market's operation. It is, as with
52SHAPRS, (1982) Annual Report 1982. SHAPRS, London.
53SHAPRS (1986) Annual Report 1986. SHAPRS, London.
54Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee Spitalfields Market Report on Consultation. 30th
July 1986.
55ibid.
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many other proposals in the community areas ring, just a
property transaction designed to cash in on the location.56
These ideas, as shown in Chapter Three, are also evident in the arguments made
by the Campaign against redevelopment in the area.
Whether SHAPRS would have had any ultimate success in opposing
'unsuitable' redevelopment on the market site is an interesting question; it was cut
by the BGNC just after the initial consultations about the market redevelopment
had begun in 1986. Retrospectively, both ex-workers for the Service, people
associated with other groups in the area, and Campaign and Labour Party activists
have noted the importance of the Service in developing a coherent critique of local
authority planning policies in the area and in formulating answers to the assertions
made by the Government, developers and Corporation about the redevelopment
made in their discourses. Whilst the CSSD had, in Forman's words, 'its work cut
out to cover the ground' lost by the closing of SHAPRS and the Local Committee,
the CSSD could not have begun the fight against the relocation of the market
without the prior work of SHAPRS in the area.57
As with the SLC the contributions of SHAPRS to the Campaign were
various. SHAPRS personnel later became involved with the Campaign, not as
active participants but as witnesses in the House of Commons and House of Lords
committees. The idea of opposition to redevelopment on principle, which later
directed the Campaign's activities in oppositon, may be linked back to the position
taken by SHAPRS whereby unless redevelopment was directed specifically
towards the needs of the people living in the area and suffering the most from
deprivation, it was to be opposed. 58 From SHAPRS workers, amongst others,
came ideas on the way that public consultation could be made more effectual
through their own experiences with consultation exercises amongst its
constituency. SHAPRS also argued very strongly against blithe acceptance of
planning gains as a result of redevelopment.
The Labour Party
56Nicholson, 0. (1988) Trusting the People: Community Areas Policy. The Architects
Journal, 30th March 1988 pp.34 - 52.
57Forman. C. (1989) Spitalfields. p.167.
58These ideas in turn may be traced back to the Community Development Projects of the GLC
in the 1970s. Further research into the establishment of SHAPRS and its connections with such
ideas would be interesting, but it unfortunately outside the remit of this project. This would
complement Forman's work on the activities of the Service, detailed in Spitalfields.
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In the introduction to this Chapter I noted that the local Labour Party had
been encouraged to take up the arguments put forward by the SLC on the demise
of the latter. Because the Campaign would not have existed without the initiative
of members of the local Labour Party, it is necessary to examine that organisation
and to ask two questions of it. Firstly, which elements of the Campaign's
organisational style and argument can be traced back to the local Labour Party?
Secondly, what sort of Labour Party existed in Spitalfields that cared sufficiently
about the redevelopment of the area to organise a campaign and enter the
redevelopment debate? It is to these questions that I shall now turn.
The establishment of the Campaign was contingent upon the Labour Party
being prompted into action - by themselves and by some individuals who had
formerly worked in the area (with the Spitalfields Project, the SLC and SHAPRS)
and perceived the redevelopment as (at that time) the major threat to Spitalfields.
The Spitalfields Ward Labour Party had in fact been considering the issue at its
meetings and had responded to the 1986 public consultation. Councillor Phil
Maxwell, writing on behalf of the group, raised the issue of 'public consultation'
which had previously not been questioned:
..we note with alarm the fact that most groups in th
Spitalfields area who have been consulted are under the
impression that the market is inevitably going to go and that
they are powerless to do anything about it. People in
Spitalfields feel that the consultation is just a public
relations exercise designed to pave the way for large scale
office redevelopment.59
This concern over public consultation later became a feature of the arguments of
the Campaign against redevelopment, as I illustrated in Chapter Three, with the
Campaign using a particular representation of Spitalfields to argue against the
public consultation carried out by the local authority. Here, then, we see the
origins of that argument. The Labour Party statement claims knowledge of the
feelings of the people of Spitalfields towards redevelopment. This implies an
understanding of its position in the area as mouthpiece for the people, with a
mandate to speak on issues such as redevelopment. This style of self-presentation
was later used by the Campaign, as the evidence in Chapter Three indicates. The
ward Labour Party response to the consultation noted that there was still the same
level of demand for the market and that it still employed the same number of
people as it had ten years ago, attempting to refute council and City declarations
59Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee, Spitalfields Market Report on Consultation, 30th
July 1986.
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that the market was uneconomic on its present site. As I showed in Chapter
Three, this argument reappears in the Campaign's objections to the redevelopment
raised in the Parliamentary committees. Low cost housing, workshop space,
leisure and community facilities should be prioritised for the site, the Labour Party
stated. In view of the housing shortage in the Borough, it was felt that office
development would be a disgraceful waste of the land involved. The ward Labour
Party thus urged the Council to take out a Compulsory Purchase Order on the
market so as to ensure that if the market moved the developments recommended
would be implemented. 60
 The Labour Party therefore offered an assertive and
principled opinion on the future of the Market site, totally at variance with the
plans that had been given planning permission by the local authority. The
Campaign's arguments continued in this vein.
The Labour Party opposed the idea of redevelopment. Their opposition
does not, however, explain the establishment of a campaign. The Labour Party in
the ward had a record of consistent comment on a wide variety of issues to a
variety of bodies including the local authority. None of these issues ever produced
a campaign such as the CSSD. I would interpret the establishment of the
Campaign by the Labour Party as conibutable to the threat posed to the Labour
Party by the redevelopment (and a redeveloped) Spitalfields. I would argue that
the redevelopment of Spitalfields posed a threat to the constituency of the Labour
Party because of the social and demographic changes that would occur.
Tower Hamlets council, from 1919 to 1986 was controlled politically by
the Labour Party, both as the modern borough, and before 1964, as the boroughs
of Bethnal Green, Stepney and Poplar. Commentators have noted the dominance,
until the early 1980s, of a Labour party run by elderly white men with a
background in organised labour. 61
 The Party was seen by Forman,
retrospectively, as 'complacent' and 'ossified', due to a virtual lack of opposition
on the council and within the Party 62
 Prior to the 1982 council elections 29 of the
43 Labour councillors had held office for over 20 years, with one member
representing his ward since 1928. 63
 In 1980 and 1981 the dominance of this 'old
guard' of right-wing Labour started to be challenged from within. These
challenges constituted the beginning of a major change in Labour Party politics in
the area.
ibid.
61Glassberg, A. (1981) Representation and Urban Community. Macmillan, London.
62Forman, C. (1989) Spitalflelds. p.38.
63ibid
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In Spitalfields what has been described as a clique of white elderly Jewish
councillors dominating the Party were challenged in 1982-3 through the attempts
to gain entry into the party of a group of younger left-wingers. 64
 This had taken
some time:
.and we did spend about a year trying to find out where
the meetings happened and trying to get an application form
and eventually we found out, I can't remember how we
found out, but we marched in one night, put our
application forms down and said "We're here" and totally
gob-smacked them. And Mark Adams was the only other
person under about 90 that was there.65
Their take-over of the party marked a decisive change in the Labour politics
of the ward. It had shifted left-wards in its policies, it had become more
democratic in its practices, and its membership numbers had greatly increased.66
Robbie Macduff interpreted the change as being attributable to the rise of a
politically motivated Bengali population in the area, which made the experience of
the left and the Labour Party in Spitalfields very specific:
64Eade, J. (1989) The Politics of Community: the Ban gladeshi Community in London.
Avebury, Aldershot. Chapter Three.
65lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989. For full details, see Eade, ibid.
I would argue that links may be made between the left-wards shift of the Spitalfields Labour
party and the emergence of the new urban left in local politics around the country at that time.
This situation was not peculiar to the ward, as Wainwright's examination of changes in Labour
Party politics in Newham indicates (Wainwright, H. (1987) Labour: A Tale of Two Parties.
Hogarth Press, London. pp. 17-23.) The new urban left is a term used by Gyford to denote a
stream of thought in British politics concerned mainly with arguing for and demonstrating the
socialist potential of local government arising from a belief in the inadequacy of traditional
models of socialist politics (Gyford, J. (1985) The Politics of Local Socialism. Allen and
Unwin, London.). Gyford points to it being not a formally organized grouping, but rather a
syndrome or set of associated practice, the characteristics of which include:
a concern for issues hitherto absent from or marginal to conventional
local government, such as local economic planning, monitoring the
police, women's rights and racial equality; a disdain for many of the
traditional ways of conducting local authority business; a view of
local government as an arena both for combating the policies of a
Conservative Government and for displaying by example the potential
of a grass-roots socialism; and perhaps most fundamentally, a
commitment to notions of mass politics based upon strategies of
decentralization and/or political mobilization at the local level. (ibid.
p.18)
I would argue that the Labour Party in Spitalfields may be identified as sharing the discourses
associated with the new urban left. It was concerned precisely with those issues and exhibits
those characteristics that Chford identifies as characterizing the new urban left. Unfortunately,
this is not the place to goquestions concerning the relevance of theories of the new urban left to
the Labour Party in Spitalfields, although I believe this to be a very important topic in its own
right and worthy of consideration.
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No I don't think its the rise of the urban left at all, I think it
was a combination of events, only one would be similar to
the other London boroughs where the left saw rise, and
that was other people moving into the area like Jil Cove and
George Roberts, who had a different perception to the
people who had run and controlled the party for numerous
years in an unchallenged way and in a very cliqueish way.
They came in as articulate white people aqthey were
horrified and angered by the misuse of the system, the way
in which the Party was run in a totally unaccountable and
undemocratic way, which of course was out of sync with
the Party's commitment to the way in which organisations
whould be run. But what happened in Spitalfields was
different, was there was an activated, politically activated
Bengali community and they were being denied access to
the Labour party by being told that the Labour Party was
full, that there was no longer any places. Now for people
who had never been involved in the labour Party - you
could believe it - it's only people who know what the
Labour Party is like, how its run, what its rules are, that
would be able to say "This is outrageous, how dare you".
So there was a combination of those events. The riots
down Brick Lane against the fascists in '78 which
politicised clearly the community also, and so there was a
right-wing Labour controlled council, there was this
National Front activity, and there was a Be4li community
that was fed up with its lot. And it saw the Labour Party
was in control, and it knew for it to have some influence it
had to be involved in that organisation and involved in that
structure.67
The changes in the Labour Party meant that it had become multi-racial and was
politically active. As Jil Cove explained it:
I suppose it's all part of the community suddenly finding
that they've got something to say, and looking for ways to
say it. And it may have been that people were very aware
that we suddenly got a Tory government that was going to
hammer areas like this, and was looking for forums to
make their voice known. That may sound a bit
sophisticated, I don't know! But it may also be that
suddenly people in this area - are natural allies of the
Labour Party but never got any ability to take part in the
Labour Party.68
Crucially, the Bengali population became involved in the Labour Party. The
results of a ward by-election in 1985 seemed to symbolise this change in the nature
and support for the Labour party locally. A 24 year old Bengali man - Abbas
Uddin - was elected to a seat on the council following the death of an 80 year old
Jewish woman. In addition, and crucial to my argument, the Labour Party's idea
67lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
68lnterview with ill Cove, 12th July 1989.
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of itself as the 'natural' party to represent the area was reinforced. The Party had
held the ward since 1919 and had traditionally seen itself as the Party of the area.
In addition, because of the increase in support the rejuvenated party was getting,
this idea did, I think, become reinforced in the minds of certain Labour Party
members.
...its a working class area, and working class equals
Labour, doesn't it, under usual circumstances. And
certainly the Bengali people would be natural Labour Party
supporters purely because they are working people, poor
people... and would see that would be the only party that
represents them. Obviously people change their politics as
they prosper and move on, but I think that certainly people
in this area are natural allies of the Labour Party, in this
immediate area.
As I explained in Chapter Three, the Campaign thought that if the
redevelopments went ahead as planned, the area would change. The social
composition would alter radically, it was thought, and the Bengali population
would be forced to leave the area. I would suggest that the Labour Party had in
fact imagined that scenario for themselves. Support for the Labour Party, by their
own analysis, came from those most affected by redevelopment. Redevelopment
of Spitalfields could seriously threaten support for the Labour Party. This was
frightening for the Party. The tone of two quotations taken from local newspapers
illustrates this:
The last thing Spitalflelds needs is wine bars and galloping
genirification from the City. The Alliance had decided to
let big money flood in from the City in order to provide a
playground for City gents and office space for new
computer technology... The site should be developed for
the benefit of the local community, not the City.7°
It now appears that the Alliance is extending its interest to
the wine market and designer clothes industry, reducing
development in the area to nothing more than a high society
soap opera. The Labour Party will stick with East
Enders.71
Redevelopment of Spitalfields would threaten the power base of the Labour Party
in the area, and I would argue that this was highly significant in prompting the
Party into action and establishing the Campaign. A gentrified Spitalfields would
not, according to the understanding of the Party, vote Labour. I am not saying
69lnterview with iii Cove, 12th July 1989.
70Abbas Uddin, quoted in City of London Recorder, 7th August 1986 and East London
Advertiser, 8th August 1986.
71Phil Maxwell, quoted in East London Advertiser, 8th August 1986.
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that this was the only reason for the establishment of the CSSD. Concern about
the future of the population of the area and the pressures on them were spurs to
action too. But I would argue that the threat to the Party was extremely significant
in prompting members into action.
Conclusion
In Chapter Three I introduced the Campaign, looking at its membership
and organisation, and introducing the basic arguments against redevelopment of
the market that appeared in its public discourse. I argued that the Campaign
understood the redevelopment of Spitalfields to constitute a threat to the area and
its population because of its impact on land values, the local economic base and
housing. In this chapter I have examined the origins of the Campaign and these
arguments. I have argued that the basic arguments articulated by the Campaign
against redevelopment were adopted from certain groups such as the Spitaffields
Project, the Spitalfields Local Committee and the Spitalfields Housing and
Planning Rights Service, brought to the Campaign by personnel involved in such
groups. I have also discussed the motives of the Spitalfields Labour Party in
establishing the Campaign, attributing them to the threat posed by redevelopment
to the constituency of the Party. Whilst the explanation so far given of the
Campaign would suffice as correct and accurate as far as it goes, it is not the full
story. Redevelopment, as I shall argue in the next chapter, was also opposed
because of the threat it posed to a particular set of ideas, images and
representations the Campaign held about Spitalfields. On what terms was
Spitalflelds defended? How was Spitalfields represented in their arguments? Why
did the Campaign argue what they did, in the ways that they did?
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Chapter Five
Representations and
Redevelopment
In this chapter 1 want to examine the ways in which the Campaign
represented Spitaiflelds. The CSSD was formed because its members thought that
the redevelopment planned for the Market would set in motion a set of processes
that combined would fundamentally alter the area, changing its function and
driving its population away. Furthermore, and as I shall argue in this chapter, the
CSSD was formed to fight the redevelopment because it constituted a threat to the
sets of images, ideas and representations the Campaign members held about the
area. These images would be totally undermined if redevelopment went ahead -
redevelopment threatened ideas held dear in people's hearts about the place that
they lived in. Opposition to redevelopment was about attempting to assert a
specific understanding of Spitalfields. In this chapter I shall examine that image of
Spitalfields through the discourse of the Campaign, and investigate how it was
used to argue against the redevelopment of the Market. In doing so I hope to
emphasise the importance of a consideration of the power of meaning and imagery
in understanding political action.
Spitalfields in pictures
I shall start this discussion by examining a collection of photographs
exhibited in October 1989 by Phil Maxwell, a Labour Councillor, photographer
and Campaign member, in the Montefiore Centre in Spitalfields. Photographs, as
Sontag notes, are images - created structures of meaning. They are an
interpretation of reality and not an irrefutable image of it. Photographs therefore
do not represent an unbiased reality because of their power of inclusion and
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exclusion. 1 These photographs, then, are extremely useful in examining the
Campaign's representation of Spitalfields.2
The commentary on the photographs, written by Robbie MacDuff, linked
Maxwell's portrayal of Spitalfields directly to the question of redevelopment:
The new look for Spitalfields can be either the dry, drab,
grey face of the City or the image of a vibrant community
enhanced by the injection of much needed, community
directed cash.3
My own comments on them will assess them from that perspective also.4
'Sontag, S. (1977) On Photography. Penguin, USA. quoted in Carringlon, K. (1989) Girls
and Graffiti. p.91. Cultural Studies 3 pp. 89- 100.
2i am of course aware that the photographs that appear elsewhere in this thesis have been chosen
by me, and that a similar analysis of my photographs might be undertaken.
3 Maxwell, P. (1988) Saving Spitalfields: A photographic exhibition by Phil Maxwell.
October 1988. Exhibition catalogue.
sin grateful to Katharine Hurd and Mary Baker of S.D.U.C., Lampeter, for their helpful
comments on the photographs.
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5.1 Introduction to Maxwell's exhibition, taken from catalogue.
I I -U L F I L I
A Photographic Exhibition by PHIL. IVIAXWLL.
SAVE SPITALFIELDS is Phil Maxwell's 4th exhibition. As a freelance photographer who has lived in
Spitalfields for seven years, Maxwell has sought to portray the life and times of the area he knows
intimately. The photographs seek to capture the very essence of life in Spitalfields: its humanity,
heritage, multiculturalism; its poverty and homelessness: namely, its great diversity.
Of Spitalfield, Maxwell says: "deprivation certainly permeates the place but people have a fighting
spirit and they form a vibrant community. The strengths of our community are too often overlooked by
misguided, well-intentioned outsiders, as well as those who are ill-intentioned, and sensationalist
journalism".
Maxwell has chosen to link his exhibition to the work undertaken by the Campaign To Save
Spitalfields From the Developers: a local community organisation which has been fighting to halt
major redevelopment in Spitalfields; redevelopments which put at risk the continued existence of the
very community the photographs portray.
With 20% of the area up for redevelopment, and the hungry-eyed City of London looking for land for
expansion, Spitalfields is threatened with a face lift. The new look for Spitalfields can be either the dry,
drab, grey face of the City or the image of a vibrant community enhanced by the injection of much
needed, community directed cash.
In this exhibition Maxwell chooses to contrast the Spitalfields photos with images of the newly
established privileged few who live on the borders of our community; a timely reminder of what could
happen to Spitalfields unless the community as a whole is diligent in working together to agree a
community perspective on new deyelopments.
Maxwell states: "we know our weaknesses; to overturn these we need to build on our strengths".
Market life, Street life, home life: the photographs are all about a living and dynamic environment:
one we should all do our best to preserve.
Phil Maxwell has dedicated SAVE SPITALFIELDS to the memory of George Roberts, a close friend
and comrade who worked for many years for an end to discrimination and the threat of a nuclear
holocaust. He is greatly missed by those who knew him.
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5.2 Their beautiful launderette
'Their beautiful launderette'	 - Brick Lane Launderette was closed down and no other facility has replaced it.
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Looking hopeful' - Cheshire Street
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5.4 Chicksand Estate -
Chicksand Estate - Hanbury Street
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Resistance'
On July 15th locals demonstrated against the policing tactics in the area. Over thirty demonstrators were arrested
and face serious charges in the Courts.
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56 The WhitechaPel Open
'The WhitechaPe Open'
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5.10 Allen Gardens
AlIen Gardens viewed from Spitalfields Farm'
This area will be blighted for up to nine years if the British Rail "Cross Rail" proposals go ahead.
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5.11 Overcrowding in Spitaiflelds
'Overcrowding in Spitalfields' -
My name is Mustaque Ahmed
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and I live with my two sisters and four brothers in a two bedroom flat on the twelfth floor of a tower block..."
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5.12 Various
Spanning the years' - Sunday Market 	 'Sunday Market' - Sciater Street
The UIlah family' - Brune House, West Spitalfields 	 'Alone together' - Cheshire Street
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Their Beauttfui Launderette
This is a picture of a launderette with a couple in it. We assume they are washing
their clothes, but we're not sure because they are kissing. I think the point that
Maxwell is making is that lauderettes are communal places, meeting places. They
are used for many functions other than washing clothes. Brick Lane Launderette
closed down, but no other facility replaced it. A meeting place, a communal
space, was lost. To my mind this image is making a point about the appropriation
of space and the availability of communal space for appropriation, and it is also
making a statement about the loss of that space.
Looking Hopeful
This photograph of Spitalfields shows bad housing conditions, decaying building
fabric, and rubbish. These features provide the background for this picture of a
small child. The photograph highlights environmental conditions in the area and
points to the fact of people's residency with them.
Chicksand Estate
A group of boys, posing together for a photograph. A happy, hopeful, friendly
image, lively and energetic. It is also an image of solidarity and cohesion. These
are Bengali boys who are portrayed as being protective of each other because they
are have their arms round each other. They are asserting their mutual support for
one another. They are portrayed as asserting ownership of their space, having
appropriating that space for themselves. The boys in the photograph are Bengali.
I would suggest that an assumption is being made, concerning the background to
this image, to the effect that elsewhere in London they are rendered either
unwelcome or invisible by a racist society. The photograph, I think, is making a
statement highlighting and celebrating their assertion of their right to use this
space, and their own feelings of exclusivity. Phil Maxwell refered to this in
interview with me, (although not in the context of refering to this photograph).
We were discussing the future of the people in the area after redevelopment:
If you just look at the way, say, young people dress,
they're asserting themselves as "we're here to stay" -
167
they've got that confidence. I think that is the key to the
future in terms of the community asserting itself.5
Resistance
This is a picture of anger, and it also has a lot of energy in it. It is an image of a
group protesting against racist policing tactics in the area. I think that this image is
making a point about the activism of the Bengali youth in Spitalfields. It is an
image of a group who will not acquiesce, in the way that a previous generation
did, to the conditions in which they are forced to live, and the configurations of
power they are forced to live under. I think that in using this image in his
exhibition, Maxwell is underscoring a point with regard to the political activism of
the young Bengali population of the area. They were portrayed not as passive
resisters but as active protesters against injustices they perceive. Maxwell spoke
about this too in interview with me, against in the context of the future of the
population of the area.
...if you ask me to speculate and go ahead 15 years, I think
that the Bangladeshi community is going to be far more
organised in a political way, and that will have a temendous
impact on the decision makers and what will happen. I
also think that there's a strong possibility, unless things
change, it's almost inevitable, there will be civil
disturbances in the area and that will have an effect on
prices and investment and will force government to do
something.6
I would suggest that this idea of active protest is being celebrated by Maxwell both
through his capture of it and through its presentation.
The Whitechapel Open
This is a photgraph of contrasts. The solid, institutional facade of the Whitechapel
Art Gallery, with its doors closed, a symbol of western culture, is contrasted with
a Bengali man, occupied with an everyday activity - wheeling his shopping home
in a trolley. Spitalfields is portrayed as an area of contrasts. This idea appears
within other areas of the Campaign's discourse, and I discuss this below.
5lnterview with Phil Maxwell, 6th September 1989.
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Warning - Developers: Children at Risk
I think that in using this image of a man wheeling a pram in front of an unfinished
housing development, Maxwell is making a point about the gradual appropriation
of public space, the takeover of streets for development, and the creation of no-go
areas in cities by developers. This new housing development, closed off from the
area by corrugated iron, is presented as housing for outsiders, not for local people
such as the man pushing the pram.
Street Ltfe
This is another image of urban decay, showing corrugated iron and boarded up
shop fronts, possibly alluding to the processes by which Spitalfields has become
run down in the way that it has. Again, this is an image of people appropriating
their space.
Playing in Hanbury Street/Allen Gardens/Overcrowding in Spitalfields
These three photographs show a normal activity on an average backstreet of
Spitalfields, and playing field that is overlooked by a railway line and a disused
signal box. The prospect of removal of this facility if redevelopment occurs is
raised as an issue, and thus the need for facilities such as these in an area where
overcrowding is rife and children require somewhere to play.
These photographs as a collection of images are realistic, that is, their style
encourages the viewer to believe that these are pictures of Spitalfields as it really it.
That reality is one of decaying buildings, rubbish and in parts a derelict
environment. There is a risk in portraying this area in this way, because it opens
up questions surrounding the need for some sort of redevelopment in order to
clean up this environment. But I think the idea that these photographs represent is
that this rather derelict area is home to a group of people who have adopted it as
their own. They have their own space in which communal life is acted out, and
are defiant about their right to assert themselves in the area, and thus their will on
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any plans for the area. I will now explore some of these ideas in more detail,
looking at how they were used in the discourse of the Campaign in the arguments
against redevelopment.
Community
The photographs seek to capture the very essence of life
in Spitalfields: its humanity, heritage, multiculturalism; its
poverty and homelessness: namely, its great diversity.
...deprivation certainly permeates the place but people have
a fighting spirit and they form a vibrant community.7
The above quotation may perhaps be read as a celebration of poverty. Maxwell's
view, as I interpret it, shared and promoted by the Campaign was that deprivation
constituted a life style shared by the people of the area, giving them their
community. The Campaign understood there to be a community of struggle in the
area, and this shared political experience had formed the community into the entity
they perceived. Buttimer has noted that a celebration of 'community' can be
tantamount to condoning the conditions of poverty, exploitation, injustice and
alienation in which this 'community' is commonly understood to live. 8
 In this
instance however, and indeed as Rose has argued, the celebration of community
was to be part of a more radical political project.9
The idea of community was fundamental to the Campaign's image of
Spitalfields.
Spitalfields is a unique and historic area forming a buffer
between the City and East London. It is an organic
community of working class and industrious people; a
multi-ethnic community where the Bengali community is
now the largest group of local residents. 10
The quotation complements Maxwell's photographs. The pictures are images of a
lively and vibrant area, and emphasise the fact that this is both a young and
Bengali area. The quotation above was written to emphasise the fact that
7Maxweii, P. (1988) Saving Spitalfields: A photographic exhibition by Phil Maxwell.
8Buttimer, A. (1980) Home, Reach and the Sense of Place. p.170. In Buttimer, A. and
Seamon, D. (1980) The Hwnan Experience of Space and Place. Croom Helm, London. pp.166
- 187.
9Rose, 0. (1990) Imagining Poplar in the 1920s; Contested Concepts of Community Journal
of Historical Geography 16 pp. 425 - 437.
10Campaign Co-ordinator, House of Commons Committee, 29th June 1988. ME 9 p.44.
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Spitalfields has a specific identity. The image of Spitaiflelds held by the Campaign
was of a stable area, an area sure of its past and what this represented. It is
portrayed as unique - like nowhere else - and historic - it has an identifiable past.
It has a distinct community, and this community is solid and working class. And
it is the home of Britain's Bengali population, whose residence in Spitalfields, as I
shall explain below, was a point of celebration for the Campaign.
The foundations of the Campaign's understanding of Spitalfields as home
to a distinct community lay in experiences of political activism in the area during
the preceeding twenty years, during which time organisations such as the
Spitalfields Project, the SLC and SHAPRS had been active, the Labour Party had
been revitalised, and the Bengali population had established themselves as the
numerically dominant group in the area. 11 In addition, there was seen to be a
tradition of organising over housing conditions because historically they had
always been so bad. For example, there was a mythology surrounding a rent
strike held in the late 1960s by tenants and organised by the Chicksand Estate
Tenants Association.
There were loads of slum blocks still around. Spitalfields,
because it had escaped a lot of bombing, it had been the last
to be redeveloped. There was all this potential. There was
a bit of a history - like Great Eastern Buildings in particular
- there was this Bill who had 'died fighting' - there were all
these legendary characters who had probably been quite
charismatic in their leadership.12
However, Spitalfields was understood to be unlike other areas in terms of its local
culture. Although there had been some tradition of organisation, experience of
Spitalfields was unlike that of areas in, for example, the dockland areas of East
London which had an established tradition of organisation through the trade
unions, resulting in a more politically confident local population. The
fragmentation produced as a result of employment in the rag trade, according to the
analysis of certain members of the Campaign had meant little or no work-place
organisation in Spitalfields, and thus a history fragmented political activism.13
So according to the analysis of some members of the Campaign, despite a
history of some local political organisation and activism, it was only with the
establishment of so-called community based orgamsations, such as the Spitalfields
"Jvjew with Ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989; Interview with Claire Murphy,
6th July 1989.
12lnterview with Claire Murphy, 6th July 1989.
13ibid
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Project, and later of other groups such as the Labour Party, that a substantial
growth in political activism was enabled. With the establishment of the
Spitalfields Project, according to an ex-worker there, people (and especially
Bengali people) were enabled to get grants and funding for projects which they
could organise themselves, and were able to build their confidence as political
activists. This created a sense of 'community confidence'. 14
 Seeing this happen
had resulted in a belief, for people who were later to found and join the Campaign,
in the establishment in Spitaffields of a community as an organised, unified,
political entity.
• ..seeing those people come together, and sort of organise
and grow in front of your very eyes was absolutely
extraordinary and terrific, and of course there were other
things which helped that. I mean, the growth of the
Bangladeshi community which did organise in part with
help, in part with being able to find a place within the sort
of structures of what was going on in terms of local
government and the community development bit in
relationship to it. But also in terms of their identity as a
nation vis-a-vis the War of Independence, the growth of
Bagladesh as an independent sovereign state, and that
whole thing there - it was amazing, I mean that was the
most energising experience I think I've ever had in terms of
my rather crummy life! To literally see a community grow
before your eyes and see people come out and sort of greet
you in the street - people you don't know, sort of 'Joy
Bangla!' and - great - oh its amazing - very heady stuff.15
The representation of Spitalfields as a community area was constructed precisely
because of this recent history of politicisation. It gave Campaign members an
understanding of their area as an area of collective activism. In short, it gave them
their community. This representation of community was important because it
enabled the Campaign to account for political difference within their community.
Defming community in terms of political activism allowed the Campaign to define
it in terms which included space for argument and dissent in that community. As
Robbie MacDuff put it: 'I don't think any community is homogenous'. 16 This
definition of community thus allowed the Campaign to account for its own
differences of opinion with other groups, for example, with the exclusion from
under its umbrella of certain groups active in the area, whilst still allowing itself to
present the views of the 'whole community'. There were problems associated
with this strategy, and I raise these questions in Chapter Six.
14lnterview with Ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989
15ibid.
16lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
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The Campaign's construction of the idea of a community in Spitalfields is
also important to this critique for a second reason. The representation of
Spitalfields as a community area was deliberate. The portrayal of the area in this
way was known to be appealing and attractive, and known to have currency. As
Williams notes:
Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe
an existing set of relationships, or the warmly persuasive
word to describe an alternative set of relationships.17
Either way, the term is never used negatively. The word has an enormous variety
of definitions, and as Brownill's review of the term illustrates, the use of the
concept appears endless. 18 I shall not attempt to discover why the term has had
such positive connotations. Rather, I shall discuss here why that positive
connotation was used, and the means by which this was undertaken. The
Campaign emphasised community because they understood the term to be a
universally appealing one. As one commentator succintly put it:
You can over-romanticise it - I do at times, OK for political
reasons amuch as anything else and you can get carried
away.19"
I would suggest that the Campaign recognised the power of the idea of
community, and used it to effect. If community is anything, notes Cuff, it is a
convenient fiction for what may in fact be dynamic, multi-faceted and full of
factions and changing actors. 20 The idea of community was realised by many
campaign members to be fictitious. As an ex-SHAPRS worker put it, the area
had to be seen or understood as being without unity as a necessary precondition to
the construction of any sort of mass action in the area. 21 Only once this was
realised could efforts be made to find ways of bringing people together and
constructing unified action, such as that against the Housing Action Trusts or the
redevelopment of Spitalfields Market. Yet that fiction was recognised as
convenient. The idea of community was thought to be useful because of the
general endorsement of community as a good thing - its appeal - and also because
' 7Williams, R. (1983) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Revised Edition,
Fontana Paperbacks, London. p.76.
18Bmi11, S. (1987) The Politics of Local Change: A Case Study of the People's Plan for
Newham's Docklands. Ph.D Thesis, University of Birmingham. p.2!.
Interview with Ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
20Cuff, D. (1989) Mirrors of Power Reflective Professionals in the Neighbourhood. p. 344.
In Woich, J. and Dear, M. (eds) (1989) The Power Of Geographer: How Territory Shapes
Social Life. Unwin Hyman, Boston, pp. 331-350.
21 lnterview with Mark Adams, 14th October 1988.
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of myths and assumptions about life in London's East End that tend to emphasise
cohesion and solidarity as pervasive in the area.
The Campaign, then, held and promoted a very strong image of
Spitalfields as an area that was home to a community. The redevelopment plans
were a threat because according to the Campaign's analysis of the processes of
urban development, the community that existed in Spitalfields would be destroyed.
Large sections of the population would be forced to move away from the area.
Redevelopment would destroy the social structure of the area. They argued
against the redevelopment by using ideas of community in order to emphasise a
positivity that would be destroyed.
A History of Migration
The Campaign had an image of Spitalfields as home to a distinct
community. Its image of Spitalfields, and its representation of the place linked this
idea of community with the idea of Spitalfields as a traditional haven for immigrant
groups, including the Irish in the nineteenth century, Jewish settlers in the decades
preceeding the First World War, and Bengali, Pakistani and Somalian migrants
after the Second World War. Members of the Campaign, in discussing this
phenomenon, seemed extremely proud of this history of their area, a feeling not
specific just to them. As Glassberg notes:
Interestingly, local political leaders in Tower Hamlets trace
migration considerably further back in time and, with some
pride, describe the area's receptivity to Huguenot refugees
from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
Historically Spitalfields had had a Jewish community which, in the minds of
certain Campaign members, had given to the area a particular culture and a
particular sense of place.
Spitalfields was in Stepney, Stepney was always seen very
much in terms of the Jewish population and Jewish
settlement, it was always seen as a sweated area, sweated
workshops and labour, it was always seen as a non-
conforming place etc.etc. ... in terms of Labour history
and Labour mythology, the old Docklands area and the
East was very much the settled pattern of working class,
very much based on Irish immigation, and it was very
much traditional manual, it was trade union organised, it
was solidly Labour, it didn't have a huge or high sort of
22Glassberg, A. (1981) Representation and Urban Community. Macmillan, London. p.40.
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intellectual content to it, it was a solid ground in a
traditional Labour neighbourhood or area, where Stepney
was an absolute riot! It was Jewish, it was volatile, we
had a lot of people who had an awful lot of nowse... a
whole series of people, a whole range in professions of
one sort or another, it was a place where the community
was getting ahead, where every mother wanted their son to
be a doctor or a lawyer!
The establishment of the Bengali population in the area was celebrated as a
continuation of this function. They formed a distinct group that required space in
order to establish themselves in Britain and Spitalfields served that function.
For 300 years people have come to Spitalfields. Some
stayed, some passed through. ... It's an extraordinary
paradox - an area in constant change and yet unchanging.
Spitalfields has been the haven for each new migration. It
has been a place to settle, a place to rebuild broken lives.
But is has also been a place of poverty. Migrants haven't
chosen Spitalfields, but were forced into its bad housing
and its sweated labour in the clothing trade. There was
nowhere else to go.
There is plenty of space and plenty of public money to
move people into the East End. So long as they are the
right people. But the Bangladeshis weren't the right
people. Poor and unskilled, they came from a rural
economy that Britain had asset-stripped for 200 years.
They were given neither space nor money to help them
settle. The rich of Wapping would still be making money
no matter where their home was. They don't depend on
the East End for their living. They can afford to live
elsewhere. The Bengalis of the catering and clothing trades
can't. They don't have a choice. They must live in the
area to survive.
The function of Spitalfields as home to successive migrant groups was constructed
by the Campaign in an extremely positive fashion and produced an image of an
exciting, exotic area that benefitted from this influx of new blood.
• ..the revival of Spitaiflelds has taken place not through the
[SpitalfieldsJ Trust but spontaneously and irrevocably
through settlement of the Bengalis who have transformed
what was a derelict street - Brick Lane - into a commercial
and cultural centre.
23lnterview with ex-Spitalfields Project Worker, 15th June 1989.
24Foimii C. (1989) Spitalfields: A Battle for Land. Hilary Shipman, London. p.4.
25ibid. p.253.
26Raphael Samuels, House of Commons Committee, 28th June 1988, ME 8, P.41. The
Spitalfields Trust is a group formedd consisting of architects and architectural historians who
have campaigned for the preservation of the Georgian fabric of Spitalfields. The construction of
the heritage of Spitaffields, both by the Campaign (including Samuels) and by the conservation
175
The redevelopment of Spitalfields threatened this function:
Spitalfields has always been an area where you've got a
new ethnic minority coming in. It's just that one day there
won't be any ethnic minorities - just office blocks instead
and yuppies. They're the ones who can afford it.27
.the area won't be the slightly run-down derelict sort of
area that would welcome the input of people with energy
and enthusiasm and there won't be the accommodation for
people to come and squat or whatever.28
The redevelopment process would remove from Spitalfields its function as a haven
for migrant groups, through the increase in land values and processes outlined in
Chapter Three. Redevelopment thus threatened the image of Spitalfields
constructed by the Campaign as an immigrant area, an image held very dear by
some members.
I think that the Bengali community.., is probably the last
wave of immigrants that will come into Tower Hamlets,
and I think that's really sad. I think one of the things about
Tower Hamlets is it1s been able to welcome all those
different cultures - there's a stong Irish community, a
strong Jewish community, a strong Somali community,
Bengali, Chinese, the whole thing, and that's part of the
attraction of the East End, I think.29
Multicultural Spitalfields
Spitalfields, then, was imagined and represented as a migrant area, and this
aspect of the area's history celebrated. I have already touched upon the celebration
of migrant culture, and indicated through the quotations above that the area was
portrayed as multicultural, and this image used in the arguments against
redevelopment. I want to expand on this idea in this section. Here, I want to
discuss how this idea is portrayed and shown to work or operate. I shall do so by
quoting at length from Forman. Spitalfields; a Battle for Land opens with a long
description of a street scene in Brick Lane, which illustrates perfectly for Forman
the nature of the area and perfectly for me the nature of Forman's (and the
Campaign's) ideas on the nature of the area.
groups is covered in detail in Jacobs, J. (1990) The Politics of the Past: Redevelopment in
London Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London.
27lnterview with Ian Worland, 18th July 1989.
28lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
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Take a walk down Brick Lane in London's East End. It is
like nowhere else. It's a narrow street, crowded with
shops opening straight onto the pavement. It's blocked
with traffic. Somewhere a wide van is parked, half-keeled
over, two wheels on the pavement, two on the road. A
man, almost submerged under a pile of thick women's
coats, is loading it from the back. He pops in and out of an
open doorway, up the steep stairs to the workshop above.
A car could get by. But a lorry is stuck - piled high with
empty beer kegs going back to Truman's brewery just
beyond.
It's Friday. There's a queue in the take-away cafes for the
meat pancake kelama, cooked only once a week. Someone
pushes his way out with an armful of polystyrene cups of
steaming tea and vegetable samosas, carried in a cut-down
cardboard box, which he uses as a tray. He heads back to
the other machinists in his workshop. They're on pece
rates, there's no time for anyone else to stop and have a
break.
The doors of the mosque fly open. Men burst out into the
frosty street and the flow of those leaving prayer is traced
in the crowds by the bobbing of thier white skull caps,
called tokis. Some of the men filter past the wicker baskets
of vegetables into the New Taj Stores for the weekend
shopping. As ever, the shop is packed. Someone is
explaining with intricate gestures how he wants his fish cut
up. Others from the mosque pass the shops by and gather
round the knots of people at the talldng corners of Princelet
Street and Hanbury Street. As conversations build, the
traffic jam of the street is repeated on the pavement.
A woman wearing a cardigan over her sari reaches the
bottom of her tenement staircase and turns out from
Hanbury Street against the flow from the mosque. She's
heading for her doctor's appointment. Her daughter holds
her hand, walking slowly, wearing her knee-length skirt
over long trousers. They cross the road, past old
Weinberg the printers, where until recently metal letters
were still laid out waiting for a compositor. Next door, the
black-hatted orthodox Jews sort their bales of cloth.
The mosque has emptied as they cross Fournier Street with
its town houses, gleaming shutters, polished knockers and
locked front doors. The girl is embarrassed. As they reach
the Church of England school, her mates are coming out in
a long ragged crocodile. 'Why aren't you in school?' they
shout. But they push on past the Seven Stars, its topless
dancers advertised, as the traffic jams up again. Someone
hoots haif-heartedly. Through the round porthole
windows of the new health centre other women can be
seen, children beside them - some silent and still, others
squirming with impatience. The girls holds the door for a
pensioner who shuffles out unsteadily. Into the warm they
go.30
30Forman, C. (1989) Spitalfields; a Battle for Land. pp. 1 -2.
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There are many, many things that I could say about this passage. I shall
confme myself to here to a discussion of the image of Spitalfields as a multicultural
area. I should hope that the reader will pause and consider some of the other ideas
contained in this quotation, such as the notion of Spitalfields as a place of industry
and economic activity, that link back to many of the Campaign's concerns
expressed in this and previous chapters.
An image of Spitalfields is constructed that tries to underline the mix of
cultures resident and evident in the area. The first thing Forman does is tell us that
this is unique. It is found nowhere else. Spitalfields is singular and individual
because of this. It is special and different because of the mix of people it contains.
In this passage, Forman is telling us that there live, cheek by jowl in Spitaiflelds, a
range of cultures - Bengali, Jewish and English. Each of these groups is divisible
too. The Bengali population are not all clothing workers - some are traders,
manufactueres, enterpreneurs. The whites are working class and gentrifiers. The
Jewish traders still work here.
Spitalfields is portrayed as a place of contrasts. The Bengali woman and
her family live in a tenement block, presumably in flats reached by communal
staircases. Contrast this with the gentrified town houses of Fournier Street, their
inhabitants closing themselves away from the world behind locked doors and
closed shutters. In one culture the women are strippers, in another women are
mothers. Men do the shopping. A woman wears both a sari and a cardigan.
Spitalfields is represented as a place with a lively street culture. It is a
crowded place; Brick Lane is a street seething with humanity. It is special because
of this, as Raphael Samuel emphasised in his presentation to the House of
Commons Committee, talking of the singling out of Brick Lane by architectural
critics as a 'city street which works'. 31
 People meet on corners to talk. The place
has public life.
Spitalfields is also given an exotic image. The clothes people wear are
different. Orthodox Jews appear in black hats, women wear saris, girls wear suits
men wear their prayer hats. The foods are different - samosas and ketlama. By
implication the smells will be different. This difference is constructed as exotic,
but it is also presented as 'normal'. There is no questioning as to whether there is
anything abnormal in this street scene. It is just presented as different
31 Raphael Samuels, quoted in the House of Commons Committee, 28th June 1988. ME 8
p.41.
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We have, then, a particular construction of Spitalfields. It is portrayed as
lively, exotic, different and exciting. 32 It is portrayed as a Bengali place above all,
as Maxwell does in his photographs. This fact is given as positive and as a cause
for celebration. This construction of Spitalfields in a particular way is undertaken
with a purpose. It is produced in order to underscore what would be lost if
redevelopment would proceed and evict the population (and crucially the Bengali
population) from the area. (Forman's book goes on to argue precisely these
points).
In constructing the representations of Spitalfields outlined so far in this
chapter, the Campaign could claim knowledge of the area. This was undertaken
for a political purpose, and this caused problems for the Campaign, as I have
noted with the questions raised concerning the political function of the Campaign's
construction of community. Because I deal with this point in Chapter Six I shall
not elaborate on it here. In the last section of this chapter I shall conclude by
examination of representations and redevelopment by discussing the images of
Spitalfields that are constructed and constrasted with images of the City of London
by the Campaign.
Images of the City
I now want to continue this examination of the images and representations
of Spitalfield by looking d the images the Campaign produced of the City of
London. The Campaign portrayed the City in a specific way so as to illustrate its
arguments about the redevelopment of Spitalfields. Interestingly, I think, an
image of the City was constructed by contrasting it with Spitalfields, and
conversely, Spitalfields was constructed to be what the City was not.
32Forman's construction of Spitalfields is in fact similar in many ways to those produced in the
media. See for example, John Brennan's article on house prices in Spitalfields, 'Cultural
Contrasts, Financial Times 2223 December 1990; Steve Platt 'The Ghetto Rippers' New Society
16th October 1987; 'East End Promise: The New East Enders', Seven Days/Sunday Telegraph
9th April 1989; 'City and Bounty' Guradian 12th April 1989. Connections may be made here
between these representations and some of the ideas and explanations for this discussed by Edward
Said in Orientalism., which examines in detail the history of the fascination of the west with the
Orient. This is not something I have developed here because I have wanted to draw Out a different
point about the political purposes of this representation in relation to the Campaigns right to
prevent the relocation of the Market. I do however consider it important and worthy of further
consideration.
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The City of London was represented as planning for Spitaffields in its own
image. The appearance of the City was taken as an indication of the changed
appearance of Spitalfields after redevelopment.
If the developers get their way Spitalfields Market will
disappear into a hole in the gound. In its place will rise the
monster office blocks of the international banking centre
planned by the SDG.33
The City was represented as an alien place, remote from people's lives as lived in
Spitalfields, although the City's towers could be seen over the road from
Spitalfields Market. Comparisons were drawn from even far afield to indicate the
future face of Spitalfields. The future cityscape was represented as foreign and
alien. The City was compared and equated with New York and Tokyo, as alien
places and symbols of unbridled capitalism. The broadsheet produced by the
Campaign, the Spitalfields Defender, is titled 'Hello Wall Street, Goodbye
Spitalfields'.
For Spitalfields as a living and working community would
be wiped out by an international banking centre. It would
become just one more line on the computer screens linking
Wall St and Tokyo.34
Other portrayals of a redeveloped Spitalfields included an image of an area behind
a 'Berlin Wall of offices' and:
...another Manhattan where no trees or grass can be seen
except in Central Park which for much of the time appears
to be unsafe for use by residents.35
The representation of redevelopment and its consequences as constructed
by the Campaign was built up by using issues that the Campaign understood to be
relevant to people in the area. The City was represented as a workplace, in
contrast to the working and residential functions of Spitalfields which the
Campaign consistently promoted. '[Spitalfields'] uniqueness is characterised by a
high concentration of local residents living within ten minutes of their place of
employment.', the Campaign told the House of Commons Committee. 36
 This
representation of Spitalfields was promoted as an appeal to sensibilities of the
benefits of permanence in a transient world and was drawn from an understanding
33spitalflelds Defender, February 1988. This was a broadsheet produced and distributed by the
Campaign during December 1987.
ibid.
35Jil Cove, House of Lords Committee 24th May 1989, ME 8 p.16.
36Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers Peitition to the House of Lords. Clause 5,
March 1989.
180
of social cohesion in the area as a product of Spitalfields' function as a combined
working and residential area:
The population had traditionally lived and worked in the
area to a degree that was totally atypical of most inner city
areas - yet this had given and continued to give the locality
its life, its identity, its community - its protection.
Although in fact a transitional area, it wasn't a transient
area with no roots.37
This view is not unique to Spitalfields. Brownill notes the concern of local
socialism and the left with the destruction by economic decline and redevelopment
of occupational communities where workers lived and worked in close proximity,
and which epitomised the traditional culture of Labour. 38
 The City, by contrast,
was portrayed as a place of change and rootlessness, and as an area devoted soley
to the financial services, in contrast to Spitalfields, which 'houses a community for
whom living and working, schooling, shopping, cultural and religious needs are
contained and sustained within the locality'. 39
 The very existence of the City was
presented as being inextricably bound up with the functions and requirements of
the financial sector. Life in the City was portrayed as reflecting this:
If you go through the City at night, you see very few
people walking around - it's not because it's unsafe, it's
because there is nothing there - no shops, no cafes, pubs
are closed in the evenings... You occasionally see a light
on at the top of a building or something like that.4°
Spitalfields, in contrast, was presented as an area which belonged to people,
because they lived and worked there.
Spitalfields was portrayed by the Campaign as a community area. This
was contrasted with images of the City, full of people who would leave after a
day's work, contributing little more than their sandwich wrappers to the area:
How are we going to be cohesive with the office people
who are coming in? You just have to walk five minutes if
less down the road to Bishopsgate and you feel totally alien
to people who are walking around down there who are just
commuters who go in every day and that's what it will be
37Essay following interview with ex-Spitalfields Project worker, 15th June 1988.
38Brownill, S. (1987) The Politics of Local Change; A Case Study of the People's Plan for
Newham's Docklands. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Birmingham. p.70. Brownill
quotes Stuart Hall on this point. See Hall, S. (1982) A Long Haul. p.17. Marxism Today
November pp. 16 - 21.; hall, 5. (1983) Whistling in the Void. p.12. New Socialism
May/June pp. 8- 12.
39cainpaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers Petition to the House of Lords. Clause 5,
March 1989.
40lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
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like when the market's going, it'll just be commuterland
even further in.41
The point to make here is not such much one of querying the veracity of the
Campaign's claim of Spitaffields as a unified and cohesive area, for indeed the
Campaign members lived political and social lives that testified to the diversity and
at times disunity of the population of the area. The point I am making is that in
constructing an image of what Spitalfields could be imagined to be, they could
then use this representation to appeal against the destruction of cohesion through
the encroachment of the City.
This representation of the City was created out of experiences of Campaign
members, and used in publicity material to indicate a likely future for Spitaffields
after redevelopment:
Residents fear that the new business people will show little
loyalty. They will leave at the end of the day, turning the
area into a ghost town at night.42
The term 'ghost town' appears repeatedly in the language of Campaign members:
...having seen what's happened with Broadgate, and round
the Shoreditch area, it'll happen round Spitalfields, so I've
moved from one place where is happened to one place
where its going to happen. Around Shoreditch it's like a
ghost town at night time; where there used to be people
walking along the streets, there used to be kids playing in
the streets, now it's just firms and it's dead.43
The ghost town representing the City is compared with the vibrant streets of
Spitalfields with its air of activity both day and night:
• .you do walk around this area, and there are people
around. There are lorries going through, there are the
women working on the streets, there are cafes open at
night, there are the pubs open at night, there are people
around. And that won't happen. The street lighting is
bloody awful, the pavements are bad, but nonetheless they
are out and about. And that will disappear. And it will just
be an extension of the City.
Spitalfields is presented as being threatened by the deadness of the City, its former
vibrancy removed. This aspect of the representation of redevelopment shows
clearly how representations of Spitalfields were used in the construction of
41lnterview with Pam Mossman, 4th July 1989.
42Jfl Cove, quoted in the City Recorder, 14th January 1988.
43lnterview with Ian Worland, 18th July 1989.
InteMew with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
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arguments against redevelopment. Spitalfields was represented and understood to
be a lively place. One Campaign member, talking with reference to Broadgate,
highlighted this point as a major reason for her objecting to the relocation of the
Market.
Well when I saw that I thought That's going to be at the
back of where I live', and at the moment its so full of
vitality and life and colour and its so vibrant... I can see it
being just a ghost town at weekends and in the evenings
possibly or there being an overspill from people in the City
staying late to use the winebars and pubs and things.45
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the Campaign's representations of
Spitaffields. The Campaign was formed on the understanding that redevelopment
would change the area. I would argue that redevelopment threatened to undermine
the images and ideas the Campaign held about Spitalfields, and this threat provided
the impetus to the establishment and trajectory of the Campaign. Their activities in
opposition involved constructing and presenting arguments against redevelopment,
which I outlined in Chapter Three. But these were fleshed out by assertions of
their own understandings of Spitalfields. I have discussed these understandings
and images of Spitaffields by examining their appearance in visual imagery (Phil
Maxwell's photgraphs), and in text through the ways in which images of
Spitalfields were presented, as a community, as a place of migration, as a
multicultural place, and as a place fundamentally different from the City of
London. Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated the importance of a
consideration of the power of meaning in helping to understand political action.
In this and preceding chapters I have emphasised how this construction of
Spitalfields, used in the arguments against redevelopment, had a constituency
claimed for it by the Campaign. A particular representation of the people of
Spitalfields was constructed by the Campaign, and simultaneously this
representation was asserted as one held by the people of Spitalfields. This raises
important questions about the political function and consequences of these images
which extend beyond their use in debates about redevelopment. It is to these
questions that I shall turn in the next chapter.
45lnterview with Pam Mossman, 4th July 1989.
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Chapter Six
Speaking for Spitalfields
In the previous chapter I discussed how images and representations of
Spitalfields were held, constructed, and used in the arguments against
redevelopment. In this chapter I shall discuss the political function and
consequences of this representation. As the reader will have noted, the Campaign
represented Spitalfields as a lively, vibrant, multicultural place and home to the
Bengali community. The Campaign argued that this entity would be destroyed if
redevelopment was allowed to take place. The Campaign also claimed support for
this image from the people it purported to represent. There were however
unintended consequences of this representation, and I shall discuss these by
exploring the relations between the Campaign and another group that became
active in the debate over redevelopment in the area in early 1989, who held
different ideas about Spitalfields and the area.1
Representations and Support
The Campaign constructed a representation of Spitalfields and its
population, conveying the image that both were different; exotic, vibrant, lively,
colourful and 'other'. As Said notes, ideas cannot seriously be understood or
studied without their force - their configurations of power - being studied also.2
This is exactly what I intend to consider here - the political function of this
representation. Why did the Campaign construct the image of Spitalfields that they
did? What were the consequences of this?
I would interpret this representation as a product of the Campaign's claims
to be representative of the population of Spitalfields and to be based within a
specific community. The Campaign had appointed itself as a group representative
of the people of Spitalfields and had entered the debate on the redevelopment
'Although I discuss the CDG and examine the Campaign's reactions to this group in some detail
in this chapter, I would like to point out that I never interviewed anybody from the CDG, and
this therefore affected my analysis of the situation. The information about the CDCi used here,
apart from that discussed as provided by the Campaign, is taken from the CDG's own publicity
material and from my attendance at some formation meetings of the CDG during 1989.
2Said, E. (1987) Orientalism Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. p.5.
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project on those terms. It had claimed a constituency in order to lend weight to its
arguments, because all its arguments centred around the consequences of
redevelopment for the whole population of the area.
In arguing against the redevelopment of Spitalfields, the Campaign was
frequently challenged as to its legitimacy as a group claiming a supportive
constituency in the area. As I illustrated in Chapter Three, it was concerned about
this. Its door-to-door petitioning and leafletting were undertaken in order to get
proof that it had support outside its very immediate constituency of white, Labour-
supporting, middle class political activists. It succeeded in doing this by
producing 700 signatures on a petition that was presented to the House of Lords
Committee. The Campaign frequently discussed this issue and worried the issues
of representativeness that I have discussed in this thesis. The following quotation,
whilst referring to the public inquiry at which the Campaign planned to appear in
1991, echoes earlier discussions held during Campaign meetings at which the
Campaign worried about its ability to represent the constituency it had defined for
itself.
We had a discussion about the future of the Campaign
bearing in mind the very few people who regularly attend
and the subsequent apparent level of interest. How well
could we claim to represent the community views and
should we continue or consider the possibility of going to
the Enquiry as individuals. At the end we agreed that for
many reasons this Campaign should continue and that we
needed to re-activate interest at an appropriate time. It was
felt that unless we did continue, the Public Enquiry would
only hear the views of the conservationists and not those of
local people.3
Despite these doubts, the Campaign continued to claim that it represented the
population of the local area.
Crucially, in order to lend credibility to its claim to know the wishes of the
population, represent it, and speak out against redevelopment on its behalf, it had
to claim knowledge of that population. It had to be seen to be knowledgable of the
desires and best interests of the people of the area. But the Campaign were, in
effect, claiming knowledge about people very different to themselves, people with
cultures, background and attitudes which may and may not have been very
different to their own. Consequently the image - the knowledge - that the
Campaign constructed about Spitalfields and its population - and especially the
Bengali population - was precisely that. It was an image, a picture, a stereotype,
3CSSD Notes of meeting on 18th March 1991. (Mailing letter)
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an ideal type of the people of the area, simplified because its reality could not be
known in its entirity and complexity to the Campaign. This is not to suggest that
the members of the Campaign had no idea of the diversity of their fellow residents.
Rather, I am suggesting that in order for the Campaign to claim a constituency
amongst this diverse population, they had to construct an image of this population
which was both a simplification (because they needed it to be) and a simplification
because they could not, as a predominantly white and middle class group, have
full knowledge of because much of the detail would be obscured to them due to
their own difference.
This construction of an image of the population and their wishes as regards
redevelopment reflects the Campaign's own politics and priorities, as I have
illustrated in previous chapters. They, for example, presented the population of
the area as a positive asset to the area, as revitalising the area, which reflected the
Campaign's own wishes to see such a population in the area. And crucially in
claiming knowledge of this population they could claim to represent it. The
representation that the Campaign constructed of Spitalfields had a political
function.
Competing Claims
The representation that the Campaign constructed of Spitalfields was
however challenged, and this caused immense problems for the Campaign.
Claims that the population of Spitalfields might benefit from redevelopment came
from an unexpected source - from within that 'community' itself. 4
 The
Community Development Group (CDG) was established in May 1989 as an
'umbrella organisation with a wide range of individuals, groups and organisations
from Spitaffields, Weavers and St. Mary's' (wards to the north and south of
Spitalfields respectively). 5
 Its aims and objectives were:
...to identify appropriate means for achieving the maximum
degree of community influence and involvement in the
redevelopment process; to promote housing, training,
workspace, educational and leisure opportunities for local
people; to seek to identify areas of agreement or substantial
agreement and options for choice; to provide information to
people resident or working in the area on proposed major
4Please note that because of the contemporaneity of this thesis, the part of the story to which
this chapter refers is not yet complete. This chapter deals only with the situation up to the
middle of 1990.
5Community Development Group (1989) Planning Our Future CDG, London. p.4.
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redevelopments and on proposals for changes in land use
and their impact on living and working conditions for
people in the area, and to raise public awareness of these
issues.6
It publicised itself as the principal forum working towards the establishment of a
Community Plan for the area and a Community Development Trust, utilising
planning gains given to the area by two developers, Rosehaugh and Grand
Metropolitan. The Plan and the Trust were developed in response to the
redevelopments of Bishopsgate Goodsyard and Trumans Brewery in the first
instance. The developers of these two sites were understood to be:
...committed to working in partnership with the local
commuity and tranfering control of land to a Community
Development TrustY
This strategy of co-operation with the developers was embarked upon on the
grounds that:
...ensuring development of all the land rather than just the
major office element, for uses meeting local needs,
combined with a community-led charitable trust having
control of all or substantial parts of that land, should ensure
that much of the new development serves local needs and is
accessible and affordable to people working, living and
trading in the area.8
The CDG was endorsed wholeheartedly by development companies such as the
SDG:
They're going to produce their own sort of plan and then
we're going to see if the two can mesh together. They
know roughly what we think and we know roughly what
they think, so the thing is going on together.9
The CDG presented itself, as had the Campaign, as representative of the wishes
and aspirations of the local population in respect of the planned redevelopments:
The Community Plan represents a starting point and gives a
community perspective on the nature, desirability and
extent of development on the two sites.10
6ibi
7ibid.
9lnterview with Tim Budgen, Consultant Surveyor, LET/SDG, 24th July 1989.
10Community Development Group (1989) Planning Our Future CDG, London. p.4.
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Funding was required for the drawing-up of the Community Plan. The Spitalfields
Task Force and Business in the Community (BIC) obliged by agreeing to fund a
team for the Community Plan and for a CDG working party in June 1989 to carry
out public consultation on the Community Plan. The CDG, then, had come to a
different conclusion to the Campaign as to the best means of dealing with
redevelopment in the area.
The Campaign were extremely hostile to the CDG. They found the
existence and arguments of the CDG extremely difficult to deal with, because both
undermined the Campaign's position as a group claiming to represent the
'community' and arguing against the redevelopment. The CDG was seen by the
Campaign as facilitating the developers, allowing them to gain a foothold in the
area. For example, the involvement of the Task Force and BIC was seen as an
indication of that, establishing community trusts,
...and basically control this community for the developers.
The Task Force, at that semi-public meeting [the Task
Force Co-ordinator] said, "we are here to facilitate the
developers." First time she publicly said that.11
One member of the Campaign, a worker with the SSBA presented the CDG as
being 'led astray' by the developers:
They're being totally manipulated by BIC and the Task
Force. The whole agenda is being set by the developer.
[The CDG are saying] "We have to get our public
consultation done by September." Well why is this?
"Because the planning application is going in in
September." Well why the hell are they setting the agenda?
And they're just being used and I don't know whether
they're blind, ignorant or stupid.12
Community Trusts were presented by the developers and by the CDG as a
mechanism by which money received through planning gain could be held in trust
by the 'community'. BIC's remit was to enable this to happen and this was felt by
the Campaign to be unacceptable:
Its true - they're now under contract with the Government
that in every Task Force area they will set up a corpmunity
trust. I was at a Business Action Team meeting ea1lier this
week, and I sat there absolutely gob-smacked because there
they are doing their social audit on groups in Hackney.
They'll move into Hackney with the co-operation of the
Council and do a social audit on community groups up
11 iiew with Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator, 21st July 1989.
12ibid.
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there to see which groups they can and can't be working
with and eveiything else. It's total social engineering that
they're doing.'3
In claiming to represent the area, the Campaign was asserting that it had a very
good understanding of the requirements of the area. The Co-ordinator of the
SSBA, related how she had in fact raised this point with the director of BIC:
When he trotted out his grand plan, I said "Look - that is a
totally inappropriate mechanism - it presupposes there's
nothing going on on the ground - we have more
community groups per square foot than architects in
Camden - the last thing you need is to come and re-invent
the wheel."t4
The emergence of the CDG and involvement of groups such as BIC and the Task
Force totally undermined this claim to knowledge concerning the needs of the area.
The CDG presented a different strategy towards private sector-funded
redevelopment, and this argument came from within the community that the
Campaign claimed to represent. Although the Campaign had defined community
as politically constituted, and could therefore account for difference therein, the
limits of this defmition were tested and broken through by the CDG.
An indication of the hostility of the Campaign towards the CDG may be
obtained by examining the quotations below. Phil Maxwell was cautious in his
criticism, but saw the CDG as quite possibly undermining the efforts of the
Campaign who had tried to argue against the redevelopment on the grounds of its
impact on the local population.
• ..there will be some people who may try to use it for
themselves, rather than have an overview of a strategy for
the community. There's a possibility that people, because
of those people in it, the developers will try to assimilate
the group and use it to justify what they're doing etc.'5
The CDG was portrayed as being undemocratic, unrepresentative, and comprised
of individuals who were attempting to make personal gain out of the
redevelopments.
...they're not interested in doing [consultation]. They're
interested in accessing what they see to be fifty... I don't
know how much money they think they're in for, but they
have no perception of the physical forms, they're not
interested - in letting the broader public know what's going
'3ibid.
15lnterview with Phil Maxwell, 6th September 1989.
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on. They're interested in a slice of the cake and think its
going to make chiefs rather than indians out of them.16
Something the Campaign had always reminded itself of was the fact that in terms
of material gain, Campaign members themselves had nothing to gain or lose
because of the redevelopment. This claim had bolstered, for them, their claims as
an opposition group. They presented themselves as protesting for the benefit of
the whole community. They had entered into the debate on redevelopment on
these grounds and not because they personally stood to benefit from
redevelopment. They extended this argument too - they argued that nobody in the
area stood to benefit from the redevelopments and they constructed an elaborate set
of representations about the area in order to do so. Yet this claim was being
completely undermined by that of the CDG, who had argued, as I illustrated
above, that redevelopment could bring substantial benefits to the area. The
representativeness of the Campaign was undermined by this emergence of an
alternative, their power of argument removed, and they were reduced to having to
make personal jibes against the CDG:
...we had this stupid thing at that meeting the other day - I
haven't got the patience for it any more - but we sat and
went through what they were and were not doing and who
would be on the committees and who wouldn't be on them
- all the usual clap trap about structures instead of getting
their heads around anything tangible that puts something or
someone on the ground that benefits people. That gets into
the whole notion of committees and who's who and what's
what.17
The Campaign's claims to know the wishes of the population of
Spitalfields with regard to redevelopment was central to its raison d'etre. This was
totally undermined by the appearance of the CDG claiming the same thing, and
relying (perhaps) for the veracity of that claim on its existence as a predominantly
Bengali group. The Campaign also understood the CDG's claims to
representativeness as being based on the latter's consultation within the area. This
consultation exercise was however derided as being minimal.
If they were serious when SHAPRS shut down, why
didn't they step in? Going round knocking door-to-door -
that was public consultation and community involvement.
They didn't have the confidence to go door-to-door - you
get spat at but you have to have the comniitiment to keep on
with it.18
16lnterview with Kay Jordan, SSBA Co-ordinator, 21st July 1989.
17ibid.
18lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
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Yet the CDG's claims at representativeness, the Campaign felt, carried far greater
weight in public than those of the Campaign. The Campaign had never carried Out
a large public consultation exercise. It had felt that it didn't need to - it was not in
the business of undertaking market research, but knew instinctively what the
people of the area wanted. This claim was totally undermined by that of the CDG
claiming representation implicitly (I would guess although I have little more than
anecdotal evidence for this) because it was a Bengali group and explicitly because
it had undertaken consultation with groups in the area. The CDG were felt to be
unrepresentative:
...they don't have the same perspective - I wouldn't say
they don't understand. Partly because they're middle class
social workers, they are not from Syihet, they are not the
working class of Spitalfields. They are being their leaders
saying things, taldng positions just like white middle class
social workers do.19
Why have the local business community, training
organisations, youth organisations not become involved?
Other organisations I may not agree with, but they do good
work. This lot are a bunch of crooks - creating jobs for the
boys and not working for the community, accessing
funding for their petty organisations.2°
The Campaign was, however, unable to make these claims in public. I shall
indicate below where I think the reasons for that lie. Before doing so I shall
discuss some more specific arenas in which the Campaign and the CDG came into
conflict.
A specific criticism that the Campaign made of the CDG concerned its role
in distributing the money that the area would receive as planning gain for the
redevelopment, and which had been given as a Community Trust for the funding
of local groups. These criticisms were drawn from experience within the
voluntary sector and from the Campaign's own critique of the role of funding for
that sector. In a nutshell, the Campaign was concerned that money in the
Community Development Trust would be accessed by a small number of
organisations for their own purposes, and that the wider 'community', and indeed
the Campaign itself, would have no say in the ways in which that money was
distributed. This would occur because of the rules governing the operation of
such trusts, and because of the Campaign's assessments of the individuals likely
to be in charge of the distribution of money amongst groups in the area.
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The Campaign perceived there to be fundamental (but not insurmountable)
difficulties associated with the receipt of funds from any institution. Forman, with
reference to local government funding for community groups, portrayed this as a
complex dynamic. Funding may be drawn from the state and on the one hand
groups might be dependent on that institution for their fmance and thus for their
existence. On the other hand, however that funding and thus the existence of such
groups might lead to political demands being made for changes inside the political
administrations that funded them. 21
 Or Robbie MacDuff put it:
...at the end of the day the person who holds the purse
strings is the person who's got or is the organisation that's
got control over you in some way, and I'm very concerned
about grant-related cultures and community and voluntary
organisations that are too dependent on their funding
organisation when they have a clear responsibility very
often to be very vocal in their criticism of those
organisations.22
This was in no way an argument against funding for voluntary groups; for
example, the GLC had done:
...pioneering work in funding organisations which
represented groups in society that were unheard, that didn't
have a voice because there was no forum in which they
were allowed to be heard. The mechanisms didn't exist for
them to be allowed to participate, contribute, determine,
effectP
However:
...I think what happened was somewhere down the line the
issue of grants became more important than the issue of
work and the issue of output Complacency set in between
/ amongst organisations that felt they had a natural right to
be grant maintained, to use that term, without actually
showing anything, or showing very little as a result. Now
that doesn't benefit anybody.24
Charlie Forman had predicted the divisions that could be caused in the area over
the question of planning gain in conversation with me in October 1988. Sure
enough, the following year when the CDG had become established and had raised
the issue of accepting planning gain as a trade off for redevelopment, the
Campaign started to voice its concerns as to the fmancing of local groups and
21Fo, C. (1989) Spiralfields. p.259.
22lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
ibid.
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projects by the private sector. Kay Jordan thought this quite acceptable in
principle:
What you need to do is do what BIC says it's supposed to
do which is access the private sector for that community
and make sure the bloody private sector coughs up
something.
Others were less happy with the private provision of public welfare needs:
you've got another group like the developers almost, going
around and offering money to do this, that and the other,
which may from their point of view make sense, but I
would challenge whether or not they have a coherent and
cohesive view of what is needed vis-a-vis actual local
needs of that neighbourhood.
The encroachment of the private sector into the funding of local groups was seen
as a harbinger of greater erosion of local democracy:
• . .basically the premise was that there's no hope, there's
no future in local government, it's all going to be done on a
voluntary basis and in terms of trusts, it's all going to be
done through the business ends and all done through
privately contracted work. ... But it seems to me its totally
undemocratic, there's no way local people can have a say
in what's going on, have a view, have a place in their own
community - which is frightening.27
At issue was also the question of accountability.
If I were a Labour councillor in a new in-coming
administration I'd have a ruthless regime on the issue of
monitoring community group funding. ...there has to be a
new criteria outlined, there has to be a set of rules to ensure
that a community is getting value for money. I know that
sounds like a bit of Thatcherism, but if you can't do your
day-to-day maintenance of your housing stock through
mismanagement, and if you're mismanaging your grant-
related sector, you're mis-managing your social services,
and you're spending a lot of money out, at the end of the
day people are saying "all this money is going into this,
that and the other and they're never getting anything for it".
And if you're a council you have a responsibility to provide
decent services.28
The Campaign were worried about the ways in which the community trust money
would be used by the CDG. It was also concerned about the CDG's very
25lnterview with Kay Jordan, 21st July 1989.
26lnterview with ex-Spitalfields Project worker, 15th July 1989.
28lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
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acceptance of the trade-off of planning gain in return for redevelopment, with no
recognition, according to the Campaign, of the dangers of this.
Discussions on planning gain crystallized the arguments used by the
Campaign on the problems of redevelopment lead by the 'carrot'
 of 'community
benefits', and an examination of the way in which planning gain was represented
yields further insights into the politics behind the opposition of the Campaign to
the redevelopment of Spitalfields. It was constructed as wrong, was presented as
a means by which people were deprived of a choice regarding the principle of
whether or not to allow redevelopment into an area at all, and it was understood as
a means by which redevelopment was legitimized as a benefit for all, concealing
the 'true' motives of developers for profit.29
None of the "gains" match the needs of the people of
Spitalfields and adjoining area. What is needed is a
strategy that begins to address the problems of inner city
deprivation and regeneration with social and economic
responsibility.30
The Campaign viewed the planning gains to be given under the Section 52
Agreement as a mere drop in the ocean in comparison with the needs of the area.
The provision of 118 residential units for Housing
Association fair rent is derisory in terms of the local
housing need. The remainder of the private sector housing
will in no way be "affordable" to local people who earn on
average £100 a week or less.31
How many people - local business people - would be able to take advantage of the
offer of new retail units, given the high rents likely? Additionally:
The reservation of shop units in the scheme is already
being diminished by the redesignation of "use class" to
enable banks, building societies, travel agents and estate
agents to be included.32
The Section 52 Agreement incorporated space for a Fashion Centre for the local
garment industry. Yet, the Campaign argued:
The provision of a Fashion Centre is a cynical gesture
when the development through its massive rise in land
29Pl	 refer back to Chapter Two for details of the planning gains made to Spitalfields under
the Section 52 Agreement
30Canpaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers Proposed Development of Spitalfields
Market: Bri ef in Relation to the City of London Spitalfields Market Bill. October 1987.
31ibid.
32ibid.
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values will wipe out the base of the local garment and
clothing industry.33
The gains as a whole were seen as 'tokenistic, misplaced, and they don't have a
real impact'.34
 According to Abbas Uddin, his experience with groups such as the
Spitalfields Local Committee and SHAPRS had shown to him how promises on
planning gains were often never enforced, or when they materialized, they were
not ultimately beneficial to the local community. 35
 The example of th
planning benefits obtained through the Sedgewicks development at Gardiners
Corner in Aidgate were often cited as an example of planning gains that did
nothing for the area - a Sports Centre costing over £100 per year to join and an
underground 'shopping precinct' full of sandwich bars and perfume shops were
not catering for the needs of the people of Spitalfields. They benefitted only the
City workers.36 As SHAPRS and the SLC had said, back in 1984, offers of
planning gain should not obscure a more fundamental issue of why planning
benefit was available in the first place.37
Given this attitude, based for some members of the Campaign on over 10
years' experience in dealing with the issues of planning gain both practically and
conceptually, it is unsurprising that the attitude of members of the Campaign was
to view planning gains as basically unacceptable:
• . .we could recognise and understand the arguments for
maximising planning gain, but at the end of the day our
argument was that the community would not be there in the
future to benefit from any planning gain that you're going
to get.38
The Campaign argued against the provision of planning gain, and by implication,
because of its self-portrayal as representative of the needs and wishes of the people
of the area, argued that the people it represented shared this view. This
representation was totally undermined by the appearance of the CDG and its
arguments. The Campaign had debated the issues surrounding the provision of
planning gain at some of its first meetings. The most vocal advocates of this
opposition strategy came from those members of the Campaign most closely
33ibid.
34lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
35ibid.
36Pers. Comm, various. Photographic evidence handed to the House of Lords Committee by the
Campaign, in May1989 was used to emphasise this point.
37 SLC Spitalfields Local Committee Proposed Criteria for Acceptable Planning Gain in
Spitalfields. 9th May 1984. SHAPRS submissions to the Bethnal Green Neighbourhood
Committee (1986) Spitalfields Market Report on Consultation. 30th June 1986.
38lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
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associated with the Labour Party. As Phil Maxwell understood it, the broader
issue of redevelopment and planning gain was understood to be both intellectually
problematic as well as difficult to deal with in practical terms:
• ..the planning regulations that exist mean that if you object
to a development and you refuse it to go ahead, you go to
the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State gives
authority and you get nothing out of it. However, if you
object and negotiate, and try to set out some guidelines and
get planning gain, then you have an office development,
but also you're getting some benefit for the community.
So it's a really difficult area to deal with.39
Given expertise in planning matters a case could be made for attempting to get the
best possible deal in negotiations, but on the other hand there was a very strong
argument for refusing planning gain and planning permission because of the
perceived or presumed consequences of such schemes on the local area. The issue
was understood to encapsulate the dilemma that socialists have with regard to their
involvement with the electoral system and a even broader establishment. 40
 The
Campaign was aware of these contradictions. Whilst the planning benefits on
offer were perceived to be a mere drop in the ocean in relation to local needs, the
118 homes would go towards accommodating some of the 1,000 families
currently living in squalid bed and breakfast lodgings because of the housing
shortage. There were further dilemmas and contradictions recognised too by the
Campaign. Spitalfields Housing Co-operative was to be one of the beneficiaries
of the Section 52 Agreement, managing some of the social housing units.4 ' It was
unable to join the Campaign or sign the parliamentary petitions, yet certain
members had sympathy with the Campaign's arguments, an ex-Chair of the Co-op
gave evidence for the Campaign in both Parliamentary Committees and its sister
organisation, the Spitalfields Small Business Association, was an active participant
in the Campaign's activities. But when all was said and done, the Campaign
disliked the idea of planning gain because it was thought to represent a pay-off by
developers to the people of the area. This argument was made by the Campaign,
in the name of the community, and was undermined when the CDG appeared and
proposed a different strategy for dealing with redevelopment.
39lnterview with Phil Maxwell, 6th September 1989.
40ibid.
41SpitaWields Housing Co-operative was formed in 1980 by a group of people living in derelict
tenements in the area who decided that due to mismanagement of properties and racism in
allocations to Bengali families, they would take control of their housing situation themselves by
establishing a Co-operative. It is still functioning, managing over 50 properties, and has recently
provided accommodation for over 20 families on the Fakahruddin estate, Peace Street, which it
built on derelict land. For further information, see Forman, C. (1989) Spitalfields: A Battle for
Lana
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The Campaign constructed a highly critical representation of planning gain
by pointing to the use of planning gains by the local authority. The system of
'planning gain for planning permission' was seen as indefensible:
...if you pursue this programme of planning gain for
planning permission the whole system of planning
legislation is coming up to the highest bidder - the best
barterer - and basically, that's corrupt.42
The local council was implicated in this, and seen as giving planning permission
merely on the assumption that good planning gain was on offer. This view is in
fact borneout by the statements from the Liberal Chair of the Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood Committee.43 Another Campaign member commented that the
council had so much planning gain they didn't know what to do with it. This was
interpreted as a dangerous situation because of the lack of difference between
decisions made for the good of the area on the sort of development required, and
decisions made for the most money that could be obtained. This implied,
according to the Campaign, that ultimately the council was not unduly bothered as
to the impact of the development, so long as planning gain was available as a
sweetener.
In practice there was little the Campaign could do beyond voice its
objections at the paucity of the planning gains on offer according to their
perceptions. Ultimately this strategy produced gains in the form of a House of
Commons Committee receptive to these arguments who decided to pass the
Spitalfields Market Bill on the condition that the Section 52 planning gains were
improved in certain respects. The House of Lords wnot so receptive to their
arguments. The Campaign, prior to their appearance,Adrawn up a shopping list of
demands on the Section 52 Agreement, but came out of that Committee with
nothing additional. In the spring of 1988, before the first Committee stage in the
House of Commons, the Campaign had considered questioning the legality of the
Section 52 Agreement on the grounds that the Council was directly acquiring some
of the benefits on the grounds of having granted planning permission in
contravention of the 1971 Act and circulars issued by the Department of the
Environment on this matter. This information was provided free through a contact
of one of the Campaign members. The Campaign were unable to go further and
42lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
43 lnterview with Jeremy Shaw, Liberal Councillor and Chairperson of Bethnal Green
Neighbourhood Committee, 13th December 1988.
44Note on Spitalfields Market Planning Agreement. Michael Dempsey, 29th February 1988.
(Amongst collection of Campaign papers)
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seek Counsel's Opinion on the matter because of their lack of funds. 45 The SLC
had previous questioned the legality of the Agreement, but apart from noting this,
there is no record of any futher action being taken on this issueA
Discussions of planning gain were not a recent concept for the Campaign.
The SLC had noted in 1984 that there were difficulties inherent with accepting
planning gains and had argued that they had never been considered within the
context of meaningful consultation with the local community or the SLC about
possible priorities or needs.47
 People were not used to the concept. There was a
perception amongst those discussing these issues that, in the case of Spitalfields
Market, the provision of planning gain had caused unprecedented divisions
between groups in the area, which was held to be simultanously interesting, new
and slightly worrying by workers who had experience with SHAPRS. 48 This had
to be due to a lack of experience in how to handle and deal with these 'carrots' that
appeared on sticks before a community that felt itself under seige anyway. 49
 The
Campaign for Homes in Central London (CHICL), who had contacts with the
GLC, the Local Committee, SHAPRS and latterly the Campaign had argued back
in 1984 that:
Developments are allowed because of the gains to the
community; this would seem to be a highly dubious
method of permitting development. The gains are often
what the developer would have done in any case ie. as a
service to an office block. Often the gain is paid for by the
council; all the developer does is leave space..., the gains
are often profitable and not open to the general public, or
they may be something that the planners want but the
community is opposed to. ... There is extensive history of
planners being persuaded by 'gains' to permit development
of a kind and scale which they would otherwise have found
unacceptable.5°
The Campaign never argued against the provision of money for the area.
Never did they reject that idea that some sort of physical redevelopment and
economic regeneration was needed in the area. Their point was that aid was
45lronically, the barrister recommended to the Campaign for further consultation on this matter
by Dempsey, one Robert Camwath QC, turned out be the Counsel acting for the City of London
a few months later in the House of Commons Committee.
46SLC / Planning Action Group Meeting Minwes 10th December 1987. Note: by this time the
SLC had ceased to exist and this group met at the St. Mary's Centre, a community resources and
advice service.
47SLC Proposed Criteria for Accepting Planning Gain in Spitalfields. 9th May 1984.
48Pers. Comm., Charlie Forman, 24th October 1988.
49Spitaifields Working Party Results of Policy Consultation in Spitalfields. 3rd September
1986.
50Letter from CHK1 to Spitalfields Project Co-ordinator, undated (Archives indicate 1984)
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needed, but that the money should be available 'without strings, without
commitments, without attachments to development'. 5 ' This in their minds
contrasted completely with the CDG's view of the use of planning gains, courtesy
of private sector redevelopment schemes, as a means of bringing money into the
area. The Campaign's representation was undermined by the CDG in this fashion
and because the CDG were arguing for redevelopment as a source of finance for
the area.
The Campaign's attitude of dislike for the CDG was based on the fact that
the CDG had completely undermined the Campaign's arguments. The
representations and images that were constructed by the Campaign about
Spitalfields and its population had a political function. In presenting the
population, and specificially the Bengali population in a particular way (and in the
only way knowable to them) the Campaign were claiming knowledge of the views
of this population, thus claiming a right to speak on their behalf and attribute to
them their own views on the consequences of redevelopment. This image of a
unified population in a poor inner city area standing behind and supportive of a
small group of people was totally undermined when a group also claiming the
same constituency as the Campaign appeared, offering a different analysis of the
benefits and disbenefits tied to redevelopment, advocating co-operation with the
developers, and doing so on the grounds that as a Bengali group it was perhaps
more representative of the wishes of the people who lived in the area.
I can go no further in my analysis of the Campaign's reactions to the CDG
than this. This story is still unfolding as I write. Additionally, I suspect that a
fuller explanation and conceptualisation of the Campaign's attitude towards the
CDG lies with information in a form more complete than I have at the present time.
I cannot discuss this here because I do not have that information in enough detail
to draw the conclusions that I think could be drawn from this situation. I can
however indicate where I suspect the roots of the Campaign's dislike of the CDG
lie, and why the Campaign was unable to voice these concerns in public.
The Campaign had its own credibility undermined by the CDG. In turn the
Campaign had its own doubts about the credibility of the CDG, and these concerns
were based on relations at a personal and a political level between the members of
the two groups. Through documentary and anecdotal evidence I happen to know
that certain members of the CDG and groups that came under its umbrella had
previously, and like the Campaign been politica]ctive and perhaps politicized by
51 lnterview with Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989.
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organisations that had existed in Spitalfields in the 1970s and 1980s - the
Spitalfields Project, the Spitalfields Local Committee, SHAPRS and the Labour
Party. There had in the past been friction between people who were subsequently
to form the Campaign and those who went on to found the CDG, occuring over
issues such as the granting of funding to certain institutions and the activities of
certain people within the Labour Party. 5253
 Members of the Campaign had severe
misgivings about the credibility being granted to certain people who became active
within the CDG. Because I do not have a perfectly clear idea myself about the
causes and consequences of these frictions, I am not prepared to go into them
here. I suspect that a lot of harm could be done were I to make an interpretation
based on incorrect facts. Whilst I am able to examine in detail the political views
of the Campaign itself, it is not my place to start a detailed examination of the
political differences between Campaign and CDG members because I do not have
what I consider to be a complete enough picture of these political differences to
make a fair and reasoned interpretation of them. An full examination of the roots
of the conflict between the Campaign and the CDG would be a very interesting
research project to undertake, but unfortunately can form no part of this thesis.
In addition to this, the Campaign were unable to make public their fears
and doubts about the CDG. They found this incredibly frustrating. I would
suspect that the reasons for this lie with the Campaign's own inability at the time to
deal with the racial politics of the situation. This was raised by the former's Co-
ordinator, Jil Cove, who herself expressed worry and frustration over the basis of
their attack on that group, and whether it was in fact caused by a communication
breakdown or, much more problematically, by racism:
..I don't know whether its is inherent racism - it may well
be that whole sort of thing about us not understanding the
culture and the way community politics and politics in
general work in Bangladesh. Which do, from my
understanding of it, work very much on the power
brokerage thing, and people push their way through the
community and become community leaders. And I don't
know what that means, actually.M
A misunderstanding of the cultural bases of politics in Bangladesh perhaps lay at
the heart of the matter. Other members understood these to have resulted in a
52lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
53Sources for this include Eade, J. (1988) The Politics of Communtiy. Gower, Aldershot.; all
86 boxes of SLC records currently housed in the Tower Hamlets Local History Library;
interviews with Jil Cove, Claire Murphy, Phil Maxwell, Abbas Uddin, and Robbie MacDuff; and
my participation and observation at Campaign and formative CDG meetings.
54lnterview with Jil Cove, 12th July 1989.
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political system which stressed co-operation and communication with powerful
institutions as a means of achieving trickle-down benefits for a less powerful
group. The CDG were operating in this fashion by aligning themselves with the
developers, and Campaign interpreted this as a reflection of a political culture in
which alliances such as this were the norm. One interviewee (not explicitly a
member of the Campaign) understood that Bangladesh had no political tradition of
democracy. The Zamindary system had operated, a zamindar being a land tax
collector and thus a powerful figure in rural communities. In order to gain power,
people allied themselves to this figure. British Imperial rule had encouraged this
system, and it had persisted, leaving its mark in the form of style of political
activity that stressed co-operation and alliances, rather in the same way that the
Campaign's political style bore the imprint of the heritage of Labour and socialist
politics in Britain. In order to influence development, the CDG had seen the
developers as the group with which they should attempt to gain influence. This
was discounted as naive and 'blind' and 'stupid' by the Campaign, yet certain
members were discomforted by their own criticisms. For this reason, I would
argue, the Campaign were never able to voice their concerns about the CDG
outright and in public. They were uncomfortable about doing so because they felt
themselves to hold an incomplete understanding of the cultural background to
Bengali politics, which perhaps lay at the heart of the matter, and thus did not feel
able to criticise the CDG on grounds that could easily be labelled racist.
...certainly I find it quite uncomfortable, because I say I'm
not sure and I don't understand when they say to me
they're a 'community worker'; I know what I think a
community worker is, but I'm not sure I understand what
they think a community worker is... And it's quite
difficult, that, and it is a lack of culture, lack of
understanding I think. I think it probably cuts both ways.
One is that they're reluctant to perhaps provide us with that
information on their own assessment of what it's all about
and what they mean by it, and our reluctance to go and ask
them. ...perhaps now is not the opportune time because it
would be looked on as an attack.55
55ibid.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to present an account and critique of
opposition to redevelopment in East London. This has been undertaken
through an examination of the activities, anatomy and genealogy of one
group, The Campaign to Save Spitalfields from the Developers. I wish at this
point to make some concluding comments thawing together some of the
empirical, conceptual, methodological and theoretical insights and
implications of this study.
An advocacy of the study of opposition to
redevelopment.
At the outset I provided a context for this thesis by highlighting the
lack of attention that has been granted within the political economy tradition in
urban studies literatures to a discussion and conceptualisation of opposition to
urban change. This absence, I would tenatively suggest, might be attributable
to the underlying theoretical paradigm within which many of these writers
have worked, namely within a Marxist tradition. Whilst I have no
fundamental criticisms of work which examines urban change as a
consequence of changes in relations of production and consumption, I would
argue that the absence of a consideration of the ways in which people make
place and society shapes space may be due to preoccupations elsewhere. I
wished to examine the process by which place is contested, and wished to
undertake an empirically-driven study, as a balance to a body of literature on
the structural mechanisms by which this occurs. However, no suitable
models existed for the conduct for such research. Descriptive accounts of
opposition struggles exist, and these have an importance because they
document stuggles over space and tell stories that deserve relating. However
these have been largely atheoretical writings on specific cases of
redevelopment, lacking an inclusion of ideas on urban change and the role of
groups and individuals in that process. The literature in urban social
movements, whilst providing a theory of urban change through social
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process, was felt to be inapplicable to this study because of the emphasis
given by writers such as Castells and others on the broad, non-party political
nature of such movements.' The Campaign could not by any stretch of the
imagination be termed an urban social movement.
Because of a lack of helpful guides within the literature as to how this
study of opposition to redevelopment might be approached, I chose to tell a
story about this opposition with the aim of providing myself with a
framework with which to not only discuss and describe, but also to critique
and conceptualise such opposition. Essential to the telling of this story
seemed to be an approach which would not present the Campaign and its
activities within Spitalfields as free-floating and purely of the present, but
rather as rooted within highly specific political traditions. A first major
conclusion I can draw therefore concerns not only the advocacy of the study
of opposition to redevelopment, but concerns also the advocacy of an
approach guided by the empirical material which, given sufficient attention to
context and detail, should in itself suggest a way of presenting such a critique.
In this thesis, I undertook this as follows. In Chapter Two I
presented the context which formed the background or backdrop for the
Campaign. I presented a brief outline of the Spitalfields area and the history
of the Market. I then discussed the redevelopment plans, firstly by looking at
the history of discussions to relocate the Market and redevelop the site. I then
looked at the plans for redevelopment that were first proposed in 1985,
arguing that their appearance at that time could be explained by the expansion
of the City of London and its need for physical space. I noted that the policy
of the Conservative Government in the 1980s had encouraged the
redevelopment of inner urban areas through the use of private sector finance.
I then examined in more detail the steps by which the redevelopment plans
took their form
Having set this up as the context for the Campaign, I then in Chapter
Three went on to examine the Campaign in more detail. I looked at its
establishment and its member's reflections on their aims on forming the
Campaign. I examined how they presented themselves and tried to mobilise
support for their cause amongst groups and individuals in Spitalfields. I
examined the Campaign's claims for itself as an umbrella group representative
1 Castells, M. (1983) The City and the Grassroots. Sage, Beverly Hills.
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of a wide constituency in the area. I then presented the arguments on which
the Campaign based its opposition to the redevelopment of the Market.
In Chapter Four I then set out to examine the roots of these arguments
and the genealogy of the Campaign. I located both in Spitalfields. I looked at
the work of the Spitalfields Project, the Spitalfields Local Committee and the
Spitaiflelds Housing and Planning Rights Service, arguing that the arguments
presented by the Campaign could be traced back to arguments put forward by
these groups against a particular type of redevelopment in Spitaffields. I then
looked at the Labour Party in the area over the preceeding ten years, in order
to try and assess what sort of Labour Party existed that cared enough about
the future of the area to organise a campaign against redevelopment.
This thesis was written as a story in which a great deal of attention
way paid to the context in which that story took place. I would not be so rash
as to suggest that this stands as the only way in which such a study might be
researched and written. What I am suggesting is that this thesis demonstrates
one particular way in which that may take place. It stands therefore as a
contribution to what I hope shall be a developing concern within literatures on
urban redevelopment; in due course I hope further work on this topic would
take on board the suggestions made here and in turn offer further approaches
based on that undertaken here.
The role of place.
In the final two chapters of this thesis I focussed in on the the role of
place in the arguments against redevelopment. I chose to be directed in my
consideration of place not by literatures on senses of place, but rather by the
detailed empirical material I had at my disposal. This material pointed to the
necessity for a specific approach to the notion of place. In accordance with
suggestions made by my material, I argued that place was a dynamic entity,
fluid and open to construction, rather than fixed, given and merely the locus
for action. In Chapter Two I showed how the developers constructed a view
of Spitalfields to suit their ends, focussing particularly on the ways in which
the Spitalfields Development Group represented the redevelopment plans for
Spitalfields. In Chapter Five I explored the ways in which Spitalfields and
redevelopment were represented by the Campaign, in order to demonstrate
how the Campaign understood and thus portrayed the area and its future after
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redevelopment. I examined these representations of Spitalfields in many
different ways. I took an exhibition of photographs by a Campaign member
and tried to assess what was being said about the area and redevelopment
through them. I examined the ways in which the Campaign portrayed
Spitalfields as a community area and as a migrant area, showing how these
ideas were important to the Campaign's ideas of what constituted Spitalfields
as a place and using a variety of data sources in this process. I looked at the
Campaign's representation of Spitalfields as a multicultural area, and
examined their celebration of this. .1 concluded this chapter by showing how
these representations of Spitalfields were used in conjunction with images and
ideas about the City of London in order to bolster their arguments against the
redevelopment of the area.The contests that occured over the meaning of
Spitalfields were examined in order to illustrate this point.
Additionally, the use of specific constructions of place in battles for
political control of an area was examined. I concluded Chapter Five by
asserting that the threats posed to the Labour Party by redevelopment were
sufficient to prompt that group into action. In Chapter Six I picked up the
theme of the Campaign's representations of Spitalfields and looked at the
political function and consequences of this. I re-introduced the question of
the Campaign's representativeness, first raised in Chapter Three, and
questioned this and their representations by examining the Campaign's
reactions to the appearance of another group in the area, claiming the same
constituency, and arguing for a different strategy with regard to the
redevelopments planned for Spitalfields. I focussed on the arguments over
the use of planning gain that had been raised briefly in Chapters Two and
Three. I left the conclusion to this open-ended, by stating that I personally
could go no further in my analysis, by noting that this particular part of the
story was still unfolding at time of writing, but by presenting as a conclusion
the Campaign's own ideas on their discomfort with the CDG.
On methodology
A third major conclusion I have reached in this thesis concerns the use
of my methodology. In Chapter One I detailed my experiences of
ethnographic practice and illustrated its use throughout the thesis with the
utilisation of a specific textual strategy which involved the incorporation of the
self within the text. I did this because, as I stated at the outside, I believe the
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validity of ethnographic inscription to rest upon the exposure of the self in the
research process in the construction of the data, and in the construction of
interpretations of that data. Accordingly, my explanation of my research
strategy included an account of the methods of participant observation and
semi-structured interview techniques which were used in the research. The
methodology chosen involved a deep level of commitment on my part to one
group of people in order to obtain and deal with material suitable for a detailed
critique of that group. I have no regrets about following this strategy.
However, there were two implications of this strategy that were not accounted
for during that strategy's formulation.
The first of these relates to my inability to include in this thesis a
consideration of other points of view held by other groups and actors
involved in the story of the redevelopment. My closeness to the Campaign
precluded my closeness to, for example, the SDG or the CDG. This is not to
say that, given a distance from the Campaign, that I would have been able to
achieve the same level of insight into the workings of these two groups as I
did of the Campaign. This would have been impossible given my personal
characteristics and circumstances. The developers would not have allowed a
young research student access to information concerning their decision-
making process. The CDG would not have allowed an outsider - a white
middle class non-Bengali non-Sylheti-speaking woman - access to
information concerning the development of their case and arguments for
redevelopment in the area. However, a certain amount of access to these two
groups, I am now convinced, might have been facilitated had I not been so
closely identified with the Campaign. For example, interviews with
executives from the SDG would have been conducted at a different (and on
their part) more professional level were my face unknown. Interviews with
founder members of the CDG would have been undertaken had I not known
that my face was clearly identified with a group who consistently denounced
the CDG's views and their very existence. The conclusion I draw from this
experience is that a 'qualitative' research methodology can raise research
difficulties that may only appear during the course of such research. They
cannot be planned for, and they may have ramifications stretching through the
collection and construction of data to its interpretation.
A second ramification of my involved research strategy concerns my
own construction of Spitalfields, and its shaping through my identification
with the Campaign. A tension existed between my own set of images and
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representations of Spitalfields and those of the Campaign. I shall discuss this
point in relation to the photographs included in the text which help to illustrate
for the reader my position in relation to the Campaign and my feelings about
the area. In Chapter Five, in order to build up my own portrayal of the
Campaign's representation of Spitalfields, I examined a collection of
photographs taken by Phil Maxwell and used in an exhibition dedicated to the
saving of Spitalfields. As I noted in a footnote there, my own photographs of
Spitalfields dispersed throughout the text could similarly be examined and
conclusions drawn concerning my own interpretations of the area and the
image that I wish to portray of it. This conclusion is in part a reflection of my
feelings on completion of the research and the thesis, and it therefore seems
doubly appropriate to mention my own reflections about that construction here
in the conclusion. The reader is, of course, encouraged to develop her own
ideas on this matter.
In order to deconstruct my own photographs, I must firstly describe
how and why these particular images were picked Out for inclusion in the text.
I shall not discuss the photographs and maps that were drawn directly from
already published sources; these images are provided in order to give the
reader a set of reference points about the area. Their form could be discussed
but that would entail a level of knowledge about the production of the original
documents that I do not possess. In addition, there are fourteen photographs
that were either taken by myself in the early spring of 1988, or by Dan
Cohen, a friend of a QMW colleague in the summer of 1989. The differences
between the two are not apparent here. Due to an unforeseen technical hitch,
although I had anticipated the inclusion into the finished text of glossy colour
photographs reproduced from negatives or transparancies, I was left with
black and white photos, reproduced I don't know how. They have what
seems to me to be a vaguely ghostly quality and also seem to refer back to an
older sepia-toned style of photography. They look rather strange to my eyes
because of this, and their production in this style was not intentional. I could
have asked for the photographs to be reproduced again, to my original
specifications. I did not, because although initially disappointed with the
reproductions, I grew to like them. They also offered me the opportunity to
view familiar images from a new and different angle. For example,
Photograph 2.3 shows a view from Bishopsgate of the market and the
church. The sky is very dark, the Christchurch steeple appears as distorted
and the market looks extremely clean. This is a very uncommon
representation of this particular view.
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The images in the photographs were chosen deliberately. Their use as
image was also premeditated, to the extent of precluding the use of detailed
captions indicating the precise location of the photographs. At the time of their
inclusion in the text I felt inclined to give the reader a set of images of
Spitalfields that were as imprecise (or as confused?) as my own images of the
place. This stands in direct contrast to Maxwell's photographs with their
clarity of image and caption. He is a resident and knows his home turf. I
was and am an outsider and do not. This difference is reflected in the
photographs.
My choice of photographs reflects my views, feelings and
impressions of Spitalfields. A detailed introspective examination of a set of
personal representations is difficult, but certain aspects of these images stand
out to me and can be shared. (The reader is of course at liberty to make up
her own mind). For example, figures 2.5 and 2.10 give two views of the
market, one of it rubbish-strewn and used by people, the other of it deserted
in the afternoon, with only market vans and large expensive cars using the
site. It is the latter image that I hold in my mind. As a non-resident of the
area my frequent visits to Spitalfields were conducted in the main between
noon and midnight. The image I hold in my head of the market is that of it as
a deserted carpark. Spitalfields market as a working market I saw only
occasionally.
Some of the photographs portray Spitalfields as rather run-down and
derelict - which it is to my eyes. For example figure 3.6 looks into
Wentworth Street from the back of a disused tenament block. I wanted to
show that there were still these tenanment blocks here, and that they had not
been renovated, unlike others elsewhere in Tower Hamlets which have been
fully refurbished and many subsequently sold. This picture is therefore, for
me, a statement about the implications of the lack of investment in the area.
Photograph 3.7 is for me a similar statement, showing a derelict site used as a
car park, where for many years plans for the Whitechapel shopping centre
have failed to come into fruition.
It has been pointed out to me that none of the photographs chosen here
show people as their main subject. This is most apparent with photograph
3.8, which shows types of housing in Hanbury Street. This could be
contrasted with Phil Maxwell's photograph of the same street with children
playing. Perhaps I am making a statement here about my ambivalence
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towards people in the area. Because I do not feel myself to be one of them, as
Phil does, I remove them from my images. Many of my photographs were
taken early in the morning because I knew that I would not find many people
on the streets (apart from around the market) - perhaps subconsciously I
wished to avoid them.
Some of the photographs were taken in order to show the contrasts
evident to my eyes in Spitalfields. For example, we have the image of
successive uses in the area and their imprint on the area's fabric, as shown in
photograph 3.9 of the Brick Lane/Hanbury Street corner showing the
Brewery arch across the street in the distance and men unloading halal meat in
the foreground, in front of an old material and haberdashery wholesalers and
the row of ciiriy houses and restaurants stretching down Brick Lane.
Others were taken because of my interest in housing. Photograph
3.10 was taken for another project on Housing Action Trusts and reproduced
here because it showed yet another back street, the end of Wentworth Street
market, and a banner saying 'No to a Housing Action Trust' - a statement
about housing set amongst some of the worst housing conditions in the UK.
Photograph 3.11 of the Herbert and Jacobson estate with Denning Point, the
last of the GLCs tower blocks, in the distance shows the contrasts in types of
housing provision in the area, and there is litter in the foreground. This is one
of the images I hold of Spitalfields, namely as a place of sub-standard
housing, litter and dirt.
Photograph 3.12 is something of an enigma to me. Taken in
Spitalfields on an extremely hot day by Dan Cohen, the colour original shows
how derelict parts of the area can look and perversely, how attractive in a
mysterious way, something not entirely captured in this poor reproduction.
On reflection I would conclude that my choice of this photograph was directed
by the image it gave of Spitalifelds as attractive and mysterious despite its
problems, a feeling heightened for me because I have no idea where this
photograph was taken. As I have pointed out elsewhere, one of the
attractions of Spitalfields is the ease with which we (the educated white urban
middle classes) can construct the area as exotic - perhaps this is my
contribution to the exoticisation of Spitalfields.
Finally, there are four photographs (4.1 - 4.4) showing the Brick
Lane area of Spitalfields, full of images that I associate with the area - for sale
signs, a mixture of architectural styles, expensive and old cars, the old
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Brewery facade reflected in the new Brewery facade and so forth. Again,
these photographs are devoid of people, and again these are images I hold in
my head when I think about the area and which I wished to reveal and
perhaps share with the reader.
These photographs seem to me to sum up clearly a major point
concerning my close level of involvement with the Campaign and my
adherence to a particpatory methodology. My relationship with the Campaign
was close, but not that close. I could identify with many of the arguments of
the Campaign, but not all. I could contribute towards the Campaign's
arguments but ultimately to a limited extent. I could aid the construction of a
set of specific representations about Spitalfields, but only up to a point.
Ultimately, my views of Spitalfields were different, my relationship with the
area was one of outsider. Although I held a position within the Campaign, it
was one of difference. Although I claim insight to the Campaign in this
thesis, that insight is tempered by that difference.
On the use of discourse analysis.
The final conclusion I wish to point out concerning this thesis relates
to the question of discourse analysis. In Chapter One my advocacy of
discourse analysis of the type undertaken by writers such as Said was
supported by the contention that such an investigative strategy could be useful
in revealing both the power relations that work within a social setting and the
representations that are constructed within social life. I undertake this by
discussing the positioning of the Campaign within a web of social relations in
Spitalfields, pointing to the positions of its members as constituents of a
specific social group. I point to the relationship between the Campaign and
the local Labour Party, noting the importance of the identification of the roots
of the Campaign for an understanding of its later trajectory, and show how a
discourse of opposition to redevelopment was constructed by both the
Campaign and previously existing groups which established a specific set of
arguments of the dangers of a particular type of redevelopment. I point to the
conflicts that ensued because of this positioning when I discuss the conflicts
between the Campaign and the Community Development Group. This is
undertaken by an examination of the discursive strategies by which both the
Campaign and the CDG constructed themselves as representative of the
'community' and the points of tension that arose through tensions between
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these two discourses. I hope to have shown that the examination of
discourses can provide a useful conceptual tool for the investigation of social
life and the power relations held within that social life. Moreover, I have
illustrated how these discourses are used in the production and control of
space, be it by the Campaign, the developers or the CDG.
As I noted briefly in Chapter One, a similar exercise involving the
study of conflicts between specific discursive constructions might have been
undertaken by examining the discourses of redevelopment and opposition
held by the developers and the Campaign respectively. It is to my regret that I
did not undertake such an exercise, the reasons for this lying both with the
time available for such a study and my own position within the Campaign. I
would argue that any further work on this case study should as a priority
include such an exercise. Similarly, an examination of the discursive
construction of Spitalfields as undertaken by the CDG was not undertaken in
this thesis. Again, my own position in relation to the Campaign and the lack
of time available for such an exercise precluded this. Therefore I conclude
that a research strategy based on the analysis of the discursive construction of
social life is only as good as the material from which such an analysis draws.
In order to investigate power relations to the fullest extent one has to
investigate the intersection between discourses, and this of course relies on
the availability of comparable material. An investigation of representations
and their construction, again, will only make complete sense if that which a
representation refutes, its 'other', is considered as a component of that
representation.
Therefore, whilst this thesis might stand as a text advocating the use
of discourse analysis and an interpretative research methodology based on
proximity to the material, it should be borne in mind that it also stands as a
warnings to the limits of. such a strategy. This is not to say that I consider this
thesis invalid because of this; far from it, and given the time again I would
happily repeat this strategy if only for what it gave to me personally. But this
thesis is partial. The research strategy ultimately conflicted with the
conceptual strategy with the result that an incomplete analysis has been
undertaken.
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And finally...
As a final statement, I wish to make two fmal points concerning the
partiality of this thesis. Fistly, this is very much a current thesis. As I write,
in May 1991, the Market is moving to its new home in Temple Mills, leaving
the old Market deserted. Plans for the redevelopment scheme are being drawn
up again, older plans have been called in to a public inquiry that will sit in
about six month's time, and the developers are stating that still older plans
might still be used on the grounds that they have planning permission. The
Campaign is still operating, still arguing against the redevelopment, but now
on the form of redevelopment rather than the fact given the imminent removal
of the market. It is still questioning itself and its role in the area, wondering
whether it is representative of its constituency and devising new strategies of
opposition. It is still co-existing uneasily with the CGD. My thesis deals
with the redevelopment of the Market from the genesis of the plans through to
the passing of the City of London (Spitalfields Market) Bill in the summer of
1989. A lot has happened since. I hope subsequent redevelopments will be
recorded somewhere else - this story is interesting and deserves retelling.
A second reason for its partiality lies with its purpose as a piece of
academic writing. You have just read a Ph.D thesis. Its function has been to
get me an academic qualification. It has been written as a critique of the
Campaign for that purpose. I have therefore had the power of the author to
emphasise that which I consider important in the story and play down things
(ideas and happenings) that I have not considered important to my argument.
This thesis may constitute a record of the Campaign's activities as fully and
accurately as I can make it, but it remains a partial record. There are
omissions in this thesis. I do not, for example, examine some of the blind
alleys and red herrings that we as a Campaign followed and dropped over the
past three years as part of the campaigning strategy. I do not go into the
background of the differences between the Campaign and the CDG in any
detail because I did not obtain enough information on that to write about it to
my satisfaction. This thesis is my interpretation of the activities of the
Campaign; it should not therefore be read as the definitive statement on the
Campaign. It is, as far as I know, factually accurate (although I am sure there
are inaccuracies) and it has been written by someone involved very closely in
the Campaign. But it is not a definitive statement.
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For this reason I hope that the Campaign will read this thesis,
comment on it, and produce their own critique of my work. I cannot
determine how or whether this will happen, but I hope it does, and I hope that
anyone who had read this will remember that. I have been critical of the
Campaign, and it is only right that those criticisms are answered. Ideally they
will be, and will be written up and placed with this thesis for public access.
As I stated in Chapter One, I wanted to write a critique of the Campaign. I
have been critical of the Campaign, but I hope that this critique is of some use
to them in thinking through what they/we have achieved and finding new
strategies and arguments to use in the debate over the form that a redeveloped
Spitalfields would take. I hope this thesis is of some use. As Abbas Uddin
put it:
I think if you write anything like that it needs to be slightly
provocative, it needs to be controversial to a degree, as long as
you don't personalise or offend people, otherwise it can be like a
novel because it's nice and peaceful.2
2lnterview with Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989.
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7.1 The day I finished writing this thesis, the Market moved.
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Appendix 1
List of Interviews
The Campaign
Jil Cove, 12th July 1989
Robbie MacDuff, 11th July 1989
Phil Maxwell, 6th September 1989
Claire Murphy, 6th July 1989
Pam Mossman, 4th July 1989
Ian Worland, 18th July 1989
Paula Worland, 18th July 1989
Abbas Uddin, 19th July 1989
Kay Jordan, 21st July 1989
Bethnal Green Neighbourhood
Jeremy Shaw, 13th December 1988
Peter Studdert, 1st September 1988
SDG
Tim Budgen, 24th July 1989
Brian Cheetham, 27th November 1989
Peter Shore, MP for Bethnal Green and Stepney, 1st August 1989
Ann Santry, Newlon Housing Trust, 8th November 1988
David Luxton, Toynbee Housing Association, 1st November 1988
Rees Johnson, Tower Hamlets Homeless Families Campaign, 3rd November
1988
Mark Adams, St. Mary's Centre, 14th October 1988
Jon Aldenton, Tower Hamlets Environment Trust, 10th June 1988
Douglas Knight, Shadwell Gardens Tenants Association, 25th July 1988
Graham Magnusson, Holland Estate Tenants Association, 24th October 1988
Charlie Forman, ex-SHAPRS, various telephone conversations.
Ex-worker with Spitalfields Project, 15th June 1988.
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The interviewees are listed for ease of reference and are divided according to
groups. An alternative division of interviewees would be to separate interviewees
according to purpose of interview. This strategy is outlined below to separate for
brief discussion interviews that were selected for factual information, and those
selected for more in-depth discussion of particular aspects of the story.
The first type includes interviews with Jeremy Shaw, Peter Studdert, Ann
Santry, David Luxton, Rees Johnson, Mark Adams, Jon Aldenton, Douglas
Knight, and Graham Magnusson. These people were selected for interview in
order to provide primarily factual information, background details, context and
chronology to the information that I was at that time handling, during the first
eighteen months of the research. For example, Ann Santry and David Luxton were
both involved with the schemes for housing provision in the new market
development. Interviews conducted with these people were essential in order to
clarify facts and to get some idea of the chronology of events to this aspect of the
story, even though much of the material obtained in these interviews is not covered
in detail or used within the text.
These interviews were not tape-recorded. Notes were taken during
interview, subsequently written up in full to incorporate both the information
obtained and my constructions and interpretations of the information given. These
notes were kept for reference but not for direct quotation. These interviews were
conducted and later used for the purpose of aiding factual reference and inference,
rather than for the direct construction of an argument and a text.
A second type of interview was conducted with people from the Campaign
(listed above). After the House of Lords Committee had made its decision in the
summer of 1989, it seemed appropriate that I should interview as many members of
the Campaign as possible, in order to take the opportunity to sit down with them
and both ask direct questions about the Campaign for the record, and to discuss
aspects of the Campaign's and individual's stories that seemed important to me at
that time, particularly those questions relating to its foundation, its success or
otherwise, and its future as a group coniructing itself as representative of the people
of Spitalfields in the face of the development of the Community Development
Group. These interviews were all loosely structured around a key set of questions,
with additional discussion arising either Out of their answers or from further
questions from me specific to themselves and their histories. Often during these
interviews I would ask questions to which I already knew the answer, but to which
I required a direct statement for the text and for my reconstruction of the story.
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These interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. They were then
examined quite carefully as a collection of texts. Three things seem important on
reflection, although these were not necessarily fully conscious strategies for
interview analysis at that time. Firstly, a certain amount of intuition plus personal
knowledge and friendship with interviewees was useful in directing attention to
various ideas that appeared in these interviews, concerning for example, why some
people preferred to talk about particular aspects of the redevelopment story at the
expense of others, or why particular languages and turns of phrase were used
(although no speech analysis was used). Secondly, the Campaign's story as told
by themselves could be (re)constucted through these interviews. This, obviously
played a central role in the construction of the written text and the (re)telling of the
opposition's story draws heavily from these interview transcripts. Thirdly, many
shades of attitude and feeling were detectable in the interview transcripts. Although
these were not used explicitly in the text, my awareness of emotion and attitude,
confirmed in the interview transcripts, were important in my critique and text.
In addition, interviews were conducted with others who played an important
role in the redevelopment story; Tim Budgen, Brian Cheetham, and Peter Shore.
Both factual information, used in the construction of the text, and impressions of
the role of these people in the story were gained through these interviews. All three
were conducted around a specific set of questions tailored to the individual. From
Tim Budgen and Brian Cheetham I gained an insight into the history of the
redevelopment as told by the developers (a story which I could not tell in great
detail due to my association with the Campaign and the conditions this imposed
upon my research strategy as I point out in Chapters One and Seven). From Peter
Shore, the Labour MP for Bethnal Green and Stepney constituency in which
Spitalfields lies, I obtained his overview of the redevelopment story, useful as an
addition to my construction of the context in which the redevelopment plans were
formulated. This interview was also helpful in aiding my interpretations of the
Campaign, because there had been a certain amount of difference in opinion
between certain members of the Campaign and their MP arising from experiences
within the local Labour Party. These interviews were all tape recorded and
transcribed. Their analysis was less intuitive than that granted to the transcripts of
the interviews conducted with Campaign members. My lack of familiarity with
these three interviewees meant that I could not read their comments and statements
with the same level of insight accorded to my readings of the transcripts of the
Campaign members.
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In addition, information was obtained from other people not listed above,
for example, representatives from tenants associations in Tower Hamlets, and
individuals involved with community development in Spitalfields to whom I was
introduced by other interviewees. These were not strictly interviews, but rather
brief encounters with people contacted briefly and informaliy. Much of the material
obtained was unattributable, is not used explicitly in the text, and these people are
therefore not directly cited as interviewees. Much of that information was
extremely useful in aiding my interpretations of the material by providing hints of
other people's local knowledges, glimpses of their interpretative frameworks and
clues as to processes of image construction and representation with reference to
redevelopment in general in the area.
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Appendix 2
List of SLC Member Groups.
Bengali Youth Movement
Bengali Youth Organisation
Chicksand Community Action Group
Chicksand Friendly Club
Christchurch Adventure Playground
Christchurch Parish
Cottages Tenants Assocation
East End Community School
East End Mission
Frendz And Neighbours of Spitalfields
Federation of Synagogues
Montefiore Youth Club
Monterfiore Co-operative
Multiracial Bengalee Association
NariSamity
Pakistan Youth Organisation
Spitalfields Housing And Planning Rights Service
Spitalfields Housing Co-operative
St. Ann's church
Tower Hamlets Commission for Racial Equality
Toynbee Hall
West Spitaiflelds Market Residents Association
West Spitalfields Residents Association
Whitechapel Art Gallery
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Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee A Count of the Bang ladeshi
Population. May 1987.
Bethnal Green Neighbourhood Committee Spitalfields Wholesale Market,
Commercial St, El. 19th November 1987.
BGNC Minutes 20th July 1986. AU other minutes for the relevant period were
consulted. All are housed in the Tower Hamlets Local History Library.
Community Development Group
CDG Planning Or Future. Summer 1989. CDG, London.
City of London Corporation
City of London Corporation (1987) Spitalfields Market Offer Document.
February 1987.
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City of London Corporation Report (1987) The Future of Spitalfields Market.
22nd October 1987.
See also the evidence presented to the House of Commons and House of Lords
Committees by the Corporation.
Spitaelds Development Group
London and Edinburgh Trust (1988) Annual Report. LET, London.
London And Edinburgh Trust Building a Partnership from Brick Lane to
Bishopsgate. London and Edinburgh Trust and Grand Metropolitan. Publicity
Brochure November 1989.
LET Avatar: Urban Venture Partnerships. Publicity document, 1989.
SDG A Solution to Sptialflelds and What it means to You. July 1986.
SDG Update. April 1987
SDG Spitalfields: A New Chapter. October 1989.
Spitalfields Market
City of London (Spitalfields Market) Bill, 1987.
Fruit, Vegetable and Flower Markets of England: Spitalfields Market (1954)
Showcase Publicity Co. Ltd., London.
O'Cathain, D. (1981) Marketing Inquiry: The London Fruit and Vegetable
Wholesale Markets. Unpublished summary of report.
Spitalfields Market Official Handbook, 1954. (Publication details not given)
Webber, R. (1971) 'Spitalfields Market' in Agriculture, January 1971.
Wells, J. (1985) London Markets Overcapacity. Unpublished House of
Commons Committee report.
Additional Sources not included elsewhere:
All material presented to the House of Commons and House of Lords Committees
on the City of London (Spitalfields Market) Bill 1987.
Brownill, S. (1987) The Politics of Local Change. A Case Study of the People's
Plan for Newham's Docklands. Ph.D. thesis, Centre for Urban and Regional
Studies, University of Birmingham.
Kaye, B. (1988) The Clothing Industry in Tower Hamlets: A Report Presented to
the Task Force. QMW/SSBA, May 1988.
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See also Jacobs, J.M. (1990) The Politics of the Past: Redevelopment in
London. Ph.D Thesis, University of London.
Finally.., this cartoon has little relevance to this thesis but a lot of relevance to the
new redevelopment plans.
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